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Abstract
Privacy is a serious concern of users in daily usage of social networks, especially when online
social networks offer free services in exchange for large collection of user information. The
motto “If you’re not paying for it; you’re the product” demands effective measures for user
privacy protection. At the same time, social networks are a valuable data source for large-scale
studies on social organization and evolution. Sanitized social network information is therefore
occasionally shared with third parties by service providers. On the other side, by participating
to social networks, users keep their own data and they may use the very infrastructure of service
providers to gather local view of the network to some extent not only restricted to 1-hop friends,
for example by exchanging noisy links. To this end, the problems of privacy protection for
social network data are still calling for effective and efficient approaches both in centralized and
decentralized settings.
This thesis addresses three privacy problems of social networks: graph anonymization, pri-
vate community detection and private link exchange. The main goal is to provide new paradigms
for publication of social graphs in noisy forms, private community detection over graphs as well
as distributed aggregation of graphs via noisy link exchange processes. We start the thesis by
giving the big picture of data privacy in social networks and clarifying the categories to which
our work belongs. Then we present our three contributions as follows.
First, we tackle the problem of graph anonymization via two different semantics: uncertainty
semantics and differential privacy. These are two main categories of graph anonymization in the
literature. As for uncertainty semantics, we propose a general obfuscation model called Uncertain
Adjacency Matrix (UAM) that keeps expected node degrees equal to those in the unanonymized
graph. We analyze two recently proposed schemes and show their fitting into the model. We also
point out disadvantages in each method and present our scheme Maximum Variance (MaxVar)
to fill the gap between them. Moreover, to support fair comparisons, we develop a new tradeoff
quantifying framework by leveraging the concept of incorrectness in location privacy research.
Experiments on large social graphs demonstrate the effectiveness of MaxVar.
Apart from privacy notion via uncertainty semantics, we contribute a new algorithm for graph
anonymization under differential privacy, also known as ε-DP graph publication. However, the
problem is very challenging because of the huge output space of noisy graphs, up to 2n(n−1)/2.
In addition, a large body of existing schemes on differentially private release of graphs are not
consistent with increasing privacy budgets as well as do not clarify the upper bounds of privacy
budgets. In this thesis, we categorize the state-of-the-art of ε-DP graph publication in two main
groups: direct publication schemes and model-based publication schemes. On the one hand, we
explain why model-based publication schemes are not consistent and are suitable only in scarce
regimes of privacy budget. On the other hand, we prove that with a privacy budget of O(lnn),
there exist direct publication schemes capable of releasing noisy output graphs with edge edit
distance of O(1) against the true graph. We introduce the new linear scheme Top-m-Filter
(TmF) and improve the existing technique EdgeFlip. Both of them exhibit consistent behaviour
with increasing privacy budgets while the model-based publication schemes do not. As for
better scalability, we also introduce HRG-FixedTree, a fast permutation sampling, to learn the
Hierarchical Random Graph (HRG) model. Thorough comparative evaluation on a wide range
of graphs provides a panorama of the state-of-the-art’s performance as well as validates our
proposed schemes.
Second, we present the problem of community detection under differential privacy. Complex
networks usually expose community structure with groups of nodes sharing many links with
the other nodes in the same group and relatively few with the nodes of the rest. This feature
captures valuable information about the organization and even the evolution of the network.
Over the last decade, a great number of algorithms for community detection have been pro-
posed to deal with the increasingly complex networks. However, the problem of doing this in
a private manner is rarely considered. We analyze the major challenges behind the problem
and propose several schemes to tackle them from two perspectives: input perturbation and al-
gorithm perturbation. We choose Louvain method as the back-end community detection for
input perturbation schemes and propose the method LouvainDP which runs Louvain algorithm
on a noisy super-graph. For algorithm perturbation, we design ModDivisive using exponential
mechanism with the modularity as the score. We have thoroughly evaluated our techniques on
real graphs of different sizes and verified their outperformance over the state-of-the-art.
Finally, we propose protocols for private link exchange over social graphs. It is motivated
by the fact that current online social networks (OSN) keep their data secret and in centralized
manner. Researchers are allowed to crawl the underlying social graphs (and data) but with
limited rates, leading to only partial views of the true social graphs. To overcome this constraint,
we may start from user perspective, the contributors of the OSNs. More precisely, if users
cautiously collaborate with one another, they can exchange noisy friend lists with their neighbors
in several rounds to get better views of the true social graph. The problem is unique in the
sense that the disseminated data over the links are the links themselves. However, there exist
fundamental questions about the feasibility of this model. The first question is how to define
simple and effective privacy concepts for the link exchange processes. The second question comes
from the high volume of link lists in exchange which may increase exponentially round after
round. While storage and computation complexity may not be big problems, communication
costs are non-trivial. We address both the questions by a simple (α, β)-exchange using Bloom
filters. We evaluate our proposed schemes on various synthetic graph models and draw a number
of critical findings.
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1.1 Motivation
1.1.1 Privacy in Social Networks
A social network is a social structure made up of a set of social actors, sets of relationships and
other social interactions between actors. With the emergence of online social networks 1, people
have a powerful social media that they have never seen before. Facebook 2, the biggest OSN, has
over 1.65 billion monthly active users which is a 15 percent increase year over year. Most of the
OSNs offer free services in exchange for large collection of user information, used in targeting
advertising by service providers. Because the protection of user data is not always guaranteed,
social network user privacy is usually put at risk. The leakage of information may be caused
by many reasons: the carelessness of users, the sharing to third parties by service providers and
the brutal attacks by cybercriminals 3.
OSNs are also an important source of Big Data, a changing-world industry. Social networks,
together with other complex networks, provide useful constructs for studies in social sciences,
statistics and graph theory. Nowadays, people are concerned about how the economic actors
can maximize the benefits of big data while minimizing its risks. From the perspective of OSN
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_networking_service
2https://zephoria.com/top-15-valuable-facebook-statistics/
3https://heimdalsecurity.com/blog/10-surprising-cyber-security-facts-that-may-affect-your-online-safety/
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users, they always wish the benefits far beyond the risks. This fact is backed by the rapid
development of increasingly complex privacy policies by service providers (e.g. Facebook). In
the next section, we motivate some risk-minimizing approaches for social networks based on
their underlying social graphs.
1.1.2 Privacy Threats Raised by Publishing Social Graphs
Li et al. [54] summarize two types of information disclosure in the literature: identity disclosure
and attribute disclosure, and identity disclosure often leads to attribute disclosure. Whenever
an attacker reveals the mapping from a database record to a specific real-world entity, we say
that an identity disclosure has occurred. Attribute disclosure implies a successful inference of
sensitive attributes of a target user. Also, the privacy literature identifies two main class of
privacy mechanisms: interactive and non-interactive. In the interactive setting, an attacker is
allowed to pose queries to a database and the database owner responds with noisy answers. Based
on the information gleaned from previous answers, the attacker may pose adaptive queries to
avoid wasteful answers. In non-interactive setting, the database owner publishes an anonymized
version of the database to meet certain privacy requirements (e.g. user names in published
database may be replaced by dummy numbers). Earlier research on data privacy mainly focused
on single-table data in which the rows represent independent and identically distributed (i.i.d)
records and the columns represent attributes [54, 59, 95]. However, real-world data is often
relational and records are related to one another or to records from other tables. This fact
raises radical challenges to preserving the privacy of users.
Each user in online social networks is represented by a rich profile as a set of attributes
(e.g. gender, date of birth, hobbies, marital status and location) and their relationships (i.e.
friendship links and memberships to groups of interest). In particular, social graphs which
represent the underlying structure of social networks are relational data and they possess a lot
of information that can be exploited by data analysts as well as attackers. Generally, OSN
users have strong perception that service providers keep their private information secure [4] and
their identities are blended among other users in published anonymized data. However, strong
correlation between users in the same database and with users in other auxiliary databases
makes large-scale re-identification attacks possible [70–72,111].
We illustrate a simple re-identification attack in Fig. 1.1. A social graph of thirteen users is
naively anonymized by replacing user names with dummy numbers. An attacker can reidentify
the users by crawling the number of friends each user has. This is completely feasible because
the OSNs like Facebook allow users to leave their number of friends in public mode. Assuming
that the attacker tries to map the node 5 in the anonymized graph to a certain user in the true
social graph, he will iterates the OSN and searches for users having five friends. Then, the user
Walter will be revealed. After that, further information about Walter may be explored by more
complex inference attacks, e.g. by examining which groups Walter joins [111].
1.1.3 New Privacy Preserving Mechanisms for Social Graphs
With the emergence of increasingly complex networks [73], the research community requires
large and reliable graph data to conduct in-depth studies. However, this requirement usually
conflicts with privacy rights of data contributing entities. Naive approaches like removing user
ids from a social graph are not effective, leaving users open to privacy risks, especially re-
identification attacks [4,46]. Therefore, many graph anonymization schemes have been proposed
[23,55,96,103,112,113]. In any anonymization (or obfuscation) scheme, we have two conflicting
2
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Figure 1.1: An example of re-identification attack
forces: privacy and utility. Higher privacy requirements would lead to more modifications to
the true graph, so the anonymized graph gets more distorted, reducing the accuracy of intended
computations (utility) and vice versa. The conflicts between privacy and utility is also known
as privacy/utility tradeoffs. As a consequence, the designers of anonymization schemes must
clarify their choice of privacy and utility measures (or metrics). Usually, utility for social graphs
is measured in graph metrics such as degree sequence, shortest path distribution, community
structure and so on. Similarly, privacy is defined by various measures in terms of the success level
of inference attacks mounted on the anonymized graphs. We make a short survey on privacy
and utility metrics in Sections 2.2.6 and 2.2.7.
Given an unlabeled undirected graph, the existing anonymization methods fall into five main
categories.
• The first includes random addition, deletion and switching of edges [13, 46, 107, 109] to
prevent the re-identification of nodes or edges.
• The second provides k-anonymity [95] by deterministic edge additions or deletions [23,55,
96, 103, 112, 113], assuming attacker’s background knowledge regarding certain properties
of its target nodes.
• The third relies on generalization [18,46,97] and clusters nodes into super nodes of size at
least k where k is a privacy parameter.
• The methods in the fourth category assign edge probabilities to add uncertainty to the
true graph. The edges probabilities may be computed explicitly as in [11] or implicitly via
random walks [66].
• Finally, there are schemes for graph anonymization based on the notion of differential
privacy [33].
Note that schemes in the third and fourth categories induce possible world models, i.e. each
edge in the anonymized graph exists with a certain probability. We can retrieve sample graphs
(see Definition 2.4) that are compatible with the probabilistic output graph.
We observe several serious drawbacks of the state-of-the-art in the fourth and the fifth
categories. The fourth category leverages the semantics of edge probability to inject uncertainty
to a given deterministic graph, converting it into a probabilistic one before publishing sample
graphs. The state-of-the-art (k,ε)-obfuscation [11] has high impact on node privacy and not
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good enough privacy-utility tradeoff while RandWalk [66] suffers from high lower bounds for
utility despite its excellent privacy-utility tradeoff.
The fifth category revolves around the problem of graph publication under differential pri-
vacy (for a gentle introduction, see Section 2.1). By differential privacy, we want to ensure the
existence of connections between users to be hidden in the released graph while retaining impor-
tant structural information for graph analysis [21,89,100,101,105]. However, the problem is very
challenging because of the huge output space of noisy graphs. A large body of existing schemes
on differentially private release of graphs is not consistent with increasing privacy budgets as
well as do not answer the question about the upper bounds of privacy budgets. Moreover, some
of them have the scalability issue, usually a quadratic complexity.
Apart from publishing the whole graph, other paradigms for private computations over
graphs are also of great interest. One such computation is community detection in graphs.
Many complex networks expose a mesoscopic structure, i.e. they appear as a combination
of components fairly independent of each other. These components are called communities,
modules or clusters and the problem of how to reveal them plays a significant role in under-
standing the organization and function of complex networks. Over the last decade, a great
number of algorithms for community detection (CD) have been proposed to address the prob-
lem in a variety of settings, such as undirected/directed, unweighted/weighted networks and
non-overlapping/overlapping communities [38]. These approaches, however, are adopted in a
non-private manner, i.e. a data collector (such as Facebook) knows all the contributing users
and their relationships before running CD algorithms. The output of such a CD, in the simplest
form, is a clustering of nodes. Even in this case, i.e. when only a node clustering (not the whole
graph) is revealed, contributing users’ privacy may still be put at risk.
Last but not least, we formulate an interesting problem of private link exchange. The problem
is motivated by the fact that current OSNs mostly keep their data secret and in centralized
manner. Conventionally, obfuscated data are released to public research and more exact data
are reserved to internal research. Alternatively, researchers are allowed to crawl the underlying
social graphs (and data) but with limited rates, leading to only partial views of the true social
graphs. To overcome this roadblock, we may start from user perspective, the contributors of the
OSNs. More precisely, if users cautiously collaborate with one another, they can exchange noisy
friend lists with their neighbors in several rounds to get better views of the true social graph. We
argue that each user trusts more in his friends than in strangers. The users therefore want the
information about their friend lists to be reduced as the propagation distance increases. However,
there exist fundamental questions about the feasibility of this model. The first question is how to
define simple and effective privacy concepts for the link exchange processes. The second question
comes from the high volume of link lists in exchange which may increase exponentially round after
round. While storage and computation complexity may not be big problems, communication
costs are non-trivial. Thus, efficient exchange protocols are needed.
1.2 Overview of the Problems
In this section, we outline the main solutions for solving the three problems addressed in the
thesis: graph anonymization, private community detection and private link exchange.
1.2.1 Graph Anonymization
We study graph anonymization from two perspectives: uncertainty semantics and differential
privacy.
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Figure 1.2: Uncertainty semantics of edges. From left to right: true graph, uncertain graph and
two sample output graphs
The intuition behind the usage of uncertainty semantics to anonymize social graphs is illus-
trated in Fig. 1.2. The true graph is transformed to an uncertain graph by adding new edges
(called potential edges) and assigning edge probabilities. Sample output graphs are produced
from the uncertain by independently sampling edges. The edges probabilities may be computed
explicitly as in [11] or implicitly via random walks [66]. The performance of different schemes
are quantified by privacy and utility metrics. Privacy metrics may be an information-theoretic
quantity such as (k, ε)-obfuscate [11] or degree-based incorrectness (Chapter 3). Commonly used
utility metrics are degree-based and path-based statistics [12, 100, 107]. Clearly, the more po-
tential edges and the more uncertain edges (i.e. edge probability approximates 0.5), the higher
privacy (e.g. lower re-identification risks) but the lower utility (more distorted graph structure).
All anonymization schemes aim at optimizing the tradeoff between these two competing forces.
Differential privacy [33] offers a formal definition of privacy with a lot of interesting proper-
ties: no computational/informational assumptions about attackers, data type-agnosticity, com-
posability [63]. Differentially private algorithms relate the amount of noise to the sensitivity
of computation. In the parlance of differential privacy, sensitivity indicates the change in the
output of the computation according to a small change in the input (e.g. adding an edge to the
input graph), so the term “differential” in the name. Lower sensitivity implies smaller added
noise and vice versa. Because edges in simple undirected graphs are usually assumed to be
independent, standard Laplace mechanism is applicable (e.g. adding Laplace noise to each cell
of the adjacency matrix). However, this approach may severely deteriorate the graph structure.
Recent methods of graph release under differential privacy try to reduce the graph sensitivity in
many ways. Schemes in [89, 100] use dK-series [60] to summarize the graph into a distribution
of degree correlations. The global sensitivity of 1K-series (resp. 2K-series) is 4 (resp. O(n)).
Lower sensitivity of O(
√
n) is proposed in [101] by graph spectral analysis. The most recent
works Density Explore Reconstruct (DER) [21] and HRG-MCMC [105] even reduce the sensi-
tivity of graph to O(logn). However, both of them incur quadratic complexity O(n2), limiting
themselves to medium-sized graphs only.
1.2.2 Private Community Detection
Community structures are quite common in real networks. Social networks include community
groups based on common location, interests, occupation, etc. Information networks (e.g. World
Wide Web) have communities in the form of groups of hyperlinked pages having topical similar-
ities. Metabolic networks have communities based on functional groupings of proteins. Citation
networks form communities by research topic.
In non-private community detection, we are given the true graph and we can run any high-
quality detection algorithms over it to obtain good clusterings of nodes. Good clusterings of
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Figure 1.3: Community detection: a good clustering (left), a noisy clustering (right)
Figure 1.4: Private link exchange. True links are bold. Fake links are italic.
nodes may indicate high modularity, low conductance, grouping similar nodes, etc. [38]. Fig.
1.3 shows an example of community detection with a good clustering and a noisy clustering.
Private community detection means to do the detection in private manners. The data curator
may give us a noisy graph over which we run detection algorithms and get noisy clusterings (i.e.
clusterings with lower modularity or any clustering quality metrics considered). Alternatively,
we are allowed to send to the data curator a number of queries on the true graph and get noisy
answers. The number of queries depends on the privacy budget allocated to us (e.g. the value
of ε in differential privacy). Based on the noisy answers we estimate a noisy clustering. In this
thesis, we only consider private non-overlapping community detection under differential privacy.
1.2.3 Private Link Exchange
Social graphs are a valuable source for research on information societies but they are not pub-
lished in clear-form due to serious privacy concerns. Instead, anonymized social graphs are
published in various forms and provided to third party consumers. In the conventional client-
server architecture of OSNs, the server keeps the whole social graph. To provide noisy sample
graphs, the server can run any graph anonymization schemes on the social graph that it keeps.
If the social graph is partitioned among several servers, we may resort to distributed anonymiza-
tion, for example [97]. Alternatively, social networking sites provide APIs (Facebook ,Twitter)
for data crawlers at limited rates and within privacy constraints (e.g. only public friend lists are
available). Using this method, the data crawlers can collect friendship information and build a
partial (local) view of the target social graph.
6
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To overcome the constraints set by the service providers, we can start from user perspective,
i.e. the contributors of OSNs. More precisely, if users cautiously collaborate with one another,
they can exchange noisy friend lists with their neighbors in several rounds to get better views of
the true social graph. Our ideas are based on the fact that user IDs are public (e.g. Facebook
profiles are searchable [1]) but the friendships are not so, except when a user leaves his friend
list in public mode. In this thesis, we introduce a different model in which nodes create noisy
link lists and exchange with their neighbors in several rounds. The problem is unique in the
sense that the disseminated data over the links are the links themselves. In the end, we have n
local graphs where n is the number of nodes. We assume that all nodes are honest-but-curious,
i.e. they follow the well-defined protocols and try to infer the true links among the noisy link
lists sent to them in exchange steps. Fig. 1.4 depicts the basic idea of link exchange. Each
node adds noise to its friend lists (bold font face) by creating fake links (italic font face). Then
connected node pairs perform the link exchange and each node automatically removes duplicate
links.
1.3 Contributions
The three problems are presented sequentially in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6. We make the following
key contributions.
• Chapter 3: We propose a general model called uncertain adjacency matrix (UAM) for
anonymizing graph via edge uncertainty semantics. The key property of this model is that
the expected degrees of all nodes must be unchanged. We show the fitting of (k,ε)-obf [11]
and RandWalk [66] into the model and then analyze their disadvantages. We introduce
the Variance Maximizing (MaxVar) scheme that satisfies all the properties of the UAM.
It achieves good privacy-utility tradeoff by using two key observations: nearby potential
edges and maximization of total node degree variance via a simple quadratic program.
Towards a fair comparison for anonymization schemes on graphs, this thesis describes
a generic quantifying framework by putting forward the distortion measure (also called
incorrectness in [92]) to measure the re-identification risks of nodes. As for the utility
score, typical graph metrics [11] [107] are chosen. We conduct a comparative study of
aforementioned approaches on three real large graphs and show the effectiveness of our
gap-filling solutions.
• Chapter 4: We analyze the two radical challenges of graph release under differential
privacy: huge output space and consistency. We also justify the relaxation of ε to lnn using
the concept of ρ-differential identifiability [52]. We prove an upper bound of privacy budget
ε that any differentially private scheme for graph release should not exceed. The upper
bound is validated by our proposed linear scheme Top-m-Filter (TmF) and the existing
scheme EdgeFlip [69]. By deeper theoretical analysis, we prove the fast convergence of
EdgeFlip and reveal its limitations. Both TmF and EdgeFlip exhibit consistent behavior
for larger privacy budgets. We introduce HRG-FixedTree to reduce the runtime of HRG
inference by several orders of magnitude, making it feasible to perform the inference over
large graphs. We also present the linear time scheme 1K-series which is based on the
configuration model [73]. We conduct a thorough evaluation on real graphs from small to
medium and large sizes to see which method performs best for different regimes of privacy.
• Chapter 5: We analyze the major challenges of community detection under differential
privacy [78]. We explain why techniques borrowed from k-Means fail and how the difficulty
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of ε-DP recommender systems justifies a relaxation of ε. We design an input perturbation
scheme LouvainDP that runs in linear time using the high-pass filtering technique from [26]
and Louvain method [9]. We propose an algorithm perturbation scheme ModDivisive
as a divisive approach by using the modularity-based score function in the exponential
mechanism. We prove that modularity has small global sensitivity and ModDivisive also
runs in linear time. We conduct a thorough evaluation on real graphs of different sizes
and show the outperformance of LouvainDP and ModDivisive over the state-of-the-art.
• Chapter 6: We introduce a novel private link exchange problem as an alternative to
social graph crawling and centralized anonymization of data. The problem is distributed
and provides a privacy/utility tradeoff for all nodes. Our proposed problem is unique in
the sense that the disseminated data over the links are the links themselves. We present
two schemes for (α, β)-exchange protocol: Baseline and Bloom filter based. We protect
the true links by adding fake links and require the propagation probability of links to be
attenuated by distance from the links to reception nodes. We analyze the advantages and
drawbacks of each scheme. We evaluate our proposed schemes on various synthetic graph
models and draw a number of critical findings.
Publications Some parts of this thesis have been published and submitted to the following
conferences and journals:
1. H. H. Nguyen, A. Imine, and M. Rusinowitch. A Maximum Variance Approach for Graph
Anonymization (FPS 2014)
2. H. H. Nguyen, A. Imine, and M. Rusinowitch. Anonymizing Social Graphs via Uncertainty
Semantics (ASIACCS 2015)
3. H. H. Nguyen, A. Imine, and M. Rusinowitch. Differentially Private Publication of Social
Graphs at Linear Cost (ASONAM 2015)
4. H. H. Nguyen, A. Imine, and M. Rusinowitch. Network Structure Release under Differen-
tial Privacy (Transactions on Data Privacy, under 1st revision)
5. H. H. Nguyen, A. Imine, and M. Rusinowitch. Detecting Communities under Differential
Privacy (WPES 2016)
6. H. H. Nguyen, A. Imine, and M. Rusinowitch. Private Link Exchange over Social Graphs
(in preparation)
1.4 Structure of the Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews prior work related to the three
problems considered in this thesis. In Chapter 3, we deal with the uncertainty-based schemes for
graph anonymization based on the publications 1 and 2. Chapter 4 continues the first problem,
but using differential privacy instead. It is related to the papers 3 and 4. Chapter 5 solves
the problem of differentially private community detection with two new methods LouvainDP
and ModDivisive. The content of Chapter 5 is primarily from the paper 5. The problems of
private link exchange are described in Chapter 6 which is prepared in the manuscript 6. Finally,
Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of this dissertation, discuss our achievements as well as
limitations, and outline some possible future research directions.
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In this chapter, we review the state-of-the-art related to the three problems to which we
make significant contributions. We start with a gentle introduction to differential privacy, a
privacy concept used extensively in Chapters 4 and 5. Then, we review the literature on graph
anonymization in Section 2.2. We survey the main existing categories of anonymization tech-
niques from k-anonymity to differential privacy. Section 2.3 highlights the taxonomy of commu-
nity detection problems and popular algorithms to tackle them in various settings. We reserve
Section 2.4 for graph aggregation and link exchange. In the end, we summarize the chapter in
Section 2.5.
2.1 Differential Privacy: A Gentle Introduction
2.1.1 Motivation
Nowadays, data is produced and collected at a phenomenal rate. Analysis of huge data sources
brings unprecedented benefits but also threatens the privacy of people. Usually, we encounter
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a paradox of learning nothing about an individual while learning useful information about a
population [35]. A lot of solutions were proposed for decades to solve this paradox, but each
time a solution came out, new vulnerabilities were found. Different from previous paradigms,
differential privacy provides us a promise: no matter what the adversary knows about you via
auxiliary information sources, your participation in a given dataset will not be affected (so the
name “differential” privacy).
Differential privacy is a formal privacy model initially developed for use on tabular data
to offer strong privacy guarantees without depending on an adversary’s background knowledge,
computational power or subsequent behavior [33,35]. Because absolute privacy is impossible (see
[32] and [35, Section 1.1]), differential privacy as an instance of relative privacy proves to be useful
with many successful applications in a wide range of data analysis tasks and is found to have tight
relations to other fields such as cryptography, statistics, complexity, combinatorics, mechanism
design and optimization. A lot of beautiful results of differential privacy are systematically
presented in [35] in which the authors explain all essential aspects of this privacy concept.
The underlying principle of differential privacy is that given two databases D and D′ such
that D′ = D ∪ {X} ,i.e. D and D′ differ only by a single item, the probability distributions on
the results of D and D′ under differential privacy will be “essentially the same”. More formally,
Definition 2.1. A randomized algorithm A is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for any two neigh-
boring datasets D and D′, and for any output O ∈ Range(A),
Pr[A(D) ∈ O] ≤ eεPr[A(D′) ∈ O] + δ
If δ = 0, we have the definition of ε-differential privacy which is proved stricter than
(ε, δ)-differential privacy [31], i.e. the (ε, δ)-differential privacy requires less distortion than
ε-differential privacy.
Bear in mind that, as a relative privacy, differential privacy merely ensures that one’s par-
ticipation in a dataset will not be disclosed. It is very possible that conclusions drawn from the
dataset may reflect statistical information about an individual. For example, given a dataset
of 100 individuals, 80 of them have a certain property P . Noisy answers to the queries of the
dataset size and the numbers of users having the property P are, for example, 101.3 and 78.6
respectively. From these noisy counts, an analyst (as well as an attacker) can estimate that
any user has the property P with probability of 77.6%, very close to the true statistics 80%.
However, this is a statistical information, not related to the participation of any individual to
the dataset as guaranteed by differential privacy.
2.1.2 Basic Techniques for Differential Privacy
There are two common settings for releasing data differential privacy: interactive versus non-
interactive as illustrated in Fig. 2.1. In non-interactive setting, given a privacy budget ε, the
data curator publishes a noisy dataset D̃ and shuts down D. The users can perform any mining
operations on D̃. In interactive settings, the users are allowed to submit a number of queries
(qi, εi) where qi is the query over D and εi is the budget of qi such that
∑
i εi ≤ ε. It means after
a query, the privacy budget is reduced and when it reaches zero, no more queries are allowed.
Laplace mechanism [34] and Exponential mechanism [63] are two standard techniques in
differential privacy. The latter is a generalization of the former.
Laplace mechanism is based on the concept of global sensitivity of a function f which is
defined as ∆f = maxD,D′ ||f(D) − f(D′)||1 where the maximum is taken over all pairs of
neighboring D,D′. Given a function f and a privacy budget ε, the noise is drawn from a
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Figure 2.1: Interactive vs. Non-interactive settings
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of differential privacy via Laplace mechanism
Laplace distribution Lap(λ) = p(x|λ) = 12λe
−|x|/λ where λ = ∆f/ε. Recently, 2-dimensional
Laplace distribution is used to construct geo-indistinguishability mechanisms [3, 20] in loca-
tion privacy. Geometric mechanism [40] is a discrete variant of Laplace mechanism with in-
tegral output range Z and random noise ∆ generated from a two-sided geometric distribution
Geom(α) : Pr[∆ = δ|α] = 1−α1+αα
|δ|. To satisfy ε-DP, we set α = exp(−ε).
For non-numeric data, the exponential mechanism is a better choice. Its main idea is based
on sampling an output O from the output space O using a score function u. This function
assigns exponentially greater probabilities to outputs of higher scores (see Section 4.2 for more
detail).
Fig. 2.2 shows an example of differential privacy via Laplace mechanism. Assuming that
a counting query on dataset D returns 10 if user X does not appear in it and returns 11
otherwise (i.e. the case of dataset D′). If true results are returned, the participation of X is
revealed by a simple difference attack. To hide this sensitive information, randomized results
would be preferred. Assuming that ε = 1, the randomized result via Laplace mechanism will
be A(D) = 10 + Lap(1) because the global sensitivity ∆f is 1 for this example. Similarly,
A(D′) = 11 + Lap(1). The ratio between the probabilities of A(D) and A(D′) at any possible
values (e.g. 9.4 as in Fig. 2.2) is bounded in [e−1, e].
2.1.3 Compositions Make Differential Privacy Programmable
Not only formally defined, differential privacy is also equipped with two powerful composition
properties: serial composition and parallel composition (see Section 4.2 for more detail). Serial
composition means that when we run a series of randomized algorithms Ai(εi) on the same
dataset D, the total privacy budget ε will be the sum of all εi. Parallel composition states
that when we run a series of randomized algorithms Ai(εi) on the disjoint subsets Di of D, the
effective privacy budget will be the maximum of {εi}.
These compositions allow many complex differentially private algorithms to break down
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to composable steps in which Laplace and exponential mechanisms play the role of building
blocks. Most of the cases, the proof of ε-DP for a given algorithm is obtained automatically.
The remaining task of algorithm designers is to reduce the variance of randomized outputs for
better utility. To our knowledge, none of the previous privacy concepts like k-anonymity [95],
l-diversity [59], t-closeness [54] and their variants possesses these composition properties.
2.2 Graph Anonymization
There is a vast literature on graph perturbation with many good surveys [2,104] covering multiple
aspects of graph anonymization: privacy risks of social data publication, de-anonymization
attacks using background knowledge, information loss by different anonymity levels and privacy-
preserving mechanisms.
As mentioned in Section 1.1.2, there are five main categories of anonymization techniques.
We review the five main categories in the following section along with a discussion on privacy
and utility metrics.
2.2.1 Anonymization via Randomization
The anonymization methods in this category perturb a graph by randomly adding, deleting or
switching of edges [13,46,107,109]. For social networks, two edge-based randomization strategies
have been commonly applied [108].
• Rand Add/Del: randomly add k false edges followed by deleting k true edges. The total
number of edges in the original graph is preserved by this strategy.
• Rand Switch: randomly switch a pair of existing edges (t, w) and (u, v) (provided that
edge (t, v) and edge (u,w) do not exist in G) to (t, v) and (u,w), and repeat this process
for k times. The degree of each node is preserved by this strategy.
In [108], Ying and Wu investigate the link privacy under Rand Add/Del and Rand Switch by
quantifying the difference between attackers’ prior and posterior beliefs about the existence of
an edge. They relate the existence of an edge to the similarity measure between the two nodes
of the edge. Although the random graph editing strategies could mitigate the re-identification
attacks, they do not guarantee that the randomized graphs satisfy k-anonymity [95]. Moreover,
by arbitrary modification of the edges, the strategies ignore the fact that privacy should be
guaranteed for all users. Instead, they benefit only random users.
Ying and Wu [107] argue that Rand Add/Del and Rand Switch have impact on both real
and spectral characteristics of a graph. The spectrum of a network corresponds to the set of
eigenvalues λi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) of an adjacency matrix derived from the graph. These eigenvalues are
closely linked to several topological characteristics of a graph including diameter, the existence
of consistent clusters, lengthy paths and bottlenecks, and randomness of the graph. Based on
these two observations, they proposed a spectrum preserving randomization approach called
Spctr Add/Del and Spctr Switch.
An advantage of randomization strategies is that many features can be accurately recon-
structed from the released randomized graph, e.g. spectrum-based reconstruction [102]. Let
λi (λ̃i) be A’s ( Ã’s) i-th largest eigenvalue in magnitude whose eigenvector is xi (x̃i). Then,
the rank l approximations of A and Ã are respectively given by A =
∑l
i=1 λixixTi and Ã =∑l
i=1 λix̃ix̃Ti .
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Bonchi et al. [13] proposed two algorithms called a random sparsification and a random
perturbation. Random sparsification works as follows. Given G = (V,E), the algorithm selects
a probability p ∈ [0, 1] and then removes edges independently with probability 1 − p. Random
perturbation transforms G = (V,E) into its obfuscated form by first removing edges with a
probability p ∈ [0, 1] and then adding an edge e ∈
(V
2
)
\E with probability q = |E|.p(|V |2 )−|E|
(1− p).
Bonchi et al. used the Shannon entropy to quantify the level of anonymity.
2.2.2 K-anonymization Approaches
For a successful attack targeted to a node, an attacker analyzes topological features of the target
node based on his background knowledge. To quantify this kind of privacy breach, Hey et al. [46]
proposed a general model for social graphs as follows.
Definition 2.2. Let G = (V,E) be a given graph. A structural query Q is a query on the local
structure of the graph around a node (e.g. node degree, degrees of node’s neighbors, etc.).
A node v is k-candidate anonymous with respect to a structure query Q if there exist at
least k − 1 other nodes in V that match query Q. In other words, |candQ(v)| ≥ k where
candQ(v) = {y ∈ V |Q(y) = Q(v)}. A graph satisfies k-candidate anonymity with respect to
Q if all the nodes are k-candidate anonymous with respect to Q.
Three types of queries (node refinement queries, subgraph queries, and hub fingerprint
queries) were presented and evaluated on the naively anonymized graphs [46].
K-anonymization approaches provide anonymity through editing nodes and edges of a graph
deterministically. Many methods have been proposed to prevent node re-identification based
on the k-anonymity concept. These methods differ in the types of the structural background
knowledge that an attacker may use. In [55], Liu and Terzi assumed that the adversary only
knows the degree of a target node and proposed k-degree anonymization. In [112], Zhou and
Pei assumed one specific subgraph constructed by the immediate neighbors of a target node is
known and devised k-neighborhood scheme. In [113], Zou et al. considered all possible structural
information around the target and proposed k-automorphism to guarantee privacy under any
structural attack. Wu et al. [103] proposed k-symmetry, a concept similar to k-automorphism
and made a graph k-symmetric by adding fake nodes. Cheng et al. [23] proposed k-isomorphism
with the concept of k-security.
Definition 2.3. Let G = (V,E) be a given graph with unique node information I(v) for each
node v ∈ V . Each node v ∈ V is linked to a unique individual U(v). Let Gk be the anonymized
graph of G. Gk satisfies k-security with respect to G if for any two target individuals A and B
with corresponding Neighborhood Attack Graphs GA and GB that are known by the adversary,
the following two conditions hold
- NodeInfo security: the adversary cannot determine from Gk and GA(GB) that A(B) is linked
to I(v) for any node v with a probability of more than 1/k
- LinkInfo security: the adversary cannot determine from Gk, GA and GB that A and B are
linked by a path of a certain length with a probability of more than 1/k
Finally, Tai et al. [96] proposed k2-degree. The algorithm anonymizes a graph such that an
adversary with prior knowledge of the degrees of two adjacent nodes will not be able to mount
a friendship attack on the graph. A graph G̃ is k2-degree anonymous if, for every node with an
incident edge of degree pair (d1, d2) in G, there exist at least k − 1 other nodes, such that each
of the k − 1 nodes also has an incident edge of the same degree pair. They proposed an Integer
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Figure 2.3: Generalization strategy
Programming formulation to find optimal solutions in small-scale networks and also presented
an efficient heuristic approach for anonymizing large-scale social networks against friendship
attacks.
2.2.3 Anonymization via Generalization
Rather than modifying the graph structure as done in k-anonymity and randomization ap-
proaches, generalization strategy [18, 46, 97] transforms the graph into super-nodes and super-
edges to mitigate the node re-identification attack. Fig. 2.3 illustrates the generalization process
with 4 super-nodes and 8 super-edges (including 4 self-loops). The collapse of nodes and edges
into super-nodes and super-edges induces edge probabilities. For example, the probability of
the edge (1,3) (in the graph on the right of Fig. 2.3) is 16 , equal to the weight of the super-edge
(A,B) divided by the product of A’s size and B’s size. Similarly, the probability of the edge (7,8)
becomes 56 .
Hay et al. [46] proposed a generalization approach for a simple unlabeled graph. A simulated
annealing is used to search for the approximate optimal super-nodes in [46]. The optimality is
estimated via a maximum-likelihood approach. The case of nodes having attributes (e.g., demo-
graphic information) is considered in Campan and Truta [18]. A batch-based greedy approach
that iteratively generalizes graph nodes is used. In every iteration, a seed node is selected and
a new super-node is created with a seed node within it. Then the algorithm selects, based on
attributes and neighborhood similarity, k−1 other nodes and add them to the super-node. This
process continues until the entire graph is anonymized.
Tassa and Cohen [97] extended the problem [18] by proposing a sequential clustering algo-
rithm to anonymize a graph with higher utility than [18]. The algorithm begins with partitioning
the nodes into n/(αk) clusters randomly, where n is the number of nodes in the graph, k is an
integer and α is a parameter set by the user. The algorithm goes over the n nodes in a cyclic
manner and moves nodes from one cluster to the most appropriate cluster that would possibly
minimize information loss.
Although the methods in [18, 46, 97] resist node re-identification attack, finding globally
optimal partition of the graph is an intractable problem. Moreover, the structural information
in the super-nodes is reduced to the number of edges in the self-loops. This requires the analyst
to sample a graph from all likely super-nodes, which inevitably leads to sampling errors. As the
generalization approaches only publish the clustered graph with super-nodes and super-edges,
the utility of the original network is significantly impacted.
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2.2.4 Probabilistic Approaches
The methods in this category convert deterministic graph into an uncertain graph by leveraging
the semantics of edge probability (see Fig. 1.2). Note that the schemes in Sections 2.2.1 and
2.2.3 are also probabilistic but the edge probabilities are not explicitly defined on edges as in this
section. In other words, randomization and generalization schemes directly output noisy sample
graphs, omitting the intermediary uncertain representations in the form of edge probabilities.
Let G = (V,E, p) be an uncertain graph, where V is the set of nodes, E is the set of edges,
p : E → (0, 1] is the function that assigns an existence probability to each edge. A sample
perturbed graph is denoted as G̃ = (V, Ẽ). The common assumption is on the independence of
edge probabilities. Below is the definition of sample graphs which is relevant to the approaches
in this section and Section 2.2.3.
Definition 2.4. Let G = (V,E, p) be an uncertain graph, where V is the set of nodes, E is the
set of edges, p : E → (0, 1] is the function that assigns an existence probability to each edge.
A sample graph G = (V,EG) is compatible with G if EG consists of edges e ∈ E sampled with
probability p(e).
Several approaches have been developed to address the above problem. Bonchi et al. [13]
proposed the k-obfuscation privacy model to guarantee that an adversary cannot map a node
identity in the perturbed graph to the node of its original graph. K-obfuscation is defined by
means of the entropy of the probability distributions that are induced on the nodes of the per-
turbed graph. Also, it uses the random sparsification (Section 2.2.1) to generate the obfuscated
graph. A perturbed graph G̃ = (U = V, Ẽ) is said to observe k-obfuscation provided that for
every node v ∈ V , the entropy of the random variable Hv that denotes the probability that u is
the image of v in G̃ over U is at least log k.
Boldi et al. [11] proposed (k, ε)-obfuscation to the problem of k-obfuscation where k ≥ 1
denotes the preferred level of anonymization and ε ≥ 0 is the parameter for tolerance. Chapter 3
discusses this method in more detail and presents our scheme MaxVar, an improvement of (k, ε)-
obfuscation using several key observations and a formulation based on quadratic optimization.
Apart from explicitly assigning probabilities to edges, we observe an implicit realization of
edge uncertainty semantics via random-walks in [66] (see Chapter 3). Mittal et al. [66] proposed
an edge-rewiring scheme (called RandWalk afterwards) by random-walks at distance t. Given
the true graph G = (V,E), the sample noisy graph G̃ = (V, Ẽ) is generated as follows. For
each node u ∈ V , we iterate all its neighbors v and perform a walk of length t − 1. Assuming
that the walk stops at node w, we add the edge (u,w) to G̃. In Chapter 3, by introducing the
uncertain adjacency matrix (UAM), we prove that RandWalk, (k, ε)-obfuscation and MaxVar
fit into UAM.
2.2.5 Differentially Private Approaches
In the context of graph publication, two neighboring datasets D and D′ are replaced by two
neighboring graphs G and G′.
• If G and G′ differ in only one edge, we have the concept of edge differential privacy. There
exists a lot of research on edge differential privacy [21, 45, 51, 69, 79, 89, 100, 101, 105], just
to cite a few.
• If G and G′ differ in only one node and its adjacent edges, we have the concept of node dif-
ferential privacy. Node differential privacy is much harder to achieve than edge differential
privacy. Only a few works [8, 14,22,49,85] deal with node differential privacy.
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Edge Differential Privacy The problem of graph publication under edge differential pri-
vacy comprises two main techniques: direct publication and model-based publication. Direct
publication means that the output graph is constructed by directly adding noise to each edge,
followed by a post-processing step. TmF [77] and EdgeFlip [69] belong to this category. The
other technique, model-based publication, relies on an intermediary structure to extract some
crucial statistics. The noise is added to the statistics in a differentially private manner. Finally,
sample output graphs are regenerated from these noisy statistics. This category includes 1K-
series, 2K-series [89, 100], Kronecker graph model [65], graph spectral analysis [101], DER [21],
HRG-MCMC [105] and ERGM (Exponential Random Graph Model) [58].
EdgeFlip [69] applies Randomized Response Technique (RRT) [35, Section 3.2] to all edges.
Given a parameter s ∈ (0, 1], each edge is flipped (1-to-0 or vice versa) with probability s/2.
EdgeFlip was originally proposed the problem of community detection and the expected number
of edges in the output graphs is 2m. This is equivalent to the choice of ε = ln(n(n−1)2m −3) ≈ lnn.
In addition, EdgeFlip incurs a quadratic runtime. We give a deeper analysis of EdgeFlip in
Section 4.4.
1K-series and 2K-series [89,100] use dK-series [60] to summarize the graph into a distribution
of degree correlations. 2K-series was expected to give better noisy output graphs but the utility
results [89, 100] are not good enough, not to say the huge values of ε used (up to thousands).
The similar problem happened to graph spectral analysis [101]. Kronecker graph model [65]
privately estimates the initiator matrix Θ using smooth sensitivity [79] and only satisfies (ε, δ)-
DP. The state-of-the-art DER and HRG-MCMC have the scalability issue. Both of them incur
quadratic complexity O(n2), limiting themselves to medium-sized graphs. We improve HRG-
MCMC by proposing the near-linear time HRG-FixedTree in Section 4.5. ε-DP graph release
is also mentioned in ERGM [58, Section 4.1] but not in detail because its main goal is to
support parameter estimation of exponential random graphs. The high complexity of Bayesian
estimation in ERGM also confines itself to graphs of hundreds of nodes.
Node Differential Privacy Kasiviswanathan et al. [49] developed several techniques for
designing differentially node-private algorithms, as well as a methodology for analyzing their
accuracy on realistic networks. The main idea behind their techniques is to “project” (in one
of several senses) the input graph onto the set of graphs with maximum degree below a certain
threshold. They presented two different techniques. First, they designed tailored projection
operators that have low sensitivity and preserve information about a given statistic and applied
to releasing the number of edges in a graph, and counts of small subgraphs such as triangles,
k-cycles, and k-stars in a graph, and certain estimators for power law graphs. Second, they
analyzed the “naive” projection that simply discards high-degree nodes in the graph with an ef-
ficient algorithms for bounding the “local sensitivity” of this projection. Using this, they derived
a generic, efficient reduction that allows them to apply any differentially private algorithm for
bounded-degree graphs to an arbitrary graph. They used this to design algorithms for releasing
the entire degree distribution of a graph.
Blocki et al. [8] introduced the notion of restricted sensitivity as an alternative to global and
smooth sensitivity to improve accuracy in differentially private data analysis. It takes advantage
of any beliefs about the dataset that a querier may have, to quantify over a restricted class of
datasets. Blocki et al. presented two main results. First, they showed that for every function
f : Gn,D → R, there exists an extension g : Gn → R that agrees with f on Gn,D and that has
global sensitivity ∆g = ∆Df . The resulting function needs not to be computable efficiently.
Second, for the specific definition of graphs of bounded degree, they exhibited efficient ways of
constructing new queries using different projection-based techniques.
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Chen and Zhou [22] proposed a novel differentially private mechanism, named recursive
mechanism, to release an approximation to linear statistics of some positive relational algebra
calculation over a sensitive database. Their definition of sensitive database takes into account
the impact of a participant on multiple tuples, so it is relevant to node differential privacy. They
modeled queries to a graph by positive Boolean expressions (not using negation) in which each
participant is a Boolean variable. They also introduced several concepts of empirical sensitivity
(local, global and universal ones). Their 3-step recursive mechanism can answer any monotonic
query on any sensitive database. It is formulated as a linear program.
2.2.6 Privacy Metrics
We now survey commonly used notions of privacy metrics. Min entropy [93] quantifies the largest
probability gap between the posterior and prior over all items in the input dataset. K-anonymity
has the same semantics with the corresponding min entropy of log2 k. So we say k-anonymity
based perturbation schemes belong to min entropy. Shannon entropy argued in [13] and [11]
is another choice of privacy metrics. Higher Shannon entropy means better privacy protection
because an attacker has to confront higher uncertainty about the true dataset. The third metrics
that we use in this thesis is the incorrectness measure from location privacy [92]. Given the
prior information (e.g. node degree in the true graph) and the posterior information harvested
from the anonymized output, incorrectness measure is the number of incorrect guesses made
by the attacker. This measure gauges the distortion caused by the anonymization algorithm.
Multiplicative ratio ε, a.k.a privacy budget, in differential privacy [35] places constraints on the
probabilities of noisy outputs when any item decides to join or not to join the dataset. Lower ε
indicates stricter constraints, leading to flatter distributions on the output space, i.e. harder to
reveal the true input. Moreover, the composability properties bring ready-to-use building blocks
for designing differentially private algorithms.
2.2.7 Utility Metrics
To evaluate the utility of anonymized graphs, a lot of graph metrics (properties) are introduced
in the literature (e.g. [73]). In this thesis, we consider three groups of graph metrics. The first
group is based on the degree sequence of nodes such as number of edges, average degree, maximal
degree, degree variance, power-law exponent and degree distribution. The second group is about
shortest paths such as average distance, connectivity length, effective diameter, diameter and
distance distribution. Finally, other important graph metrics like clustering coefficient and graph
cut queries are used. Detailed definitions of these metrics are presented in Sections 3.5.2 and
4.7.1.
2.3 Community Detection
2.3.1 Non-Private Community Detection
For recent comprehensive surveys, we refer to [27,38,61]. Detailed discussions and comparisons
on quality measures for community detection can be found in [19, 28, 106]. In this section, we
discuss modularity function and several classes of detection techniques.
Newman and Girvan [75] proposed modularity as a quality measure for network clustering.
It is based on the idea that a random graph is not expected to have a modular structure, so
the possible existence of clusters is revealed by the comparison between the actual density of
17
Chapter 2. State of the Art
edges in a subgraph and the density one would expect to have in the subgraph if the nodes
of the graph were connected randomly (the null model in parlance of hypothesis testing). The
modularity Q is defined as
Q =
nc∑
c=1
[
lc
m
−
(
dc
2m
)2]
(2.1)
where nc is the number of clusters, lc is the total number of edges joining nodes of community
c and dc is the sum of the degrees of the nodes of c.
Many methods for optimizing modularity have been proposed over the last ten years, such as
agglomerative greedy [25,74], simulated annealing [64], random walks [82], statistical mechanics
[86], label propagation [84], InfoMap [87] or Louvain method [9], just to name a few.
To find a partition that provides the maximum value of modularity is an NP-complete
problem [15]. Many greedy heuristics have therefore been proposed. The first algorithm devised
to maximize modularity was a greedy method of Newman [74]. It is an agglomerative hierarchical
clustering method, where groups of nodes are successively merged to form larger communities
such that modularity increases after the merging. One starts from n clusters, each containing a
single node. Edges are not initially present, they are added one by one during the procedure.
However, the modularity of partitions explored during the procedure is always calculated from
the full topology of the graph. The complexity of Newman method is O((m + n)n), or O(n2)
on a sparse graph. Clauset et al. [25] proposed a faster greedy by storing a matrix containing
only the values of the communities, i.e. the modularity changes when joining the communities
i and j. This operation can be performed more efficiently by using data structures for sparse
matrices, like max-heaps, which rearrange the data in the form of binary trees.
Medus et al. [64] presented a simulated annealing method to study the community structure
in networks based on the search for that partition that maximizes the value of modularity.
Simulated annealing is a probabilistic procedure for global optimization used in different fields
and problems. It is a generalization of the well known Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
procedure. Its standard implementation combines two types of “moves”: local moves, where a
single node is shifted from one cluster to another, taken at random; global moves, consisting
of mergers and splits of communities. Global moves reduce the risk of getting trapped in local
minima and they have proven to lead to much better optima than using simply local moves. In
practical applications, one typically combines n2 local moves with n global ones in one iteration.
The method can potentially come very close to the true modularity maximum, but it is slow.
Latapy and Pons [82] observed that random walks on a graph tend to get “trapped” into
densely connected parts corresponding to communities. They proposed a measure of similarities
between nodes based on random walks which has several important advantages: it captures well
the community structure in a network, it can be computed efficiently, and it can be used in an
agglomerative algorithm to compute efficiently the community structure of a network. Their
algorithm called WalkTrap runs in time O(mn2) and space O(n2) in the worst case, and in time
O(n2 logn) and space O(n2) in most real-world cases.
Raghavan et al. [84] have designed a simple and fast method based on label propagation.
Nodes are initially given unique labels (e.g. their node labels). At each iteration, a sweep over
all nodes, in random sequential order, is performed: each node takes the label shared by the
majority of its neighbors. If there is no unique majority, one of the majority labels is picked
at random. In this way, labels propagate across the graph: most labels will disappear, others
will dominate. The process reaches convergence when each node has the majority label of its
neighbors. Communities are defined as groups of nodes having identical labels at convergence.
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By construction, each node has more neighbors in its community than in any other community.
The modular structure of a graph can be considered as a compressed description of the
graph to approximate the whole information contained in its adjacency matrix. Based on this
idea, Rosvall and Bergstrom [87] proposed InfoMap algorithm which uses the probability flow of
random walks on a network as a proxy for information flows in the real system and decomposes
the network into modules by compressing a description of the probability flow. The result is a
map that both simplifies and highlights the regularities in the structure and their relationships.
Since its introduction in 2008, Louvain method [9] became one of the most cited methods
for the community detection task. It optimizes the modularity by a bottom-up folding process.
The algorithm is divided in passes each of which is composed of two phases that are repeated
iteratively. Initially, each node is assigned to a different community. So, there will be as many
communities as there are nodes in the first phase. Then, for each node i, the method considers
the gain of modularity if we move i from its community to the community of a neighbor j (a
local change). The node i is then placed in the community for which this gain is maximum and
positive (if any), otherwise it stays in its original community. This process is applied repeatedly
and sequentially for all nodes until no further improvement can be achieved and the first pass
is then complete.
2.3.2 Private Community Detection
To motivate the problem of private community detection, we show a simple example of how
different clusterings of nodes may give hints to attackers. In Fig. 2.3, thirteen nodes are clustered
in four communities {{0,1,2}, {3,4}, {5,6,11,12}, {7,8,9,10}}. Assuming that a new edge (0,3)
is added, the new clustering of nodes may become {{0,1,2,3}, {4,5,6,11,12}, {7,8,9,10}}. By
observing the clusterings before and after the addition of the edge (0,3), an attacker infers that
there might have been new edge(s) between 3 and the nodes in the community {0,1,2}.
The problem of community detection under differential privacy is quite new and only men-
tioned in the recent work [69] where Mülle et al. use a randomized response technique [35, Section
3.2] to perturb the input graph so that it satisfies differential privacy before running the con-
ventional CD algorithms. This technique (we call it EdgeFlip afterwards) is classified as input
perturbation in differential privacy literature (the other two categories are algorithm perturba-
tion and output perturbation). Similarly, ε-DP schemes for graph release in Section 2.2.5 are
applicable.
By maximizing the modularity, Louvain method is based on edge counting metrics, so it fits
well with the concept of edge differential privacy (Section 2.2.5). One of the most recent methods
SCD [83] is not chosen because it is about maximizing Weighted Community Clustering (WCC)
instead of the modularity. WCC is based on triangle counting which has high global sensitivity
(up to O(n)) [110]. Moreover, SCD pre-processes the graph by removing all edges that do not
close any triangle. This means all 1-degree nodes are excluded and form singleton clusters. The
number of output clusters is empirically up to O(n). Thus, we target effective ε-DP schemes for
community detection using edge differential privacy and modularity optimization.
A recent paper by Campan et al. [17] studies whether anonymized social networks preserve
existing communities from the original social networks. The considered anonymization methods
are k-anonymity [18] and k-degree method [55] which belong to input perturbation. In this
thesis, we only examine differentially private schemes in both categories: input and algorithm
perturbations.
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2.4 Graph Aggregation and Link Exchange
Epidemic spreading [68, 81] is the most related to our work. In [81], Pastor-Satorras et al.
study the spreading of infections on scale-free (power-law) networks via the susceptible-infected-
susceptible (SIS) model [5]. They find the absence of an epidemic threshold (λc = 0) and its
associated critical behavior when the number of nodes goes to infinity using mean-field approx-
imation. Moreno et al. [68] provide a detailed analytical and numerical study of susceptible-
infected-removed (SIR) on Watts-Strogatz (WS) small-world model and Barabási-Albert (BA)
scale-free model. WS graphs with exponentially distributed degrees can be considered as a ho-
mogeneous model in which each node has the same expected number of links. WS graphs have
finite epidemic thresholds. On the contrary, BA graphs with power-law distributed degrees are
heterogeneous and they expose the weaker resistance to epidemics starting on highly connected
nodes.
Giakkoupis et al. [41] introduce a distributed algorithm RIPOSTE for disseminating infor-
mation in a social network that preserves privacy of nodes. Whenever the information reaches a
node, the node decides to either forward the information to his neighbors or drop it. RIPOSTE
uses two global parameters δ and λ and satisfies differential privacy by applying Randomized
Response Technique (RRT) [35]. Our work is also a form of information dissemination over
graphs but it spreads a large number of links, not a single item.
Gossip-based protocols [39,99] aim at providing alternatives to network-level multicast with
good scalability and reliability properties. In these protocols, message redundancy for high relia-
bility is ensured by the fact that each member forwards each message to a set of other, randomly
chosen, group members. Ganesh et al. [39] propose a fully decentralized and self-configuring
protocol SCAMP that provides each member with a partial view of group membership. As
the number of participating nodes changes, the size of partial views automatically adapts to
the value required to support a gossip algorithm reliably. CYCLON [99] is a protocol for con-
struction of reliable overlay networks. It is targeted to overlays that have low diameter, low
clustering, highly symmetric node degrees and highly resilient to massive node failures. These
properties are satisfied by random graphs. CYCLON employs an enhanced shuffling operation
in which nodes select neighbors for cache exchange based on their age.
By exchanging noisy link lists, our schemes are related to distributed graph anonymization
[18, 97]. However, rather than producing a single global anonymized graph as in [97], link
exchange protocols result in multiple local outputs. In addition, link exchange operates at
finest-grained level (node-level) whereas previous works consider a small number of data holders
who manage disjoint sets of nodes.
The idea of adding fake links to hide true links appears in a number of earlier studies,
e.g. [76,91]. Shokri et al. [91] propose a method for privacy preservation in collaborative filtering
recommendation systems. They develop a model where each user stores locally an offline profile
on his own side, hidden from the server, and an online profile on the server from which the
server generates the recommendations. Each user arbitrarily contacts other users over time,
and modifies his own offline profile through aggregating ratings from other users. The more
ratings a user aggregates, the higher privacy he gets but the lower accuracy in recommendations
he obtains. Our work [76] presents a centralized graph anonymization scheme based on edge
uncertainty semantics. Fake edges are added to probabilistically hide true edges. We consider
distance-2 fake edges to keep higher utility (see Chapter 3).
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2.5 Summary and Discussion
The above discussion on related work clarifies how we can improve in graph anonymization,
private community detection and private link exchange. Uncertainty-based methods for graph
anonymization [11, 66] have some limitations in privacy/utility tradeoff and lack a theoretical
analysis model. Our objective is to formalize the probabilistic graph anonymization through an
analytical model and design novel schemes to fill the existing gap.
The prevalence of differential privacy makes it appealing in graph anonymization and private
community detection. We showed that the existing model-based schemes for graph anonymiza-
tion [21, 100, 101, 105] are not consistent for large privacy budgets and/or incur quadratic com-
plexity. These drawbacks have left the room for better direct publication schemes that are both
efficient and consistent. Using differential privacy to detect communities in social graphs raises
considerable challenges. We found the existing schemes ineffective, especially those based on
ε-DP graph release. That is why we explore other directions such as using Louvain method on
noisy super graphs or top-down privately sampling highly modular partitions of nodes.
To advocate the users’ rights on their private information, we propose a novel link exchange
problem that allows the users to build their own local views of the underlying social graph.
The existing work on epidemic spreading of information, gossip-based protocols and distributed
graph anonymization are related but not totally in the same vein as our model. Via the private
link exchange, we would like to bring up a different mechanism for private and democratic
information exchange in online social networks.
In the next chapter, we present our first main contribution which is about social graph
anonymization via uncertainty semantics.
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3.1 Introduction
Graphs represent a rich class of data observed in daily life where entities are described by vertices
and their connections are characterized by edges. With the emergence of increasingly complex
networks [73], the research community requires large and reliable graph data to conduct in-depth
studies. However, this requirement usually conflicts with privacy rights of data contributing
entities. Naive approaches like removing user ids from a social graph are not effective, leaving
users open to privacy risks, especially re-identification attacks [4] [46]. Therefore, many graph
anonymization schemes have been proposed [23, 55,96,103,112,113].
Given an unlabeled undirected graph, the existing anonymization methods fall into four
main categories. The first category includes random addition, deletion and switching of edges
to prevent the re-identification of nodes or edges. The methods in the second category provide
k-anonymity [95] by deterministic edge additions or deletions, assuming attacker’s background
knowledge regarding certain properties of its target nodes. The methods in the third category
assign edge probabilities to add uncertainty to the true graph. The edges probabilities may be
computed explicitly as in [11] or implicitly via random walks [66]. Finally, the fourth class of
techniques, generalization, cluster nodes into super nodes of size at least k. Note that the last
two classes of schemes induce possible world models, i.e., we can retrieve sample graphs that are
consistent with the anonymized output graph.
The third category is the most recent class of methods which leverage the semantics of edge
probability to inject uncertainty to a given deterministic graph, converting it into an uncertain
one. Most of schemes in this category are scalable, i.e. runnable on million-scale graphs or more.
As an example, Boldi et al. [11] introduced the concept of (k,ε)-obfuscation (denoted as (k, ε)-
obf), where k ≥ 1 is a desired level of obfuscation and ε ≥ 0 is a tolerance parameter. However,
the pursuit for minimum standard deviation σ in (k,ε)-obf has high impact on node privacy
and high privacy-utility tradeoff. Edge rewiring method based on random walks (denoted as
RandWalk) in [66] also introduces uncertainty to edges as we show in section 3.3. This scheme
suffers from high lower bounds for utility despite its excellent privacy-utility tradeoff.
Motivated by (k,ε)-obf and RandWalk, we propose in this chapter a general model for
anonymizing graphs based on edge uncertainty. Both (k,ε)-obf and RandWalk display their
fitting into the model. We point out disadvantages in (k,ε)-obf and RandWalk, the tradeoff gap
between them and present several elegant techniques to fill this gap. Finally, to support fair
comparisons, we develop a new tradeoff quantifying framework using the concept of incorrectness
in location privacy research [92].
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose a general model called uncertain adjacency matrix (UAM) for anonymizing
graph via edge uncertainty semantics (Section 3.2). The key property of this model is that
expected degrees of all nodes must be unchanged. We show the fitting of (k,ε)-obf and
RandWalk into the model and then analyze their disadvantages (Section 3.3).
• We introduce the Variance Maximizing (MaxVar) scheme (Section 3.4) that satisfies all
the properties of the UAM. It achieves good privacy-utility tradeoff by using two key
observations: nearby potential edges and maximization of total node degree variance via
a simple quadratic program.
• Towards a fair comparison for anonymization schemes on graphs, this chapter describes
a generic quantifying framework (Section 3.5) by putting forward the distortion measure
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(also called incorrectness in [92]) to measure the re-identification risks of nodes. As for
the utility score, typical graph metrics [11] [107] are chosen.
• We conduct a comparative study of aforementioned approaches on three real large graphs
and show the effectiveness of our gap-filling solutions (Section 3.6).
Table 3.1 summarizes notations used in this chapter.
Table 3.1: List of notations
Symbol Definition
G0 = (V,EG0) true graph with n = |V | and m = |EG0 |
G = (V,E, p) uncertain graph constructed from G0
G = (V,EG) sample graph from G, G v G
du(G), du(G) degree of node u in G,G
∆(d) number of nodes having degree d in G
N (u) neighbors of node u in G
Rσ truncated normal distribution on [0,1]
σ standard deviation of the normal distribution
re ← Rσ a sample from the distribution Rσ
pi (puv) probability of edge ei (euv)
np number of potential edges, |E| = m+ np
A, A, A(G) adjacency matrices of G0, G and G
PRW random walk transition matrix of G0
B(t) uncertain adjacency matrix, B(t) = AP t−1RW
t walk length
S switching matrix
TV total degree variance
3.2 A General Model
This section starts with definitions and common assumptions on uncertain graphs. It then
introduces a general model UAM via semantics of edge uncertainty.
3.2.1 Uncertain Graph
Let G = (V,E, p) be an uncertain undirected graph, where V is the set of nodes, E is the set of
edges, p : E → (0, 1] is the function that gives an existence probability to each edge (see Fig.3.3b).
The common assumption is on the independence of edge probabilities. Following the possible-
worlds semantics in relational data [29], the uncertain graph G induces a set {G = (V,EG)}
of 2|E| deterministic graphs (worlds), each is defined by a subset of E. The probability of
G = (V,EG) v G is:
Pr(G) =
∏
e∈EG
p(e)
∏
e∈E\EG
(1− p(e)) (3.1)
As an example, the uncertain graph in Fig.3.3b has 25 possible graphs and the graph with three
edges (v1, v2), (v2, v3)(v3, v4) has probability of P (G) = 0.3× 0.7× 0.4× (1− 0.8)× (1− 0.9) =
0.00168. Note that deterministic graphs are also uncertain graphs with all existing edges having
probabilities 1 and non-existing edges having probabilities 0.
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Figure 3.1: Semantics of selfloops (left), multi-selfloops (middle) and multiedges (right) in un-
certain graph.
3.2.2 Uncertain Adjacency Matrix (UAM)
Given the true undirected graph G0, an uncertain graph G constructed from G0 must have its
uncertain adjacency matrix A satisfying
1. Aij = Aji (symmetry);
2. Aij ∈ [0, 1] and Aii = 0 (no multiedges or selfloops);
3.
∑n
j=1Aij = di(G0) i = 1..n, (expected degrees of all nodes must be unchanged).
While the constraints (1) and (2) are straightforward for uncertain undirected graph, the third
constraint is novel and central to our model of UAM. It stems from the need of preserving the
expected degree sequence of graph which is useful for degree distribution estimation, e.g. in [45].
In terms of dK-series [60], the degree sequence is d1-series, the first moment of graph. The
higher moments like d2-series are left for future work.
By relaxing (2) to (2’): Aii ≥ 0 and Aij ≥ 0, we allow graphs with selfloops, multi-selfloops
and multiedges (see Fig. 3.1). In other words, the non-negative weighted edges fully capture the
semantics of selfloops, multi-selfloops and multiedges in the model of UAM.
3.3 Application of UAM
In this section, we analyze several existing and novel schemes using the model of UAM.
3.3.1 RandWalk Scheme
Preliminary results
We first define the transition matrix PRW which is right stochastic (i.e. non-negative and row
sums equal to 1) as follows (note that we use the short notation di = di(G0))
PRW (i, j) =
{
1/di if (i, j) ∈ EG0 i 6= j
0 otherwise.
(3.2)
The power P tRW when t→∞ is P∞RW (i, j) =
dj
2m .
We prove two lemmas on properties of the products AP and AP t where P is right stochastic.
Lemma 3.1. For an adjacency matrix A and a right stochastic matrix P , the product AP is
non-negative and has row sums equal to those of A.
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Proof. The non-negativity of AP is trivial. The sum of row i of AP is
∑
j(
∑
kAikPkj) =∑
kAik(
∑
j Pkj) =
∑
kAik.1 =
∑
kAik
Lemma 3.2. For a deterministic graph G possessing adjacency matrix A and PRW , the product
B(t) = AP t−1RW is also symmetric.
Proof. We prove the result by induction. The case t = 1 is trivial. We prove that for any t ≥ 2,
B
(t)
ij =
∑
pt(i,j)∏
k∈pt(i,j),k 6=i,j 1/dk where pt(i, j) is a path of length t from i to j.
When t = 2, B(2)ij =
∑
k AikPkj =
∑
(i,k),(k,j)∈E 1/dk, so the result holds. Assuming that
the result is correct up to t − 1, i.e. B(t−1)ij =
∑
pt−1(i,j)
∏
k∈pt−1(i,j),k 6=i,j 1/dk. Because B
(t) =
B(t−1)PRW , we have B(t)ij =
∑
lB
(t−1)
il Plj =∑
l,(l,j)∈E(
∑
pt−1(i,l)
∏
k∈pt−1(i,l),k 6=i,l 1/dk)1/dl =∑
pt(i,j)
∏
k∈pt(i,j),k 6=i,j 1/dk.
Because G is undirected, the set of all pt(i, j) is equal to the set of all pt(j, i), so B(t)ij =
B
(t)
ji .
We prove the uniqueness of PRW as follows
Proposition 3.1. Given a deterministic graph G with adjacency matrix A, there exists one and
only one right stochastic matrix P that satisfies Puv = 0 for all (u, v) /∈ G and AP t is symmetric
for all t ≥ 0. The unique solution is P = PRW .
Proof. Lemma 3.2 shows that P = PRW satisfies Puv = 0 for all (u, v) /∈ G and AP t is symmetric
for all t ≥ 0.
To prove that this is the unique solution, we repeat the formula in the proof of Lemma 3.2.
Let B(t) = AP t−1, then B(t)ij =
∑
pt(i,j)
∏
k∈pt(i,j),k 6=i,j Pk,k+1 where k + 1 implies the successive
node of k in pt(i, j). Because B(t)ji has the same number of products as B
(t)
ij (i.e. the number
of paths of length t), B(t) is symmetric if and only if corresponding products are equal, i.e.∏
k∈pt(i,j),k 6=i,j Pk,k+1 =
∏
k∈pt(j,i),k 6=i,j Pk,k+1. At t = 2, for any path (i, k, j) we must have
Pkj = Pki. Along with the requirement that P is right stochastic, i.e.
∑
i Pki = 1, we obtain
Pki = 1/dk. This is exactly PRW .
Analysis
Now we show the fitting of RandWalk [66] to the model of UAM. We should mention that
RandWalk is proposed only for link privacy analysis in [66] whereas the current work is on
node privacy. Algorithm 1 depicts the steps of RandWalk. As we show below, the trial-and-
error condition in Line 6 makes RandWalk hard to analyze 4. So we modify it by removing the
condition and using parameter α instead of 1.0 in Line 12 5 (see Algorithm 2). When α = 0.5, all
edges (u, z) are assigned with probability 0.5. In RandWalk-mod, we add a checking for du = 1
(Line 8) to keep the total degree of G′ equal to that of G, which is missing in RandWalk. Note
that RandWalk-mod accepts selfloops and multiedges (i.e. it satisfies the relaxed constraint (2’),
not (2)).
4It also causes edge miss at t = 2, e.g. a 2-length walk on edge (v3, v2) (Fig. 3.3a) causes the selfloop (v3, v3).
5This line causes errors for degree-1 nodes as shown in RandWalk-mod.
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Algorithm 1 RandWalk(G0, t,M) [66]
Input: undirected graph G0, walk length t and maximum loop count M
Output: anonymized graph G′
1: G′ = null
2: for u in G0 do
3: count = 1
4: for v in N (u) do
5: loop = 1, z = u
6: while (u == z ∨ (u, z) ∈ G′) ∧ (loop ≤M) do
7: perform t− 1 hop random walk from v
8: z is the terminal node of the random walk
9: loop+ +
10: if loop ≤M then
11: if count == 1 then
12: add (u, z) to G′ with probability 1.0
13: else
14: add (u, z) to G′ with probability 0.5du−1du−1
15: count+ +
return G′
Let Q be the edge adding matrix defined as
Qij =

0.5 if di = 1 ∧ j is the unique neighbor of i
α if j is the first neighbor of i
0.5di−α
di−1 if j is a neighbor of i but not the first one
0 otherwise.
We show that RandWalk-mod can be formulated as an uncertain adjacency matrix ARW =
(AP t−1RW ) ◦ (Q+QT ), where ◦ is the Hadamard product (element-wise). AP
t−1
RW is equivalent to
computations in lines 2-6 and Q+QT is equivalent to computations in lines 7-13. We use Q+QT
instead of Q due to the fact that when the edge (u, z) is added to G′ with probability Quz, the
edge (z, u) is also assigned the same probability. We come up with the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. RandWalk-mod can be formulated as ARW = (AP t−1RW ) ◦ (Q + QT ). ARW is
symmetric. It satisfies the constraint of unchanged expected degree iff α = 0.5 6.
Proof. By Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, let B(t)RW be AP
t−1
RW , we have symmetric B
(t)
RW and its row sums
are equal to those of A. Because ARW = B(t)RW ◦ (Q + QT ) and both B
(t)
RW and (Q + QT ) are
symmetric, ARW is also symmetric.
Due to the fact that (Q + QT ) has the same locations of non-zeros as B(t)RW , the condition
of unchanged expected degree is satisfied if and only if all non-zeros in (Q + QT ) are 1. This
occurs if and only if α = 0.5.
We investigate the limit case when t → ∞ (i.e. P t−1RW → P∞RW ). Correspondingly B∞RW =
AP∞RW has B∞RW (i, j) =
didj
2m . The following theorem quantifies the number of selfloops and
multiedges in B∞RW for power-law (PL) graphs and sparse Erdös-Renyi (ER) random graphs [73].
6This implies a mistake in Theorem 3 of [66]
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Algorithm 2 RandWalk-mod(G0, t, α)
Input: undirected graph G0, walk length t and probability α
Output: anonymized graph G′
1: G′ = null
2: for u in G0 do
3: count = 1
4: for v in N (u) do
5: perform t− 1 hop random walk from v
6: z is the terminal node of the random walk
7: if count == 1 then
8: if du == 1 then
9: add (u, z) to G′ with probability 0.5
10: else
11: add (u, z) to G′ with probability α
12: else
13: add (u, z) to G′ with probability 0.5du−αdu−1
14: count+ +
return G′
Theorem 3.2. For power-law graphs with the exponent γ, the number of selfloops in B∞RW is
ζ(γ−2)
ζ(γ−1) , where ζ(γ) is the Riemann zeta function defined only for γ > 1; the number of multiedges
is zero.
For sparse ER random graphs with λ = np constant where p is the edge probability, the
number of selfloops in B∞RW is λ+ 1; the number of multiedges is zero.
Proof. For power-law graphs, the node degree distribution is P (k) = k−γζ(γ) . The number of
selfloops nPLsl in B∞RW is the sum of elements on the main diagonal.
nPLsl =
1
2m
n∑
i=1
d2i =
1
2m
∞∑
k=1
k2nP (k) = n
nE(k)
∞∑
k=1
k2P (k)
= 1
E(k)
∞∑
k=1
k−(γ−2)
ζ(γ) =
ζ(γ)
ζ(γ − 1)
ζ(γ − 2)
ζ(γ) =
ζ(γ − 2)
ζ(γ − 1)
To prove that there is no multiedge in B∞RW we show that all elements in B∞RW are less than 1.
This is equivalent to show dmax <
√
2m. We use the constraint that the number of nodes with
degree dmax must be at least 1, i.e. nd
−γ
max
ζ(γ) ≥ 1↔ dmax ≤ (n/ζ(γ))
1/γ . Because ζ(γ) > 1 and we
consider γ > 2 in social networks, (n/ζ(γ))1/γ <
√
n. Meanwhile,
√
2m =
√
n ζ(γ−1)ζ(γ) >
√
n due
to the fact that ζ(γ) is monotonically decreasing. So we conclude nPLme = 0.
For sparse ER random graphs, we have P (k)→ e−λ λkk! . The number of selfloops n
ER
sl is
nERsl =
1
2m
n∑
i=1
d2i =
1
2m
∞∑
k=1
k2nP (k) = n
nE(k)
∞∑
k=1
k2P (k)
= 1
λ
E(k2) = 1
λ
(E(k)2 + V ar(k)) = 1
λ
(λ2 + λ) = λ+ 1
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Figure 3.2: Edge switching
0 1 auw 0
1 0 0 avt
auw 0 0 1
0 avt 1 0


0 −avt 1 avt
−auw 0 auw 1
1 avt 0 −avt
auw 1 −auw 0
 =

0 0 auw 1
0 0 1 avt
auw 1 0 0
1 avt 0 0
 (3.4)
Similar to the case of PL graphs, we show that dmax <
√
2m where dmax = maxk ne−λ λ
k
k! ≥
1 = maxk k!λk ≤ ne
−λ. Using the basic facts kk/2 ≤ k! and k > λ we get kk/2
λk
≤ ne−λ < n,
so k < n2/kλ2 <
√
nλ =
√
2m as long as n is sufficiently large and λ ≥ 4. So we conclude
nERme = 0.
3.3.2 Edge Switching Scheme
In edge switching (EdgeSwitch) approaches (e.g. [107]), two edges (u, v), (w, t) are chosen and
switched to (u, t), (w, v) if aut = awv = 0 (Fig. 3.2). This is done in s switches. Using the
switching matrix S, we represent 1-step EdgeSwitch in the form AS = A (Equation (3.4)).
The switching matrix S is feasible if and only if auwavt = 0. Note that in the full form,
S is n × n matrix with the n − 4 remaining elements on diagonal are 1, other off-diagonal are
0. In general, S is not right stochastic and this happens only if auw = avt = 0. For s-step
EdgeSwitch A
∏s
i=1 Si = A. If ∀i, Si is right stochastic (i.e. we choose edges (u, v), (w, t) such
that auw = avt = 0), then Lemma 3.1 applies.
3.3.3 (k, ε)-obf Scheme
Given the deterministic adjacency matrix A, we can directly construct A that satisfies all three
constraints (1),(2) and (3) of UAM. (k,ε)-obf [11] introduces such an approach.
(a) (b)
−2 −1 0 1 2
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1
1.5
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σ=0.1
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(c)
Figure 3.3: (a) True graph (b) An obfuscation with potential edges (dashed) (c) Truncated
normal distribution on [0,1] (bold solid curves)
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Construction and Limitations
In [11], Boldi et al. extend the concept of k-obfuscation developed earlier [13] which uses Shannon
entropy.
Definition 3.1. (k,ε)-obf [11]. Let P be a vertex property, k ≥ 1 be a desired level of obfuscation,
and ε ≥ 0 be a tolerance parameter. The uncertain graph G is said to k-obfuscate a given vertex
v ∈ G with respect to P if the entropy of the distribution YP (v) over the vertices of G is greater
than or equal to log2 k:
H(YP (v)) ≥ log2 k (3.5)
The uncertain graph G is a (k, ε)-obf with respect to property P if it k-obfuscates at least (1− ε)n
vertices in G with respect to P. 
Given the true graph G0 (Fig.3.3a), the basic idea of (k, ε)-obf (Fig.3.3b) is to transfer the
probabilities from existing edges to potential (non-existing) edges to satisfy Definition 3.1. For
each existing sampled edge e, it is assigned a probability 1− re where re ← Rσ (Fig. 3.3c) and
for each non-existing sampled edge e′, it is assigned a probability re′ ← Rσ.
Table 3.2 gives an example of how to compute degree entropy for the uncertain graph in
Fig. 3.3b. Here vertex property P is the node degree. Each row in the left side is the degree
distribution for the corresponding node. For instance, v1 has degree 0 with probability (1 −
0.8).(1 − 0.3).(1 − 0.9) = 0.014. The right side normalizes values in each column (i.e. in each
degree value) to get distributions YP (v). The entropy H(YP (v)) for each degree value is shown
in the bottom row. Given k = 3, log2 k = 1.585, then v1, v3 with true degree 2 and v2, v4 with
true degree 1 satisfy (3.5). Therefore, ε = 0.
Table 3.2: The degree uncertainty for each node (left) and normalized values for each degree
(right)
node degree uncertainty YP (v)
d=0 d=1 d=2 d=3 d=0 d=1 d=2 d=3
v1 .014 .188 .582 .216 .044 .117 .355 .491
v2 .210 .580 .210 .000 .656 .362 .128 .000
v3 .036 .252 .488 .224 .112 .158 .298 .509
v4 .060 .580 .360 .000 .187 .362 .220 .000
H 1.40 1.84 1.91 0.99
While (k, ε)-obf provides a novel technique to come up with an uncertain version of the
graph, the specific approach in [11] has two drawbacks. First, it formulated the problem as
the minimization of σ. With small values of σ, re highly concentrates around zero, so existing
sampled edges have probabilities nearly 1 and non-existing sampled edges are assigned probabil-
ities almost 0. Simple rounding techniques can easily reveal the true graph. Even if the graph
owner only publishes sample graphs, the re-identification attacks are still effective as we show
in Section 3.6. Note that in [11], the found values of σ vary in a wide range from 10−1 to 10−8.
Second, the approach in [11] does not consider the locality (subgraph) of nodes in selecting pairs
of nodes for establishing potential edges. As shown in [36], subgraph-wise perturbation effectively
reduces structural distortion.
Furthermore, the expected degrees of nodes in (k, ε)-obf are approximately unchanged due to
the fact that re, re′ are nearly zero by small σ. So (k,ε)-obf satisfies the constraints (1) and (2)
but it only approximately satisfies the constraint (3) of UAM. To remedy these shortcomings,
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we present the MaxVar approach in Section 3.4. It adds potential edges to G0, then tries to find
the assignment of edge probabilities such that the expected node degrees are unchanged while
the total variance is maximized. A comparison among schemes is also shown in Section 3.4.3.
3.3.4 Mixture Scheme
In this section, we present the Mixture approach applicable to RandWalk-mod, (k, ε)-obf, Max-
Var and EdgeSwitch. Its UAM Ap is parametrized by p, with the output sample graph Gp.
Given the true graph G0 and an anonymized G v G, every edge (i, j) is chosen into Gp with
probability Ap(i, j) where
Ap(i, j) =

1 if (i, j) ∈ EG0 ∩ EG
1− p if (i, j) ∈ EG0 \ EG
p if (i, j) ∈ EG \ EG0
It is straightforward to show that Ap = (1−p)A(G0)+pA(G). When applied to G generated
by RandWalk-mod with α = 0.5, we have Ap = (1− p)A+ pAP t−1RW = A[(1− p)In + pP
t−1
RW ] and
Ap satisfies three constraints (1) (2’) and (3).
If there exists Pmix with constraint Pmix(i, j) = 0 if (i, j) /∈ EG0 such that P t−1mix = (1 −
p)In+pP t−1RW , then Mixture can be simulated by the RandWalk-mod approach with the transition
matrix Pmix.
3.3.5 Partition Scheme
Another approach that can apply to RandWalk-mod, (k, ε)-obf, MaxVar and EdgeSwitch is the
Partition approach. Given true graph G0, this divide-and-conquer strategy first partitions G0
into disjoint subgraphs sG, then it applies one of the above anonymization schemes on subgraphs
to get anonymized subgraphs sG. Finally, it combines sG to obtain G. Note that the partitioning
may cause orphan edges as in MaxVar (Section 3.4). Those edges must be copied to G to keep
node degrees unchanged.
3.4 Variance Maximizing Scheme
We introduce the Variance Maximizing (MaxVar) scheme as an instance of the UAM. It achieves
a good privacy-utility tradeoff by two key features: considering nearby potential edges and
maximizing total node degree variance via a simple quadratic program. We start this section with
the formulation ofMaxVar in the form of quadratic programming based on two key observations.
Then we describe the anonymization algorithm.
3.4.1 Formulation
Two key observations underpinning the MaxVar approach are presented as follows.
Observation #1: Maximizing Degree Variance
We argue that efficient countermeasures against structural attacks should hinge on node de-
grees. If a node and its neighbors have their degrees changed, the re-identification risk is reduced
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significantly. Consequently, instead of replicating local structures as in k-anonymity based ap-
proaches [23,55,96,103,112,113], we can deviate the attacks by changing node degrees probabilis-
tically. For example, node v1 in Fig.3.3a has degree 2 with probability 1.0 whereas in Fig.3.3b,
its degree gets four possible values {0, 1, 2, 3} with probabilities {0.014, 0.188, 0.582, 0.216} re-
spectively. Generally, given edge probabilities of node u as p1, p2, ..pdu(G), the degree of u is a
sum of independent Bernoulli random variables, so its expected value is
∑du(G)
i=1 pi and its vari-
ance is
∑du(G)
i=1 pi(1− pi). If we naively target the maximum (local) degree variance without any
constraints, the naive solution is at pi = 0.5 ∀i. However, such an assignment distorts graph
structure severely and deteriorates the utility. Instead, by following the model of UAM, we have
the constraint
∑du(G)
i=1 pi = du(G0). Note that the minimum variance of an uncertain graph is
0 and corresponds to the case G has all edges being deterministic, e.g. when G = G0 and in
switching-edge based approaches. In the following section, we show an interesting result relating
the total degree variance with the variance of edit distance.
Variance with edit distance
The edit distance between two deterministic graphs G,G′ is defined as:
D(G,G′) = |EG \ EG′ |+ |EG′ \ EG| (3.6)
A well-known result about the expected edit distance between the uncertain graph G and
the deterministic graph G v G is
E[D(G, G)] =
∑
G′vG
Pr(G′)D(G,G′) =
∑
ei∈EG
(1− pi) +
∑
ei /∈EG
pi
Correspondingly, the variance of edit distance is
V ar[D(G, G)] =
∑
G′vG
Pr(G′)[D(G,G′)− E[D(G, G)]]2
We prove in the following theorem that the variance of edit distance is the sum of all edges’
variance (total degree variance) and it does not depend on the choice of G.
Theorem 3.3. Assume that G(V,E, p) has k uncertain edges e1, e2, ..., ek and G v G (i.e.
EG ⊆ E). The edit distance variance is V ar[D(G, G)] =
∑k
i=1 pi(1− pi) and does not depend on
the choice of G.
Proof. We prove the result by induction.
When k = 1, we have two cases of G1: EG1 = {e1} and EG1 = ∅. For both cases,
V ar[D(G1, G1)] = p1(1− p1), i.e. independent of G1.
Assume that the result is correct up to k−1 edges, i.e. V ar[D(Gk−1, Gk−1)] =
∑k−1
i=1 pi(1−pi)
for all Gk−1 v Gk−1, we need to prove that it is also correct for k edges. We use the subscript
notations Gk, Gk for the case of k edges. We consider two cases of Gk: ek ∈ Gk and ek /∈ Gk.
Case 1. The formula for V ar[D(Gk, Gk)] is
V ar[D(Gk, Gk)] =
∑
G′
k
vGk
Pr(G′k)[D(G′k, Gk)− E[D(Gk, Gk)]]2
=
∑
ek∈G′k
Pr(G′k)[Dk − E[Dk]]2 +
∑
ek /∈G′k
Pr(G′k)[Dk − E[Dk]]2
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The first sum is
∑
G′
k−1vGk−1
pkPr(G′k−1)[Dk−1 − E[Dk−1]− (1− pk)]2.
The second sum is
∑
G′
k−1vGk−1
(1− pk)Pr(G′k−1)[Dk−1 − E[Dk−1] + pk)]2.
Here we use shortened notations Dk for D(G′k, Gk) and E[Dk] for E[D(Gk, Gk)].
By simple algebra, we have V ar[D(Gk, Gk)] = V ar[D(Gk−1, Gk−1)]+qk(1−qk) =
∑k
i=1 pi(1−
pi).
Case 2. similar to the Case 1.
Observation #2: Proposing Nearby Edges
As indicated by Leskovec et al. [53], real graphs reveal two temporal evolution properties: densi-
fication power law and shrinking diameters. Community Guided Attachment (CGA) model [53],
which produces densifying graphs, is an example of a hierarchical graph generation model in
which the linkage probability between nodes decreases as a function of their relative distance in
the hierarchy. With regard to this observation, (k, ε)-obf, by heuristically making potential edges
solely based on node degree discrepancy, produces many inter-community edges. Shortest-path
based statistics will be reduced due to these edges. MaxVar, in contrast, tries to mitigate the
structural distortion by proposing only nearby potential edges before assigning edge probabili-
ties. Another evidence is from [98] where Vazquez analytically proved that Nearest Neighbor can
explain the power-law for degree distribution, clustering coefficient and average degree among
the neighbors. Those properties are in very good agreement with the observations made for
social graphs. Sala et al. [88] confirmed the consistency of Nearest Neighbor model in their
comparative study on graph models for social networks.
3.4.2 Algorithms
Overview
The intuition behind the new approach is to formulate the perturbation problem as a quadratic
programming problem. Given the true graph G0 and the number of potential edges allowed to
be added np, the scheme has three phases. The first phase tries to partition G0 into s subgraphs,
each one with ns = np/s potential edges connecting nearby nodes (with default distance 2, i.e.
friend-of-friend). The second phase formulates a quadratic program for each subgraph with the
constraint of unchanged node degrees to produce the uncertain subgraphs sG with maximum
edge variance. The third phase combines the uncertain subgraphs sG into G and publishes
several sample graphs. The three phases are illustrated in Fig. 3.4.
By keeping the degrees of nodes in the perturbed graph, our approach is similar to the edge
switching approaches (e.g. [107]) but ours is more subtle as we do it implicitly and the switching
occurs not necessarily on pairs of edges.
Graph Partitioning
Because of the complexity of exact quadratic programming (Section 3.4.2), we need a pre-
processing phase to divide the true graph G0 into subgraphs and run the optimization on each
subgraph. Given the number of subgraphs s, we run METIS 7 to get almost equal-sized sub-
graphs with minimum number of inter-subgraph edges. Each subgraph has ns potential edges
added before running the quadratic program. This phase is outlined in Algorithm 3.
7http://glaros.dtc.umn.edu/gkhome/views/metis
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Figure 3.4: MaxVar approach
Algorithm 3 Partition-and-Add-Edges
Input: true graph G0 = (V,EG0), number of subgraphs s, number of potential edges per sub-
graph ns
Output: list of augmented subgraphs gl
1: gl← METIS(G0, s).
2: for sG in gl do
3: i← 0, EsG ← ∅
4: while i < ns do
5: randomly pick u, v ∈ VsG and (u, v) /∈ EsG with d(u, v) = 2
6: EsG ← EsG ∪ (u, v)
7: i← i+ 1
return gl
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Quadratic Programming
By assuming the independence of edges, the total degree variance of G = (V,E, p) for edit
distance (Theorem 3.3) is:
V ar(E) =
|E|∑
i=1
pi(1− pi) = |EG0 | −
|E|∑
i=1
p2i (3.7)
The last equality in (3.7) is due to the constraint that the expected node degrees are un-
changed (i.e.
∑du(G)
i=1 pi = du(G0)), so
∑|E|
i=1 pi is equal to |EG0 |. By targeting the maximum edge
variance, we come up with the following quadratic program.
Minimize
|E|∑
i=1
p2i
Subject to 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 ∀i∑
v∈N (u)
puv = du(G0) ∀u
The objective function reflects the privacy goal (i.e. sample graphs do not highly concentrate
around the true graph) while the expected degree constraints aim to preserve the utility.
By dividing the large input graph into subgraphs, we solve independent quadratic optimiza-
tion problems. Because each edge belongs to at most one subgraph and the expected node
degrees in each subgraph are unchanged, it is straightforward to show that the expected node
degrees in G are also unchanged. We have a proposition on problem feasibility and an upper
bound for the total variance.
Proposition 3.2. The quadratic program in MaxVar is always feasible. The total variance
TVMaxV ar = V ar(E) is upper bounded by mnpm+np .
Proof. The feasibility is due to the fact that {pe|pe = 1 ∀e ∈ EG0 and pe = 0 otherwise} is
a feasible point. Let ku be the number of potential edges incident to node u. By requiring
u’s expected degree to be unchanged, we have
∑
v∈N (u) puv = du. Applying Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality, we get
∑
v∈N (u) p
2
uv ≥ 1du+ku (
∑
v∈N (u) puv)2 =
d2u
du+ku . Now we take the sum over all
nodes to get the following
V ar(E) = m−
m+np∑
i=1
p2i = m−
1
2
∑
u
∑
v∈N (u)
p2uv
≤ m− 12
∑
u
d2u
du + dk
≤ m− 12
(
∑
u du)2∑
u(du + ku)
= mnp
m+ np
where the last equality is again due to Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
3.4.3 Comparison of schemes
Table 3.3 shows the comparison of schemes we investigate in this chapter. Only MaxVar and
EdgeSwitch satisfy all three properties (1),(2) and (3) of the UAM. The next two propositions
quantify the TV of (k, ε)-obf and RandWalk-mod.
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Table 3.3: Comparison of schemes
Scheme Prop.1 Prop.2 Prop.3 Uncertain A
RandWalk-mod ◦ (α = 0.5) × ◦ ◦
RandWalk [66] ◦ ◦ × ◦
EdgeSwitch ◦ ◦ ◦ ×
(k, ε)-obf [11] ◦ ◦ × ◦
MaxVar ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Mixture depends on the mixed scheme
Partition depends on the scheme used in subgraphs
Proposition 3.3. The expected total variance of (k, ε)-obf TVobf is (m + np)(E[re] − E[r2e ]).
The expressions of E[re], E[r2e ] are given in (3.8) and (3.9).
Proof. In (k, ε)-obf, m existing edges are assigned probabilities 1 − re while np potential edges
are assigned probabilities re. Therefore, the total variance is TVobf = m(1− re)(1− (1− re)) +
npre(1 − re) = (m + np)re(1 − re) where re ← Rσ. Take the expectation of TVobf , we get
E[TVobf ] = (m+ np)(E[re]− E[r2e ]).
Rσ has pdf f(x) = C 1σ√2πe
−x2/2σ2 if x ∈ [0, 1] and 0 otherwise. The normalization constant
C = 0.5erf(1/σ
√
2) where erf is the error function. Basic integral computations (change of
variable and integration by parts) give us the formulas for E[re] and E[r2e ] as follows
E[re] =
Cσ√
2π
(1− e−1/2σ2) (3.8)
E[r2e ] =
Cσ√
2π
(σ
√
2π
C
− e−1/2σ2) (3.9)
Note that for σ ≤ 0.1, C ≈ 1 and e−1/2σ2 ≈ 0, so
E[TVobf ] ≈ (m+ np)
(
σ√
2π
− σ2
)
(3.10)
Proposition 3.4. The total variance of RandWalk-mod TVRW (t) at walk-length t is upper
bounded by m(Kt−m)Kt where Kt is the number of non-zeros in B
(t).
For power-law graphs with the exponent γ, TV PLRW (∞) = m − 12
[
ζ(γ−2)
ζ(γ−1)
]2
. For sparse ER
random graphs with λ = np constant, TV ERRW (∞) = m− 12(λ+ 1)
2
Proof. Proof for TVRW (t)’s upper bound is obtained in the same way as in the proof of Propo-
sition 3.2. At t =∞, the computations of TV PLRW (∞) and TV ERRW (∞) are similar to those in the
proof of Theorem 3.2.
TV PLRW (∞) =
1
2
n∑
i,j=1
didj
2m (1−
didj
2m ) = m−
1
8m2
n∑
i,j=1
d2i d
2
j = m−
1
2E2(k)
( ∞∑
k=1
k2P (k)
)2
= m− ζ(γ)
2
2ζ(γ − 1)2
ζ(γ − 2)2
ζ(γ)2 = m−
1
2
[
ζ(γ − 2)
ζ(γ − 1)
]2
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TV ERRW (∞) = m −
1
2E2(k)
( ∞∑
k=1
k2P (k)
)2
= m − 12λ2 (λ
2 + λ)2 = m − 12(λ + 1)
2
Note that the Kt increases with t and when t is equal to the diameter of G, Kt = n2.
Therefore, the upper bound of TVRW (t) converges very fast to m, compatible with the results
in the limit cases of PL and ER random graphs.
By propositions 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, we roughly conclude that
E[TVobf ] < TVMaxV ar < TVRW (t) < m (3.11)
3.4.4 Directed Graphs
For directed graphs, the UAM model can be extended in several ways. We can apply the
constraint of unchanged expected degree to in-degrees, out-degrees or both in/out-degrees of
nodes.
In the case of unchanged out-degrees, it is straightforward to verify that RandWalk-mod still
keeps the expected out-degrees of all nodes (note that we have to double the probabilities of
adding every (u, v) due to the directionality of edges). The case of unchanged in-degrees needs
reverse random walks (i.e. walks on in-edges) and the same conclusion holds. However, if we
require both expected in/out-degrees of nodes to be unchanged, there exists no such random-
walks. This is not the case for (k, ε)-obf and MaxVar. For MaxVar, the constraints in (3.4.2) is
updated to
∑
v∈N−(u)
puv = d−u (G0)
∑
v∈N+(u)
puv = d+u (G0) ∀u
Interestingly, in the case of unchanged out-degrees, MaxVar has a trivial solution puv =
d+u (G0)/d+u (G) due to Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. The case of unchanged in-degrees is similar.
Because the main focus of this chapter is on undirected graphs, we leave the full analysis of
UAM on directed graphs for future work.
3.5 Quantifying Framework
This section describes a generic framework for privacy and utility quantification of anonymization
methods.
3.5.1 Privacy Measurement
We focus on structural re-identification attacks under various models of attacker’s knowledge as
shown in [46]. We quantify the privacy of an anonymized graph as the sum of re-identification
probabilities of all nodes in the graph. We differentiate closed-world from open-world adversaries
as in [46]. For example, when a closed-world adversary knows that Bob has three neighbors,
this fact is exact. An open-world adversary in this case would learn only that Bob has at least
three neighbors. We consider the result of structural query Q (Definition 2.2) on a node u as the
node signature sigQ(u). For example, by a structural query returning degree of each node, the
node signature of u in the graph G is dG(u). Given a structural query Q, nodes having the same
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signature form an equivalence class. We define node privacy score as the inference probability
based on node signatures in the true graph and the sample graph. Given the true graph G0 and
an output anonymized graph G∗, the privacy score is measured as the sum of all node privacy
scores. We illustrate the privacy score in the following example.
Example 3.1. Assuming that we have signatures of G0 and signatures of G∗ as in Table 3.4,
the re-identification probabilities in G∗ of nodes 1,2,8 are 13 , of node 4 is
1
2 , of nodes 3,5,6,7 are
0s. And the privacy score of G∗ is 13 +
1
3 + 0 +
1
2 + 0 + 0 + 0 +
1
3 = 1.5. In G0, the privacy score
is 13 +
1
3 +
1
3 +
1
2 +
1
2 +
1
3 +
1
3 +
1
3 = 3, equal to the number of equivalence classes.
Table 3.4: Example of node signatures
Graph Equivalence classes
G0 s1{1, 2, 3}, s2{4, 5}, s3{6, 7, 8}
G∗ s1{1, 2, 6}, s2{4, 7}, s3{3, 8}, s4{5}
Note that in the above example, a more detailed node mapping from G∗ to G0 may assign
the privacy score 1/n to the nodes whose signatures have been changed. The total privacy score
of such nodes is always less than one, much less than the number of equivalence classes in G0.
In this chapter, we simply assign these privacy scores to zero.
We consider two privacy scores in this chapter using two types of structural queries H1 and
H2open.
• H1 score uses node degree as the node signature, i.e. we assume that the attacker knows
apriori degrees of all nodes.
• H2open uses the set (not multiset) of degrees of node’s friends as the node signature. For
example, if a node has 6 neighbors and the degrees of those neighbors are {1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 5},
then its signature for H2open attack is {1, 2, 3, 5}.
Higher-order scores like H2 (exact multiset of neighbors’ degrees) or H3 (exact multiset of
neighbor-of-neighbors’ degrees) induce much higher privacy scores of the true graph G0 (in the
order of |V |) and represent less meaningful metrics for privacy. The following proposition claims
the automorphism invariant property of structural privacy scores.
Proposition 3.5. All privacy scores based on structural queries [46] are automorphism-invariant,
i.e. if we find a non-trivial automorphism G1 of G0, the signatures of all nodes in G1 are un-
changed.
Proof. G1 is an automorphism of G0 if there exists a permutation σ : V → V such that (u, v) ∈
EG0 ↔ (σ(u), σ(v)) ∈ EG1 . ForH1 score, it is straightforward to verify thatH1G1(u) = H1G0(u)
according to the definition of σ.
For H2open score, we prove that ∀dv ∈ H2G0(u) we also have dv ∈ H2G1(u) and vice versa.
Because dv ∈ H2G0(u) → (u, v) ∈ EG0 → (σ(u), σ(v)) ∈ EG1 . Note that dσ(v) = dv (H1
unchanged), so dv ∈ H2G1 . The reverse is proved similarly.
This argument can be extended to any structural queries (signatures) in [46].
3.5.2 Utility Measurement
Following [11] and [107], we consider three groups of statistics for utility measurement: degree-
based statistics, shortest-path based statistics and clustering statistics.
39
Chapter 3. Anonymizing Social Graphs via Uncertainty Semantics
Degree-based statistics
- Number of edges: SNE = 12
∑
v∈V dv
- Average degree: SAD = 1n
∑
v∈V dv
- Maximal degree: SMD = maxv∈V dv
- Degree variance: SDV = 1n
∑
v∈V (dv − SAD)2
- Power-law exponent of degree sequence: SPL is the estimate of γ assuming the degree
sequence follows a power-law ∆(d) ∼ d−γ
Shortest path-based statistics
- Average distance: SAPD is the average distance among all pairs of vertices that are path-
connected.
- Effective diameter: SEDiam is the 90-th percentile distance among all path-connected pairs
of vertices.
- Connectivity length: SCL is defined as the harmonic mean of all pairwise distances in the
graph.
- Diameter : SDiam is the maximum distance among all path-connected pairs of vertices.
Clustering statistics
- Clustering coefficient: SCC = 3N∆N3 where N∆ is the number of triangles and N3 is the
number of connected triples.
All of the above statistics are computed on sample graphs generated from the uncertain out-
put G. In particular, to estimate shortest-path based measures, we use Approximate Neighbour-
hood Function (ANF) [80]. The diameter is lower bounded by the longest distance among all-
destination bread-first-searches from 1,000 randomly chosen nodes. The relative error (rel.err)
for each statistic S is computed as |S(G0)−Savg(G)|S(G0) . The relative error for a sample graph is the
average of relative errors of all the statistics defined above.
In this chapter, we define the privacy/utility tradeoff as
√
H2open× rel.err as we conjecture
the quadratic and linear behaviors of H2open and rel.err respectively.
3.6 Evaluation
In this section, our evaluation aims to show the disadvantages of (k, ε)-obf and RandWalk/RandWalk-
mod as well as the gap between them. We then illustrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the
gap-filling approaches MaxVar and Mixture. The effectiveness is measured by privacy scores
(lower is better), the relative error of utility (lower is better) and the privacy/utility tradeoff
(lower is better). The efficiency is measured by the running time. All algorithms are imple-
mented in Python and run on a desktop PC with Intelr Core i7-4770@ 3.4Ghz, 16GB memory.
We use MOSEK 8 as the quadratic solver.
Three large real-world datasets are used in our experiments 9. dblp is a co-authorship
network where two authors are connected if they publish at least one paper together. amazon is
a product co-purchasing network where the graph contains an undirected edge from i to j if a
product i is frequently co-purchased with product j. youtube is a video-sharing web site that
includes a social network. The graph sizes (|V |, |E|) of dblp, amazon and youtube are (317080,
1049866), (334863, 925872) and (1134890, 2987624) respectively. We partition dblp, amazon
into 20 subgraphs and youtube into 60 subgraphs. The sample size of each test case is 20.
8http://mosek.com/
9http://snap.stanford.edu/data/index.html
40
3.6. Evaluation
3.6.1 (k, ε)-obf and RandWalk
We report the performance of (k, ε)-obf in Table 3.5. We keep the number of potential edges
equal to m (default value in [11]) and vary σ. We find that the scheme achieves low relative
errors only at small σ. However, privacy scores, especially H2open, rise fast (up to 50% compared
to the true graph). This fact incurs high privacy-utility tradeoff as confirmed in Table 3.8.
Table 3.6 shows the performance similarity between RandWalk and RandWalk-mod except
the case of youtube and for t = 2 in amazon. Because RandWalk-mod satisfies the third con-
straint, it benefits several degree-based statistics while the existence of selfloops and multiedges
does not impact much on shortest-path based metrics. RandWalk misses a lot of edges at t = 2
(see footnote 4 in Section 3.3.1). The remarkable characteristics of random-walk schemes are the
very low privacy scores and the high relative errors (lower-bounded around 8 to 10%). Clearly,
there is a gap between high tradeoffs in (k, ε)-obf and high relative errors in RandWalk where
MaxVar and Mixture may play their roles.
3.6.2 Effectiveness of MaxVar
We assess privacy and utility of MaxVar by varying the number of potential edges np. The
results are shown in Table 3.7 and Fig. 3.5. The ratio of replaced edges in Figures 3.5a,3.5b and
3.5c is defined as |EG0\EG||EG0 | . As for privacy scores, if we increase np, we gain better privacy (lower
privacy scores H1 and H2open) as we allow more edge switches, making more node signature
changes. Due to the expected degree constraints in the quadratic program, all degree-based
metrics vary only a little.
We observe the near linear relationships between H1, rel.err and the ratio of replaced edges
in Figures 3.5a, 3.5c and near quadratic relationship of H2open against the ratio of replaced edges
in Fig.3.5b. A analytical analysis of these phenomena would be a good suggestion for future
work.
The runtime of MaxVar consists of time for (1) partitioning G0, (2) adding friend-of-friend
edges to subgraphs, (3) solving quadratic subproblems and (4) combining uncertain subgraphs
to get G. We report the runtime in Fig.3.5d. As we can see, the total runtime is in several
minutes and the runtime of the partitioning step is almost negligible. Increasing np gives rise
to the runtime in steps 2,3 and 4 and the trends are nearly linear. The runtime on youtube is
three times longer than on the other two datasets, almost linear to their data sizes.
3.6.3 Comparative Evaluation
Table 3.8 shows comparisons between MaxVar, (k, ε)-obf and RandWalk/RandWalk-mod with
the tradeoff column. We omit the column H1 × rel.err because they are almost equal for all
schemes considered in this chapter. Clearly, MaxVar gains better privacy-utility tradeoffs than
(k, ε)-obf, but worse than RandWalk, RandWalk-mod. However, MaxVar has its own merit as
a gap-filling solution. Figures 3.6a,3.6b and 3.6c show that while RandWalk, RandWalk-mod
have the best tradeoffs, they suffer from high lower bounds for utility. In other words, if the
dataset allows higher privacy risk for better utility (lower rel.err) then the usage of two random
walk based solutions may be limited. The simple solution Mixture also fills the gap. We omit
EdgeSwitch due to its worst tradeoffs.
In addition to the re-identification scores H1 and H2open, we also compute ε for k ∈
{30, 50, 100} to have a fair comparison with (k, ε)-obf. Table 3.8 shows that MaxVar has the
best (k, ε) scores. The number of potential edges used in MaxVar could be 20% of |EG0 |, much
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less than that of (k, ε)-obf (100% for c = 2 [11]). MaxVar and RandWalk/RandWalk-mod have
|EG0 \ EG| ' |EG \ EG0 | and these two quantities are higher than those of (k, ε)-obf where
the number of edges is preserved only at small σ. RandWalk and RandWalk-mod do not have
many edges preserved due to their rewiring nature. |EG0 \ EG| increases slowly in MaxVar
because the edges in G0 always have positive probabilities. Fig 3.6d compares the normalized
total variance (i.e. divided by |EG0 |) of three schemes. Again, MaxVar is between (k, ε)-obf and
RandWalk-mod as shown in inequality (3.11).
3.7 Conclusion
We provide a general view of graph anonymization based on the semantics of edge uncertainty.
Via the model of UAM with the constraint of unchanged expected degree for all nodes, we
analyze recently proposed schemes and explain why there exists a gap between them by com-
paring the total degree variance. We propose MaxVar, a novel anonymization scheme exploiting
two key observations: maximizing the total degree variance while keeping the expected de-
grees of all nodes unchanged and using nearby potential edges. We also investigate an elegant
Mixture approach that together with MaxVar fill the gap between (k, e)-obf and RandWalk.
Furthermore, we promote the usage of incorrectness measure for privacy assessment in a new
quantifying framework rather than Shannon entropy and min-entropy (k-anonymity). The ex-
periments demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our methods. Our work may incite
several directions for future research including (1) novel constructions of uncertain graphs based
on the model of UAM (2) deeper analysis on the privacy-utility relationships in MaxVar (e.g.
explaining the near linear and near quadratic curves) (3) study on directed and bipartite graphs.
In the next chapter, we tackle the problem of graph anonymization again, but within the
differential privacy framework.
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4.1 Introduction
As one of the most general forms of data representation, graph supports all aspects of the
relational data mining process. With the emergence of increasingly complex networks [73],
the research community requires large and reliable graph data to conduct in-depth studies.
However, this requirement usually conflicts with privacy policies of data contributing entities.
Naive approaches like removing user ids from a social graph are not effective, leaving users open
to privacy risks, especially re-identification attacks [4,46]. Therefore, many graph anonymization
schemes have been proposed [23, 55, 96, 112, 113]. The main techniques used in those works are
based on random edge manipulation or deterministic transformations to satisfy k-anonymity [95].
Another popular class of schemes relies on uncertainty semantics [11, 76].
In this chapter, we address the problem of graph anonymization from the perspective of dif-
ferential privacy. This privacy model offers a formal definition of privacy with a lot of interesting
properties: no computational/informational assumptions about attackers, data type-agnosticity,
composability and so on [63]. By differential privacy, we want to ensure the existence of con-
nections between users to be hidden in the released graph while retaining important structural
information for graph analysis [21, 89,100,101,105].
Differentially private algorithms relate the amount of noise to the sensitivity of computation.
Lower sensitivity implies smaller added noise. Because edges in simple undirected graphs are
usually assumed independent, standard Laplace mechanism is applicable (e.g. adding Laplace
noise to each cell of the adjacency matrix). However, this approach may severely deteriorate
the graph structure. Recent methods of graph release under differential privacy try to reduce
the graph sensitivity in many ways. Schemes in [89, 100] use dK-series [60] to summarize the
graph into a distribution of degree correlations. The global sensitivity of 1K-series (resp. 2K-
series) is 4 (resp. O(n)). Lower sensitivity of O(
√
n) is proposed in [101] by graph spectral
analysis. The most recent works [21,105] even reduce the sensitivity of graph to O(lnn)10. While
Density Explore Reconstruct (DER) [21] employs a data-dependent quadtree to summarize the
adjacency matrix into a counting tree, Xiao et al. [105] propose to use Hierarchical Random
Graph (HRG) [24] to encode graph structural information in terms of edge probabilities. A
common disadvantage of the state-of-the-art DER [21] and HRG-MCMC [105] is the scalability
issue. Both of them incur quadratic complexity O(n2), limiting themselves to medium-sized
graphs only.
A characteristic shared by the methods 1K-series, 2K-series [89, 100], Kronecker graph
model [65], spectrum-based [101], DER [21] and HRG-MCMC [105] is that they use a cer-
tain summarization structure (model) to encode the key information of the true graph and then
perturb this structure to satisfy ε-DP before regenerating noisy sample graphs for output. We
observe that these model-based approaches are not consistent in the sense of privacy/utility
tradeoff. At the extreme of ε = 0 (best privacy), the summarization structures are random
and the utility is lowest. However, at the extreme ε = ∞ (no privacy), we cannot get the
true graph (best utility). This phenomenon may be explained by the loss of information in
the summarization structures. Note that the term consistency in the current work is slightly
different from [7,47] where consistency means the noisy output must satisfy certain constraints,
e.g. non-negative integrality [7] or ordered sequence [47].
To remedy the scalability and consistency problems, we propose Top-m Filter (TmF) algo-
rithm, which runs in O(m), linear in the number of edges and attains highest utility for large
10In this thesis, lnn is the natural logarithm used to bound the privacy budget ε and logn is the base-2 logarithm
for complexity analysis.
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enough ε. By considering the adjacency matrix as a sparse dataset, TmF leverages the high-pass
filtering idea in [26] to avoid the whole matrix manipulation. More importantly, via TmF, we
provide a theoretical result stating that O(lnn) is an upper bound of privacy budget for graph
release under differential privacy, i.e. at ε = O(lnn) we get a noisy graph very close to the true
graph (highest utility). This naturally rules out high-sensitivity schemes in [89, 100, 101] and
makes 1K-series, DER and HRG-MCMC meaningful only in regimes of scarce privacy budgets
(i.e. not exceeding O(lnn)).
After the publication of TmF [77], we found the scheme EdgeFlip by Mülle et al. [69] which
uses edge flipping technique. By a deeper analysis, we prove that EdgeFlip also provides an
upper bound O(lnn) for privacy budget ε and it makes the expected edit distance converge
faster than TmF. However, EdgeFlip costs O(n2) and we will show that it could be slightly
redesigned to run in linear time for ε ≥ ln(n(n−1)2m − 1).
For a better comparison on large graphs, we introduce HRG-FixedTree, a fast permuta-
tion sampling, to learn the Hierarchical Random Graph (HRG) model. HRG-FixedTree runs
in O(m logn) and may be of independent interest for the community detection problem [38].
Finally, we present 1K-series scheme which uses the degree sequence instead of the degree dis-
tribution [100] and also runs in linear time.
In brief, our contributions are as follows
• We analyze the two key challenges of graph release under differential privacy: huge output
space and consistency. We also justify the relaxation of ε to lnn using the concept of
ρ-differential identifiability [52].
• We prove an upper bound of privacy budget ε that any differentially private scheme for
graph release should not exceed. The upper bound is validated by our proposed linear
scheme TmF and the existing scheme EdgeFlip. By deeper theoretical analysis, we prove
the fast convergence of EdgeFlip and reveal its limitations. Both TmF and EdgeFlip
exhibit consistent behavior for larger privacy budgets.
• We introduce HRG-FixedTree to reduce the runtime of HRG inference by several orders
of magnitude, making it feasible to perform the inference over large graphs.
• We conduct a thorough evaluation on real graphs from small to medium and large sizes to
see which method performs best for different regimes of ε.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 explains more about the key
concepts and mechanisms of differential privacy. It also analyzes key challenges of ε-DP graph
release. TmF scheme is described in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, we present the deeper analysis
and a linear algorithm for EdgeFlip. We review HRG model, the limitations of full space explo-
ration and then propose a faster technique HRG-FixedTree in section 4.5. The 1K-series method
and the comparison of schemes are described in section 4.6. In Section 4.7, six competitors are
evaluated on a variety of graphs. Finally, Section 4.8 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we explain in more detail about key concepts and mechanisms of differential
privacy. Then, we present the key challenges of graph release under differential privacy.
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4.2.1 Edge Differential Privacy for Graphs
Essentially, ε-differential privacy (ε-DP) [34] is proposed to quantify the notion of indistinguisha-
bility of neighboring databases. In the context of graph release, two graphs G1 = (V1, E1) and
G2 = (V2, E2) are neighbors if V1 = V2, E1 ⊂ E2 and |E2| = |E1|+ 1. Formal definition of ε-DP
for graph data is as follows.
Definition 4.1. A randomized algorithm A is ε-differentially private if for any two neighboring
graphs G1 and G2, and for any output O ∈ Range(A),
Pr[A(G1) ∈ O] ≤ eεPr[A(G2) ∈ O]
Laplace mechanism [34] and Exponential mechanism [63] are two standard techniques in
differential privacy. The latter is a generalization of the former. Laplace mechanism is based on
the concept of global sensitivity of a function f which is defined as ∆f = maxG1,G2 ||f(G1) −
f(G2)||1 where the maximum is taken over all pairs of neighboring G1, G2. Given a function f
and a privacy budget ε, the noise is drawn from a Laplace distribution p(x|λ) = 12λe
−|x|/λ where
λ = ∆f/ε.
Theorem 4.1. (Laplace mechanism [34]) For any function f : G→ Rd, the mechanism A
A(G) = f(G) + 〈Lap1(
∆f
ε
), ..., Lapd(
∆f
ε
)〉 (4.1)
satisfies ε-differential privacy, where Lapi(∆fε ) are i.i.d Laplace variables with scale parameter
∆f
ε .
Geometric mechanism [40] is a discrete variant of Laplace mechanism with integral output
range Z and random noise ∆ generated from a two-sided geometric distribution Geom(α) :
Pr[∆ = δ|α] = 1−α1+αα
|δ|. To satisfy ε-DP, we set α = exp(−ε). We use geometric mechanism in
our 1K-series scheme (Section 4.6) and LouvainDP scheme in the next chapter.
For non-numeric data, the exponential mechanism is a better choice. Its main idea is based
on sampling an output O from the output space O using a score function u. This function
assigns exponentially greater probabilities to outputs of higher scores. Let the global sensitivity
of u be ∆u = maxO,G1,G2 |u(G1, O)− u(G2, O)|.
Theorem 4.2. (Exponential mechanism [62]) Given a score function u : (G × O) → R for a
graph G, the mechanism A that samples an output O with probability proportional to exp( ε.u(G,O)2∆u )
satisfies ε-differential privacy.
Composability is a nice property of differential privacy which is not satisfied by other pri-
vacy models such as k-anonymity. Specifically, parallel composition is a key ingredient in our
algorithm TmF (Section 4.3).
Theorem 4.3. (Sequential and parallel compositions [63]) Let each Ai provide εi-differential
privacy. A sequence of Ai(D) over the dataset D provides Σni=1εi-differential privacy.
Let each Ai provide εi-differential privacy. Let Di be arbitrary disjoint subsets of the dataset
D. The sequence of Ai(Di) provides maxni=1 εi-differential privacy.
52
4.2. Preliminaries
4.2.2 Challenges of Graph Release under Differential Privacy
In this section, we discuss two key challenges of the problem addressed in this chapter: huge
output space and consistency.
The first challenge is about the size of the output space. While the output is a scalar value
for simple counting problems [34], the dimension of the output space becomes much larger (i.e.
O(n2)) for graph release because we publish a noisy graph, not a scalar metric. The definition
of ε-DP requires that for any two neighboring graphs G1, G2 and any output graph G̃, the
randomized algorithm A must satisfy Pr[A(G1)=G̃]
Pr[A(G2)=G̃]
∈ [e−ε, eε].
Note that Pr[A(G1) = G̃] = 0 iff Pr[A(G2) = G̃] = 0, i.e. the distributions of A(G1) and
A(G2) have the same support over the output space. Intuitively, the smaller the output space,
the higher the probability of each G̃ in the space, so the higher the utility because G̃ is more
concentrated around G1. However, the output space is usually super-exponential. If we set no
constraints, the output space of G̃ is of size 2n(n−1)/2 because any edge can appear independently.
If we require the (expected) number of edges in G̃ ism as in Top-m-Filter and EdgeFlip (Sections
4.3 and 4.4), the output space of G̃ reduces to
(n(n−1)/2
m
)
. If we go further with the constraint
of unchanged (expected) degree sequence as in 1K-series (Section 4.6), the size of the output
space of G̃ is approximated by the number of ways to rewire the node stubs [73], i.e. (2m)!. If
we try to keep the expected 2K-series unchanged [88, 100], the output space of G̃ gets smaller
than (2m)! but at the price of much higher sensitivity O(n).
Over the huge output space, the mechanism A is useful only if it gives higher probabilities
to those G̃ “close” to G1 in the sense of utility metrics. So it is very challenging to find the
ε-DP mechanism A that can reduce the output space and at the same time produce a highly
concentrated distribution of G̃ around G1 (as in the case of Laplace noises added to scalar
counting values [34]). The huge output space of G̃ therefore relaxes the stringent requirement of
ε (usually set to 1.0 in the literature). That is why we consider ε = O(lnn) in the experiments.
Note that this limit of ε is much lower than the value 100 in [88], 200-2,000 in [100] or 4,474
in [101].
Another important justification of ε = lnn is the edge re-identification risk quantified by
ρ-differential identifiability (ρ-DI) [52]. In differential privacy, ε limits how much one indi-
vidual can affect the function f , not how much information is revealed about an individual.
Using the semantics of possible worlds, Lee and Clifton show that any ε-DP mechanism satisfies
1
1+(M−1)e−ε -DI where M is the number of possible worlds. In our case, a powerful attacker who
knows all edges EG1 \ {e} tries to infer the existence of e in G1. The number of possible worlds
is M = n(n−1)2 −m, so we have ρ =
1
1+(n(n−1)/2−m−1)e−ε . Substituting ε = lnn into it, we get
ρ ≈ 2n given the fact that m = O(n) for sparse graphs. We believe that the factor ρ = O(1/n)
at ε = lnn is acceptable for edge privacy, especially on million-scale graphs.
For the second challenge, consistency means that if we constantly increase the privacy budget
ε, G̃ must get closer to G1. Ideally, the expected edit distance between G̃ and G1 is one at a
certain value of ε (a.k.a upper bounds of privacy budget to obtain the best utility, see Theorems
4.6 and 4.9). Only Top-m-Filter and EdgeFlip are consistent with ε. The consistency property
allows data owners to have a wider range of choices for ε. For example, they can allow ε up to
lnn or 1.5 lnn for better utility when the privacy is not too stringent.
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4.3 Top-m Filter
We introduce our linear time algorithm Top-m Filter (TmF) in this section. Its basic idea is
to consider the adjacency matrix as a sparse dataset. Most of the real-world graphs expose
sparsity, i.e. the average degree is of O(logn) where n is the number of nodes [73, Table 2].
TmF then uses an idea similar to High-pass Filter in [26] to avoid the materialization of the
noisy adjacency matrix. Our algorithm processes at most 2m cells of the adjacency matrix, so
it is linear in the number of edges. By devising TmF, we also reach an upper bound on privacy
budget for graph publication in ε-DP setting.
4.3.1 Overview
In [26], Cormode et al. propose several summarization techniques for sparse data under dif-
ferential privacy. Let M be a contingency table having the domain size m0 and m1 non-zero
entries (m1  m0 for sparse data). The conventional publication of a noisy table M ′ from M
that satisfies ε-DP requires the addition of Laplace/geometric noise to all m0 entries because the
“differential” item can appear in any counting entry. The entries inM ′ could be filtered (e.g. re-
moving negative ones) and/or sampled to get a noisy summaryM ′′. This direct approach would
be infeasible for huge domain sizes m0. Techniques in [26] avoid materializing the vast noisy
data by computing the summary M ′′ directly from M using filtering and sampling techniques.
Because the counting values are integral, the Geometric mechanism 4.2.1 is preferred.
Compared to the High-pass filtering technique applied to contingency tables [26], our TmF
method is different in two points. First, TmF aims at publication of sparse unweighted graphs
with only 0-or-1 entries, not for any non-negative entries as in contingency tables. Second,
the integral threshold used with the geometric mechanism in [26] makes the expected sum of
noisy entries not equal to the sum of original entries. To keep the expected number of edges in
published graphs unchanged, we use real-value thresholds, which lead to the application of the
Laplace mechanism.
Given the input graph G (represented by an adjacency matrix A) and a privacy budget ε, by
the assumption of edge independence, the naive approach (Naive) adds Laplace noise to all cells
in the upper-triangle of A, i.e. Ãij = Aij +Lap(1/ε) for all j > i ≥ 1. Ãij is then post-processed
by rounding Âij = arg minx=0,1 |Ãij − x|.
Instead of processing each cell independently as in Naive approach, our idea is to keep top-m
noisy values Ãij and reconstruct them to 1-cells. However, the number of edges m needs to be
first obfuscated (note that in edge privacy model, only n is public [105]). We can achieve this
by Laborious filtering, i.e. first computing the noisy number of edge m̃ = m + Lap(1/ε2), then
adding Laplace noise Lap(1/ε1) to all n(n−1)2 cells and selecting top-m̃ noisy cells. This approach
costs O(n2) in space and O(n2 logn) in time because of the materialization of all cells. TmF
avoids such problem by computing the threshold θ so that there are exactly m̃ noisy cells larger
than θ. We call those cells passing cells. Fig. 4.1 depicts the processes of Naive, Laborious
filtering and TmF.
The distributions for noisy values of 1-cells and 0-cells are shown in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. By
setting a threshold θ, the probability of a 0-cell (resp. 1-cell) passing the filter is represented by
the area under the blue curve (resp. the green curve) on the right of the vertical line at x = θ.
Clearly, the area for the 1-cells is always larger than the area for the 0-cells, i.e. the 1-cells have
higher probability to pass the filter. By adjusting the threshold, we can control the number
of 0-cells and 1-cells in the output graphs for given constraints. Such a constraint is the total
number of passing cells.
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Figure 4.1: TmF algorithm
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Figure 4.2: 0 < θ < 1
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Figure 4.3: 1 ≤ θ
We have two cases: 0 < θ < 1 and 1 ≤ θ. The case θ ≤ 0 results in the number of passing
cells is at least n(n−1)4  m̃, and therefore omitted.
Case 1: 0 < θ < 1: the expected number of passing 1-cells is
n1 = m
+∞∫
θ
ε1
2 exp(−ε1|x− 1|)dx =
m
2 (2− e
−ε1(1−θ)) (4.2)
The expected number of passing 0-cells is
n0 = (
n(n− 1)
2 −m)
+∞∫
θ
ε1
2 exp(−ε1|x|)dx
= (n(n− 1)2 −m)
1
2e
−ε1θ
By equating the sum of n1 and n0 to m̃, we can compute the value of θ. Because m̃ =
m + Lap(1/ε2), we have E[m̃] = m. So to simplify the calculations, we set n1 + n0 = m. This
leads to
θ = 12ε1
ln(n(n− 1)2m − 1) +
1
2 (4.3)
Case 2: 1 ≤ θ: Similarly, the number of passing 1-cells is
n1 =
m
2 e
−ε1(θ−1) (4.4)
The number of passing 0-cells is
n0 = (
n(n− 1)
2 −m)
1
2e
−ε1θ (4.5)
The value of θ is
θ = 1
ε1
ln(n(n− 1)4m +
1
2(e
ε1 − 1)) (4.6)
To decide whether θ ≥ 1 or 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, we compute the threshold εt of ε1 at θ = 1. For both
cases,
θ = 1↔ εt = ln(
n(n− 1)
2m − 1) (4.7)
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4.3.2 TmF Algorithm
Algorithm 4 Top-m Filter
Input: input graph G = (V,E), privacy parameters ε1, ε2
Output: sanitized graph G̃
1: G̃← ∅
2: // compute m̃ and θ
3: m̃ = m+ Lap(1/ε2)
4: εt = ln(n(n−1)2m̃ − 1)
5: if ε1 > εt then
6: θ = 12ε1 ln(
n(n−1)
2m̃ − 1) +
1
2
7: else
8: θ = 1ε1 ln(
n(n−1)
4m̃ +
1
2(e
ε1 − 1))
9: // process 1-cells
10: n1 = 0
11: for Aij = 1 do
12: compute Ãij = Aij + Lap(1/ε1)
13: if Ãij > θ then
14: add edge (i, j) to G̃
15: n1 ++
16: // process 0-cells
17: n0 = m̃− n1
18: while n0 > 0 do
19: pick an edge (i, j) /∈ E uniformly at random
20: if G̃ does not contain (i, j) then
21: add edge (i, j) to G̃
22: n0- -
23: return G̃
Algorithm 4 shows steps of Top-m-Filter in which we replace all m by m̃ 11. Line 3 computes
the noisy number of edges m̃ using a budget ε2 (set to 0.1 in our experiments). The threshold θ
is decided in Lines 4-8. Lines 10-15 process 1-cells using the threshold θ. The remaining passing
cells are sampled from 0-cells (Lines 17-22).
Theorem 4.4. The complexity of TmF is O(m)
Proof. Processing 1-cells (Lines 10-18) runs in O(m). The maximum value of n0 (Line 20) is
m̃ ( = m in expectation). For each 0-cell to be processed, the rejection sampling (Lines 22-25)
succeeds with probability at least 1− 2mn(n−1) = 1−O(1/n). So in summary, the total complexity
of TmF is O(m).
Theorem 4.4 makes sense if we consider the complexity O(n2) of the state-of-the-art DER [21]
and HRG-MCMC [105].
11Note that in [26], Cormode et al. made a minor error by using the number of non-zero cells m1 in public
form. We can fix it by reserving a small ε2 to mask m1, similar to what has been done to m in TmF. See more
in Appendix A.
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4.3.3 Privacy Analysis
In this section, we show that TmF satisfies ε-DP where ε = ε1 + ε2. Our TmF consists of two
steps. It is easy to verify that the sensitivity of m is 1. The first step of computing m̃ satisfies
ε2-DP. The second step of processing 1-cells and 0-cells is equivalent to independently adding
noise Lap(1/ε1) to each cell and letting them go through a high-pass filter with threshold θ. The
sensitivity of each cell is also 1. By the assumption of edge independence, parallel composition
(Theorem 4.3) is applicable at cell level. So the second step satisfies ε1-DP. By sequential
composition (Theorem 4.3), TmF satisfies (ε1 + ε2)-DP as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5. TmF satisfies ε-DP where ε = ε1 + ε2.
Now we proceed to the more important result: TmF reduces the expected edit distance
between G̃ and G to O(1) at ε1 = O(logn). The expected edit distance is defined as (to simplify
the notation, we omit the expectation operator in the right hand side expression of the following
formula)
D(G, G̃) = 12(|EG \ EG̃|+ |EG̃ \ EG|) (4.8)
By the analysis in Section 4.3.1, the expected number of passing 1-cells is n1, so the expected
edit distance D(G, G̃) is m−n1. For a deeper analysis of the effect of ε2 on n1, see Appendix A.
At θ = 1, we have n1 = m2 = D(G, G̃) and ε1 = εt = ln(
n(n−1)
2m̃ − 1). The cases of small edit
distance therefore correspond to the case 0 < θ < 1. Setting D(G, G̃) = γm , γ ∈ [ 1m , 1], we
need to find the value of ε1.
D(G, G̃) = γm
↔ m− m2 (2− e
−ε1(1−θ)) = γm
↔ e−ε1(1−θ) = 2γ
↔ θ = 1 + 1
ε1
ln(2γ)
↔ 12ε1
ln(n(n− 1)2m − 1) +
1
2 = 1 +
1
ε1
ln(2γ) (from (4.3))
↔ ε1 = ln(
n(n−1)
2m − 1
4γ2 )
Because real-world graphs are usually sparse, m = O(n), we reach ε1 = O(lnn). Specifically,
ε1 ≈ 3 lnn, ε1 ≈ 2 lnn, ε1 ≈ lnn at γ = 1m , γ =
1√
m
and γ = 0.5
O(
√
d̄)
respectively (d̄ = 2mn is
the average degree). We come up with the following theorem which proves that TmF has the
consistency property (cf. discussion in Section 4.1).
Theorem 4.6. TmF makes the expected edit distance D(G, G̃) decrease to O(1) at ε1 ≈ 3 lnn.
Fig. 4.4 shows the normalized number of passing 1-cells n1/m as a function of ε1/ lnn over
nine graphs (cf. Table 4.2). As we can see, at ε1 = lnn (the solid vertical line), 65-90% of edges
in G are kept in G̃.
This result naturally points out the waste of privacy budget in [89, 100] and [101] where
ε = O(
√
n) or ε = O(n). Interestingly, in HRG-MCMC scheme [105], the sensitivity ∆u ≈ 2 lnn
which means that the non-private HRG-MCMC with ε = 2∆u ≈ 4 lnn costs a budget even
higher than ε ≈ 3 lnn in our non-private TmF. We further analyze HRG in Section 4.5.
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Figure 4.4: n1/m as a function of ε1/ lnn
4.4 EdgeFlip: Differential Privacy via Edge Flipping
We present a deeper analysis of EdgeFlip scheme in this section and a partially linear imple-
mentation of EdgeFlip using an idea similar to TmF.
4.4.1 A Tighter Upper Bound for Privacy Budget
EdgeFlip scheme [69] is also a direct publication scheme as TmF. It is presented in Algorithm 5.
Its basic idea is also based on the nature of edge differential privacy, i.e. all edges are independent.
Given the privacy parameter s ∈ (0, 1], any edge is flipped (from one to zero or vice-versa) with
probability s/2 and preserves its value with probability 1− s/2. The probability ratio that two
neighboring graphs are perturbed to the same graph can be expressed as 1−s/2s/2 = 2/s − 1. To
satisfy ε-DP, we must have 2/s−1 ≤ eε or equivalently ε ≥ ln(2/s−1) as stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.7. (EdgeFlip privacy [69]) EdgeFlip guarantees 1-edge differential privacy for ε ≥
ln(2/s− 1).
The expected number of edges in G̃ is as follows
Theorem 4.8. (Expected number of edges [69]) E[|V ′|] = (1− s)m+ n(n−1)4 s
By considering all edges in G (there are n(n−1)2 such edges), Algorithm 5 incurs a quadratic
complexity and needs to be redesigned for large graphs. First, we compute the expected edit
distance D(G, G̃) = 12(|EG \ EG̃|+ |EG̃ \ EG|) where
|EG \ EG̃| = |m− (1−
s
2)m| =
sm
2 (4.9)
|EG̃ \ EG| =
(
n(n− 1)
2 −m
)
s
2 (4.10)
So, we get D(G, G̃) = n(n−1)s8 . From Theorem 4.7, s =
2
eε+1 . Therefore, the relation between
the expected edit distance and the privacy budget in EdgeFlip is as follows
D(G, G̃) = n(n− 1)4(eε + 1) (4.11)
By solving similar equations as in TmF, we come up with the following theorem
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Algorithm 5 Original EdgeFlip(G, s) [69]
Input: undirected graph G = (V,E), privacy parameter s
Output: anonymized graph G̃
1: G̃ = (V,E′)
2: construct adjacency matrix A from E of G
3: initialize the adjacency matrix A′ for E′ of G̃
4: for aij ∈ A with i < j do
5: if aij is chosen with probability 1− s then
6: set a′ij = a′ji = aij in A′ of G̃
7: else
8: if 0 is chosen with probability 0.5 then
9: set a′ij = a′ji = 0 in A′ of G̃
10: else
11: set a′ij = a′ji = 1 in A′ of G̃
12: return G̃′
Theorem 4.9. (EdgeFlip edit distance) EdgeFlip can reduce the expected edit distance to 1 at
ε = ln
(
n(n−1)
4 − 1
)
≈ 2 lnn,
√
m at ε = ln
(
n(n−1)
4
√
m
− 1
)
≈ 1.5 lnn and m/2 at ε = ln(n(n−1)2m −1)
The expected edit distance in EdgeFlip decreases faster than that of TmF for ε ∈
[
ln(n(n−1)2m − 1),+∞
)
.
Interestingly, D(G, G̃) is equal to m/2 at ε = ln(n(n−1)2m − 1) in both of them. However, when
ε gets smaller, e.g. at ε ≈ 0.5 lnn, D(G, G̃) will be of O(n1.5). This means EdgeFlip costs a
super linear space to store the edges of G̃, not feasible on million-scale graphs. In contrast, TmF
always outputs a noisy G̃ having the expected number of edges of m.
4.4.2 A Partially Linear Implementation
To make EdgeFlip runnable on large graphs, we propose a partially linear-time version as in
Algorithm 6 where we process 1-cells and 0-cells separately. Note that Algorithm 6 is linear-time
only if s ≤ 4mn(n−1) (see Lines 3-6) when the expected number of edges of G̃ is
E[|V ′|] = (1− s)m+ n(n− 1)4 s = m+ (
n(n− 1)
4 −m)s
≤ m+ (n(n− 1)4 −m)
4m
n(n− 1) = 2m−
4m2
n(n− 1) < 2m
We check this condition privately (Line 6) using a small ε2 (set to 0.1 in the experiments)
after computing m̃ and εt. The parameter s is replaced by s̃. For 1-cells, Lines 9 and 10 cost
O(m). Because E[|V ′|] ≤ 2m for s ≤ 4mn(n−1) , the number of 0-cells that are flipped to 1-cells
n0 < E[|V ′|], so EdgeFlip runs in linear time when s ≤ 4mn(n−1) and in quadratic time otherwise.
This is an improvement over the original EdgeFlip [69] (Algorithm 5).
The interested readers may think about the application of filtering technique of TmF to
EdgeFlip for s ≥ 4mn(n−1) . This idea, however, turns out to be infeasible. In TmF (a short-cut
method of Laborious Filtering), all cells of the adjacency matrix are added a continuous Laplace
noise, so the top-m noisy cells are easily computed. EdgeFlip, on the contrary, by using the
flipping technique, outputs discret values 0 or 1. For s ≥ 4mn(n−1) , the number of 1-cells is at
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Algorithm 6 Partially linear-time EdgeFlip(G, s, ε2)
Input: undirected graph G = (V,E), privacy parameter s
Output: anonymized graph G̃
1: G̃← ∅, ε2 = 0.1
2: m̃ = m+ Lap(1/ε2)
3: εt = ln(n(n−1)2m̃ − 1)
4: ε = ln(2s − 1)− ε2
5: s̃ = 2eε+1
6: if ε+ ε2 ≤ εt then return EdgeFlip(G, s̃) [69]
7: // process 1-cells
8: for Aij = 1 do
9: add edge (i, j) to G̃ with prob. 1− s̃/2
10: // process 0-cells
11: n0 = (n(n−1)2 − m̃)
s̃
2
12: while n0 > 0 do
13: pick an edge (i, j) /∈ EG uniformly at random
14: if G̃ does not contain (i, j) then
15: add edge (i, j) to G̃
16: n0- -
17: return G̃′
Figure 4.5: TmF vs. EdgeFlip
least 2m, so we cannot filter the top-m 1-cells. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 visualize the difference
between TmF and EdgeFlip. In TmF, the expected number of edges in G̃ is always m while in
EdgeFlip, this number increases with s (i.e. when ε decreases), making the algorithm infeasible
for small values of ε. This is the EdgeFlip’s tradeoff between the smaller upper bounds than
TmF (Theorem 4.9) and the infeasibility at s ≥ 4mn(n−1) (corresponding to ε ≤ ln(
n(n−1)
2m − 1).
4.5 HRG-based Schemes for Large Graphs
In this section, we propose HRG-FixedTree (section 4.5.2) for the problem of sampling dendro-
gram in HRG-MCMC [105]. It satisfies ε-DP and is runnable on large graphs by reducing the
complexity to O(n logn).
60
4.5. HRG-based Schemes for Large Graphs
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
ε / ln(n)
no
rm
al
iz
ed
 n
um
be
r 
of
 e
dg
es
 
 
n
1
 (EF)
total−edges (EF)
n
1
 (TmF)
total−edges (TmF)
Figure 4.6: The number of passing 1-cells and the total of edges in EdgeFlip and TmF (on
amazon graph)
4.5.1 HRG-MCMC and Limitations
Hierarchical Random Graph (HRG) [24] is a graph summary structure of size O(n). It is a
binary tree with n leaves being graph nodes and n − 1 internal nodes. Fig. 4.7 shows an
example of a graph G and a possible dendrogram T . Each internal node r is equipped with a
connection probability pr = ernLr.nRr , where nLr, nRr are the number of leaf nodes in the left and
right subtrees Lr, Rr of r. Note that er is the number of edges connecting leaf nodes in Lr, Rr.
Given a graph G, the number of possible dendrograms is super-exponential. In reality, we are
concerned with the highly likely dendrograms, where the likelihood of T is measured as
L(T, {pr}) =
∏
r∈T
perr (1− pr)nLrnRr−er (4.12)
The log-likelihood of T is
logL(T, {pr}) = −
∑
r∈T
nLrnRrh(pr) (4.13)
where h(pr) = −pr log pr−(1−pr) log(1−pr) is the Gibbs-Shannon entropy function. Intuitively,
−nLrnRrh(pr) is maximized when pr is close to 0 or 1, which means high-likelihood dendrograms
are those that partition the nodes into groups between which connections are either very common
or very rare. This happens, for example, in community-like or multi-partite graphs.
Clauset et al. [24] propose HRG-Fit using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) to learn
an ensemble of high-likelihood dendrograms. Given the current dendrogram T , a neighbor
dendrogram T ′ is proposed by randomly selecting an internal node r (other than the root node)
and performing 1 of 2 possible subtree reorderings. T ′ is accepted with probability
min(1, exp(logL(T
′))
exp(logL(T )) ) (4.14)
Xiao et at. [105] employ HRGmodel to address the problem of graph release under differential
privacy. Their scheme first privately samples the dendrogram T by a privacy budget ε1 and
then adds noise Lap(1/ε2) to er of the sampled dendrogram. MCMC method fits well to the
exponential mechanism (Definition 4.2), i.e. to sample a huge space of states where direct
computation of the normalization constant is infeasible, MCMC can be used to explore the
space. The score function u of dendrogram T is the log-likelihood of T , i.e. u(G,T ) = logL(T ).
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Figure 4.7: (left) graph G (right) a dendrogram T
To satisfy ε-DP, the acceptance probability in [105] is
min(1,
exp( ε12∆u logL(T
′))
exp( ε12∆u logL(T ))
) (4.15)
where ∆u is the global sensitivity of a dendrogram’s log-likelihood, and ∆u ≈ ln(n24 ) ≈ 2 lnn.
By comparing Formula 4.14 with Formula 4.15, we see that HRG-Fit in [24] is 2∆u-DP in
nature. However, even at ε = 2∆u = 4 lnn, i.e. when HRG-MCMC becomes HRG-Fit, the
sample graphs reconstructed are not good enough as we will see in Section 4.7.
Limitations of MCMC on full HRG. HRG-MCMC induces a huge state space of (2n−
3)!! ≈
√
2(2n)n−1e−n possible dendrograms. Empirical evaluation by Clauset et al. shows
that MCMC on HRG converge relatively quickly, with the likelihood reaching the plateau after
roughly O(n2) steps. In ε-DP setting, Xiao et al. use 1000n steps for MCMC, along with
a reconstruction of O(n2 logn)-complexity. In the subsequent section 4.5.2, we present HRG-
FixedTree with complexity of O(n logn), runnable on large graphs. We also present a fast
sampling technique on dendrograms in section 4.5.3.
4.5.2 HRG-FixedTree: Sampling over Node Permutations
In this section, we present our scheme, HRG-FixedTree for structural inference on large graphs.
HRG-FixedTree reduces the sampling space to n! by fixing a binary tree D and sampling good
permutations of nodes for the leaves of D.
Fig. 4.8 illustrates one step of HRG-Fixed. We fix the dendrogram structure with the leaf
nodes {a, b, c, d, e, f}. Then to perform a MCMC step, we randomly choose two nodes, say
a and d, and swap them to get a permutation proposal. The affected internal nodes (dotted
squares) are updated accordingly. The likelihoods of two permutations are shown under each
permutation. Algorithm 7 is essentially similar to HRG-MCMC. The difference is that HRG-
MCMC has costly MCMC steps while HRG-FixedTree ensures the logarithmic complexity for
each MCMC run as we will see below.
The state space of HRG-FixedTree is the set of all permutations over n nodes, so it is
connected. It is straightforward to verify that the transitions performed in line 3 of HRG-
FixedTree are reversible and ergodic (i.e. any pair of nodeset partitions can be connected by
a sequence of such transitions). Hence, HRG-FixedTree has a unique stationary distribution
in equilibrium. By empirical evaluation, we observe that HRG-FixedTree converges after K|S|
steps for K = 1000.
Fast MCMC step for HRG-FixedTree. Algorithm 8 is called in the line 3 of Algorithm
7. Whenever two leaf nodes u and v are swapped, we have to recompute the pr for each internal
node r along the two paths from u and v to their lowest common ancestor (see Fig. 4.8 for
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Figure 4.8: HRG-FixedTree
Algorithm 7 HRG-FixedTree
Input: input graph G = (V,E), fixed dendrogram structure D, privacy budget ε1
Output: sampled permutation Ssampled
1: initialize the permutation S0
2: for each step i in the Markov chain do
3: pick a neighboring permutation S′ of Si−1 by randomly swapping two nodes in Si−1.
4: accept the transition and set Si = S′ with probability min(1,
exp( ε12∆u logL(S
′))
exp( ε12∆u logL(Si−1))
)
5: // until equilibrium is reached
6: return a sampled partition Ssampled = Si
an example). FastSwap ensures the logarithmic time for this computation by precomputing the
signature of each leaf node and storing in leafPath. Numbering the internal nodes of D from 1
to n, we compute the signature of each node in the form of an array of size logn. The minus
means that the node is in the leaf subtree of that internal node. For example, node a is in the
left subtrees of internal nodes 4,2 and 1, so its signature is {-4,-2,-1}. We sort all the signatures
in ascending order.
FastSwap works as follows. First, it finds affected internal nodes and store them to listP .
This step costs logn. Then the log-likelihood L(S) is subtracted by −nLrnRrh(pr) of all nodes
in listP (see formula 4.13). To remove u from S, we consider all w ∈ N(u) and match the
signatures of w and u to find the infected internal node r. The matching operation here is
understood as to find two elements from the two signatures that their sum is zero. For example,
to remove node a with N(a) = {b, c}, we match signatures of a and b to find the infected internal
node is 4. Similarly, the infected node of the pair (a, c) is 2. The matching operation for each
pair costs logn because all the signatures are already sorted. Let d̄ be the average degree of G,
the removal of u and v from S (line 5 of FastSwap) runs in 2d̄ logn. The replacement of u and
v (after swappping) back to S (line 7 of FastSwap) runs in the same manner. Then all nodes
r ∈ listP are updated with new values of er and pr and the log-likelihood L(S) is added by
−nLrnRrh(pr). Finally, u and v update their pointers to parent/child nodes to keep the tree
consistent.
Because each call to FastSwap costs 2d̄ logn and we run k.n MCMC steps, the complexity
of HRG-FixedTree is O(k.nd̄ logn) = O(k.m. logn) as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.10. HRG-FixedTree runs in O(k.m logn), where k = 1000.
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Algorithm 8 FastSwap
Input: input graph G = (V,E), fixed dendrogram structure D, permutation S, L(S), two nodes
u, v
Output: log-likelihood L(S′) where S′ is S with u, v swapped
1: find affected internal nodes listP
2: for each node r ∈ listP do
3: L(S) = L(S) + nLrnRrh(pr)
4: remove u and v from S
5: swap u, v in leafPath
6: add u and v back to S
7: for each node r ∈ listP do
8: update er and pr
9: L(S) = L(S)− nLrnRrh(pr)
10: update pointers of u and v
4.5.3 Fast Sampling From Dendrogram
Apart from costly MCMC of 1000n steps, another bottle-neck in HRG-MCMC [105] is its Al-
gorithm 3 (Generate Sanitized Graph), which runs in O(n2 logn) to generate a sanitized graph
G̃ from a noisy T̃ . In this section, we point out that from any dendrogram T , we can sample a
graph G̃ in O(n logn).
In Algorithm 3 of HRG-MCMC, for each pair of nodes (i, j), the lowest common ancestor r
of i and j is computed. Then the edge (i, j) is placed in G̃ with probability pr. We call their
approach node-pair based reconstruction. Now we propose edge based reconstruction.
First, at each internal node r, we build the nodesets of its left and right children. For example
the root node on the right of Fig. 4.7 has left nodeset of {a, b, c} and right nodeset of {d, e, f}.
This step costs time and space of O(n logn) by bottom-up construction. Then we consider each
internal node r (there are n − 1 such nodes) and sample er edges between r’s left and right
nodesets. This step costs O(m) because
∑
r∈T er = m. In reality, m = O(n logn) so the total
complexity of edge based reconstruction is O(n logn).
Theorem 4.11. From any dendrogram generated by HRG-MCMC or HRG-FixedTree, a sample
graph can be generated in O(n logn).
4.6 1K-series Scheme
4.6.1 Algorithm
First coined by Mahadevan et al. [60], the term dK-series specifies all degree correlations within
d-sized subgraphs of a given graph. So, the term 0k-series represents the average degree of all
nodes; the term 1K-series denotes the degree distribution; the term 2K-series denotes the graph’s
joint degree distribution and so on. For example, the graph in Fig. 4.7 has {0K: d̄ = 2.33}, {1K:
P(2)=4, P(3)=2} and {2K: P(2,2)=2 P(2,3)=4}. In this section, we describe a simple version
of 1k-Series scheme which is slightly different from [100]. As shown in [100], the differentially
private 2K-series scheme is only better than 1K-series with weak privacy enforcement (very large
ε value). By TmF and EdgeFlip we know that the upper-bound for ε is only O(logn), so we
focus on 1K-series.
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Algorithm 9 outlines the main steps of 1K-series scheme. Our 1K-series scheme is different
from DP-1K of [100] in several aspects. First, we use geometric mechanism (see section 4.2)
because the degree values are always integral. Second, our 1K-series uses the degree sequence
having the global sensitivity of 2 while DP-1K relies on the degree distribution with the global
sensitivity of 4. We regenerate noisy graphs from the noisy degree sequence so that the node ids
are kept intact for the cut queries (see section 4.7.1). The following example shows the difference
between the degree distribution and the degree sequence.
Example 4.1. The degree distribution of the graph in Fig. 4.7 is {0,0,4,2,0,0}, i.e. we have no
nodes of degree 0, 1, 4 or 5, 4 nodes of degree 2 and 2 nodes of degree 3. The degree sequence
is {2,2,3,3,2,2}. If we remove the edge (a,b), the new degree distribution is {0,2,2,2,0,0}, so
the L1-distance is 4. The degree sequence, on the other hand, becomes {1,1,3,3,2,2}, so the
L1-distance is 2.
After adding noise (lines 1 to 3), we compute the sum s of noisy degrees (line 4) and sort
{d̃(u)}. We adjust negative noisy degrees (lines 6 to 9) so that all of them are positive and their
sum is still equal to s. Finally, line 10 regenerates a noisy sample graph G̃ from {d̃(u)} using
the configuration model [73].
Algorithm 9 1K-series
Input: input graph G = (V,E), privacy budget ε
Output: anonymized graph G̃
1: α = exp(−ε/2)
2: get degree sequence {d(u)}, u ∈ V
3: add geometric noise d̃(u) = d(u) +Geom(α), u ∈ V
4: s =
∑
u d̃u
5: sort {d̃u}
6: ∀u ∈ V , ru = d̃u/s if d̃u > 0, ru = 1/s otherwise
7: c =
∑
udru.se
8: nc = n− (c− s)
9: d̃u = dru.se if u ≤ nc, d̃u = dru.se − 1 otherwise
10: generate G̃ from {d̃u} using the configuration model [73]
11: return G̃
4.6.2 Comparison of Schemes
We compare the aforementioned schemes by their model complexity, runtime/space complex-
ity and the graph sizes that they can run on. TmF and EdgeFlip output directly the noisy
graphs while the two HRG-based schemes as well as DER and 1K-series employ an intermediary
structure to model the true graph.
DER [21] uses a quadtree to partition the adjacency matrix to quadrants in h levels. All
nodes (except the root node) store the noisy count of 1-cells in their rectangular subregion. So
the model complexity of DER is O(2h). 1K-series has the model complexity of O(n) by using the
degree sequence. HRG-MCMC and HRG-FixedTree privately fit the true graph into a binary
tree (dendrogram), so their model complexity is also O(n).
DER costs O(n2) for storing the count summary matrix as shown in [21] while the other
schemes incur only O(m) for storing the graph G. Table 4.1 shows the comparison of the
schemes investigated in this chapter.
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Table 4.1: Comparison of schemes
Model Runtime Space Graph size
Direct publication TmF n/a O(m) O(m) 10
6
EdgeFlip* [69] n/a O(m) O(m) 106
Model-based publication
HRG-MCMC [105] O(n) O(n2) O(m) 104
HRG-FixedTree O(n) O(k.m logn) O(m) 106
DER [21] O(2h) O(n2) O(n2) 104
1K-series [100] O(n) O(m) O(m) 106
(* Recall that EdgeFlip is linear only for ε ≥ ln(n(n−1)2m − 1))
4.7 Experiments
Our evaluation aims to compare the efficiency (in runtime) and the effectiveness (in terms of
utility metrics) among the competitors. We pick six small and medium-sized graphs and three
large ones 12. In Table 4.2, logLKLouvain, logLKHRG-MCMC, logLKHRG-Fixed and logLKInit are the
log-likelihoods of the non-private dendrograms created by Louvain algorithm [9], HRG-MCMC,
HRG-FixedTree and bottom-up binary initialization (i.e. nodes 1 and 2 are paired, nodes 3 and
4 are paired and so on) respectively. By Louvain method, we recursively partition the graph
into nested communities until their sizes are smaller than a threshold (e.g. 50 or 100 nodes).
Then we build a dendrogram from those communities.
All algorithms are implemented in Java and run on a desktop PC with Intelr Core i7-4770@
3.4Ghz, 16GB memory.
The typical utility metrics are listed in Section 4.7.1. We assess the effectiveness of TmF in
Section 4.7.2. Then the non-private versions of HRG-based schemes and 1K-series are evaluated
in Section 4.7.3. Finally, Section 4.7.4 compares the overall performance of all competitors and
clarifies the contribution of each utility metric.
4.7.1 Utility Metrics
We reuse the statistics in Section 3.5.2 for utility measurement along with the three following
metrics
- Degree distribution: SDD is the normalized degree histogram.
- Distance distribution: SPDD is the normalized node-pair shortest-path histogram.
- Cut queries: Scut(X,Y ) is the number of edges between two disjoint node sets X and Y .
We group twelve metrics into three groups: degree-based metrics (SAD, SMD, SDV , SPL,
SDD), path-based metrics (SAPD, SEDiam, SCL, SDiam, SPDD) and other metrics (SCC , Scut).
All of the above statistics are taken average over 20 sample graphs. SAPD, SCL, SEDiam,
SDiam are computed exactly in six small graphs. In amazon, dblp and youtube, we estimate
SAPD, SCL, SEDiam and SDiam using HyperANF [12]. The relative error (rel.err) for each metric
S is computed as |S(G)−Savg(G̃)|S(G) except SDD and SPDD whose errors are computed as |S(G) −
Savg(G̃)|1/2. The number of cut queries is 1,000 and the size of node set does not exceed 500.
The schemes are abbreviated as EdgeFlip (EF), Top-m-Filter (TmF), 1K-series (1K), DER,
HRG-MCMC and HRG-FixedTree (HRG-Fixed). We test all schemes for ε in {2.0, 0.25lnn,
0.5lnn, 0.75lnn, lnn, 1.25lnn, 1.5lnn}. The rationale behind this choice of ε is presented in
Section 4.2.2. By ρ-differential identifiability [52], the identification risk is ρ = O(1/n) (resp.
O(1/
√
n)) for ε = lnn (resp. ε = 1.5 lnn). At ε = 2 lnn, ρ = O(1), i.e. blatantly non-private.
12available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~mejn/netdata/ and http://snap.stanford.edu/data/index.html
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Table 4.2: Graph dataset statistics (k:thousand, m:million)
Dataset #Nodes #Edges logLKLouvain logLKHRG-MCMC logLKHRG-Fixed logLKInit
polbooks 105 441 -957 -781 -896 -1248
polblogs 1,222 16,714 -65.6k -59.3k -50.7k -74k
as20graph 6,474 12,572 -71k -73.8k -87.6k -100k
wiki-Vote 7,066 100,736 -576k -556k -432k -618k
ca-HepPh 11,204 117,619 -328k -746k -377k -854k
ca-AstroPh 17,903 196,972 -903k -1426k -1,006k -1,515k
amazon 334k 925k -3.6m n/a -8.6m -11.1m
dblp 317k 1,050k -5.0m n/a -9.3m -11.1m
youtube 1,134k 2,987k -24.7m n/a -31.5m -35.8m
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Figure 4.9: Effectiveness of TmF: degree distributions (log-log scale)
Therefore, the values of ε ≥ 2 lnn are not valid. Recall that EF is only linear with ε in {lnn,
1.25lnn, 1.5lnn} while DER and HRG-MCMC only runs on six small graphs. We also test EF
at ε = 0.75 lnn on six small graphs when the number of edges in output graphs starts to become
super-linear.
4.7.2 Effectiveness of TmF
We assess the utility of TmF by varying ε1 while fixing ε2 = 0.1. Figures 4.9 and 4.10 display
SDD and SPDD for three graphs as20graph, ca-AstroPh and amazon. At ε = 2.0 and 0.5 lnn,
TmF produces highly deformed degree distributions and distance distributions. Additionally,
the SDD and SPDD at ε = 2.0 and 0.5 lnn are nearly identical. This could be explained by
the large edit distance D(G, G̃) at those values. At ε = lnn, the noisy degree and distance
distributions become asymptotic to the true ones.
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Figure 4.10: Effectiveness of TmF: distance distributions
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4.7.3 HRG-based Schemes
In this section, we assess the effectiveness of HRG model. We try to answer the question: is
HRG a good model for graph summarization? The columns logLKLouvain, logLKHRG-MCMC and
logLKHRG-Fixed of Table 6.2 shows the log-likelihood of non-private dendrograms generated by
Louvain method, HRG-MCMC and HRG-Fixed. As one of the best community detection tech-
niques, Louvain method (non-private) [9] gives us high-likelihood dendrograms, especially on the
three large graphs. HRG-MCMC and HRG-Fixed always return dendrograms of higher likeli-
hood than the initial D0 (logLKInit). The non-private HRG-MCMC samples better dendrograms
than HRG-Fixed only on polbooks and as20graph.
As we can see in Table 4.3, despite the high-likelihood scores, dendrograms generated by
Louvain and non-private HRG based schemes cannot reduce the relative errors significantly.
This fact implies inherent limitations of HRG models. In other words, ε-DP schemes based on
HRG models are not consistent with ε. The same conclusion could be draw for 1K-series, i.e.
compared with the true graph, the graphs regenerated from the true degree sequence have a
significant gap in utility metrics.
Fig. 4.11 compares the relative errors of HRG-MCMC and HRG-Fixed on six small/medium
graphs in two cases: with and without SPL. Clearly, the relative error of SPL in HRG-MCMC
is much more stable than in HRG-Fixed. In other words, SPL is the main contributor to the
high relative error of HRG-Fixed in most of the cases. Without SPL, HRG-Fixed outperforms
HRG-MCMC on polblogs, wiki-Vote, ca-HepPh and ca-AstroPh. Details on the consistency of
individual utility metric are investigated in the next section.
Table 4.3: Relative error of non-private 1K-series and HRG-based schemes
Dataset 1K-series Louvain HRG-MCMC HRG-Fixed
polbooks 0.191 0.390 0.242 0.255
polblogs 0.089 0.405 0.277 0.474
as20graph 0.122 0.712 0.186 0.693
wiki-Vote 0.046 0.486 0.318 0.452
ca-HepPh 0.248 0.357 0.439 0.241
ca-AstroPh 0.220 0.370 0.352 0.309
amazon 0.381 0.372 n/a 0.511
dblp 0.265 0.371 n/a 0.327
youtube 0.200 0.584 n/a 0.523
4.7.4 Comparative Evaluation
We report the comparisons between the competitors in Fig. 4.12. As ε increases (lower privacy
guarantee), we gain better utility (lower relative errors) for TmF and EF while the other methods
do not have this trend. TmF performs poorly for ε in {2, 0.25 lnn, 0.5 lnn, 0.75 lnn} because
of the number of passing 1-cells is low. As ε exceeds the threshold εt ≈ lnn, the edit distance
D(G, G̃) decreases quickly (i.e. the number of passing 1-cells increases, Fig. 4.4), so does the
relative error. At ε = 0.75 lnn, TmF works slightly better than EF except on as20graph. We
do not run EF at ε = 0.75 lnn on the three large graphs because the number of edges becomes
super-linear in this case and the relative errors of the five degree-based metrics overwhelm the
rest.
1K-series provides the best utility for ε in {2, 0.25 lnn, 0.5 lnn, 0.75 lnn}. Because the degree
sequence has small sensitivity, a small privacy budget is enough to keep the degree sequence
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Figure 4.11: Relative errors of HRG-MCMC and HRG-Fixed (with and without SPL)
almost identical to that of the true graph while larger values of ε are redundant. Put differently,
1K-series benefits a lot from the five degree-based metrics (details below in Figures 4.13, 4.14
and 4.15). On the six small graphs, HRG-MCMC performs better than DER but the gap is
small in polbooks, wiki-Vote, ca-HepPh and ca-AstroPh.
Over the six small and medium graphs, HRG-Fixed is comparable to HRG-MCMC on pol-
books and ca-AstroPh. It works better than HRG-MCMC only on ca-HepPh. However, the
near-linear complexity makes HRG-Fixed runnable on large graphs.
Except TmF and EdgeFlip, the remaining schemes (1K, HRG-MCMC, HRG-Fixed and
DER) do not show strong consistency with ε. We argue that the consistency of TmF and
EdgeFlip is due to their nature of direct publication while the remaining schemes are model-
based (indirect) and rely too much on regeneration processes. In direct methods, we quantify
exactly the relationship between the edit distance D(G1, G̃) and ε. On the contrary, the similar
quantification in model-based methods is not well defined and to our knowledge, has not been
considered in the literature.
To see how much each metric contributes to the average relative error, we plot the relative
errors for all twelve metrics in Figures 4.13, 4.14 and 4.15. We pick the three graphs polbooks,
ca-HepPh and dblp. Because all the subfigures have the same set of curves, we only show the
legend in the first subfigure to save the space for the plots. TmF and EF are consistent with
increasing ε on all metrics except SAD which is preserved in expectation, i.e. zero relative error.
The model-based schemes show weak consistency on several metrics, for example HRG-Fixed
on SDD and SDiam. 1K-series, the best scheme for small ε, has nearly zero errors on the five
degree-based metrics but it gives poor results on the path-based metrics as well as SCC . HRG-
Fixed outperforms HRG-MCMC on many metrics, especially on the five path-based metrics
and SCC . The good performance of 1K-series and HRG-based schemes on different subsets of
metrics confirms again the information loss in each model-based scheme. Reversely, it suggests
that more complex summarization structures can combine the best of both models. We leave
this for future work.
The runtime is reported in Table 4.4. As expected, TmF, EF and 1K-series run very fast,
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Figure 4.12: Comparative evaluation: the relative error is averaged on twelve utility metrics
linear in the number of edges. They run in several seconds on youtube, the largest graph
considered in this chapter. Although incurring the quadratic time complexity as HRG-MCMC,
DER runs faster because HRG-MCMC has the big constant k = 1000. Both of them is infeasible
on the three large graphs. Recall that HRG-Fixed runs in O(m logn), an improvement over
HRG-MCMC [105].
4.8 Conclusion
We prove an upper bound O(lnn) for the privacy budget ε that any differentially private scheme
for graph release should not exceed. Based on a filtering technique, we design the algorithm TmF
that reduces the edit distance between the noisy graph and the true graph to O(1) at an upper
bound of ε = O(lnn). By further investigation of EdgeFlip, we show that it also satisfies the
upper bound. Moreover, TmF and EdgeFlip, as representatives of direct publication schemes,
show a strong consistency with the large privacy budgets. We explain the inherent information
loss in model-based methods which prevents them from achieving the perfect utility for ε ≥
1.5 lnn. On scalability, we show that TmF, EdgeFlip (partially), HRG-FixedTree and 1K-series
have linear complexity while HRG-MCMC and DER do not. The comprehensive experiments
demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of our TmF and explain the inconsistency in the
model-based schemes HRG-MCMC, HRG-Fixed, DER and 1K-series. For future work, we intend
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Figure 4.13: Relative errors of utility metrics on polblogs
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Figure 4.14: Relative errors of utility metrics on ca-HepPh
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Figure 4.15: Relative errors of utility metrics on dblp
to (1) find better consistent schemes and (2) examine summary structures for graphs other than
HRG and 1K-series.
The next chapter presents another application of differential privacy. It tackles the problem
of ε-DP community detection.
Table 4.4: Runtime in milliseconds
Dataset 1K TmF EF DER HRG-MCMC HRG-Fixed
polbooks 6 3 3 13 3922 665
polblogs 39 24 36 1,486 1,576,871 20,878
as20graph 47 30 31 25,140 544,298 31,591
wiki-Vote 232 113 86 45,486 1,185,644 153,488
ca-HepPh 287 135 95 81,989 5,547,744 206,520
ca-AstroPh 469 226 97 182,556 14,734,655 358,263
amazon 2,780 1,565 1,185 n/a n/a 3,743,018
dblp 3,188 1,576 524 n/a n/a 4,091,923
youtube 11,369 5,265 1,853 n/a n/a 13,049,549
72
Chapter 5
Detecting Communities under
Differential Privacy
Contents
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.2 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.2.1 Louvain Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.2.2 Challenges of Community Detection under Differential Privacy . . . . . 76
5.3 Input Perturbation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.3.1 LouvainDP: Louvain Method on Noisy Supergraphs . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.3.2 Other Input Perturbation Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.4 Algorithm Perturbation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.4.1 ModDivisive: Top-down Exploration of Cohesive Groups . . . . . . . . . 80
5.4.2 HRG-MCMC and Variants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.5 Experiments and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.5.1 Quality Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.5.2 LouvainDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.5.3 ModDivisive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.5.4 Comparative Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.1 Introduction
Graphs represent a rich class of data observed in daily life where entities are described by nodes
and their connections are characterized by edges. Apart from microscopic (node level) and
macroscopic (graph level) configurations, many complex networks display a mesoscopic struc-
ture, i.e. they appear as a combination of components fairly independent of each other. These
components are called communities, modules or clusters and the problem of how to reveal them
plays a significant role in understanding the organization and function of complex networks. Over
the last decade, a great number of algorithms for community detection (CD) have been proposed
to address the problem in a variety of settings, such as undirected/directed, unweighted/weighted
networks and non-overlapping/overlapping communities (for a comprehensive survey, see [38]).
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These approaches, however, are adopted in a non-private manner, i.e. a data collector
(such as Facebook) knows all the contributing users and their relationships before running CD
algorithms. The output of such a CD, in the simplest form, is a clustering of nodes. Even in this
case, i.e. only a node clustering (not the whole graph) is revealed, contributing users’ privacy
may still be put at risk (cf. Section 2.3.2).
Community detection is closely related to the problems of clustering (e.g. k-Means [94])
and recommender systems [56] (see Section 5.2.2). A straightforward application of community
detection is to predict missing links (or link recommendation), the focus of link prediction
problem [57]. For example, given noisy output clusterings by private community detection
algorithms, the analysts may predict future links by assigning higher probabilities to intra-
cluster links and lower probabilities to inter-cluster links. The prediction accuracy in this case
would be lower than the case of non-private high-quality clusterings but it may still be useful.
In this chapter, we address the problem of CD from the perspective of differential privacy [34].
This privacy model offers a formal definition of privacy with a lot of interesting properties: no
computational/informational assumptions about attackers, data type-agnosticity, composability
and so on [63]. By differential privacy, we want to ensure the existence of connections between
users to be hidden in the output clustering while keeping the low distortion of clusters compared
to the ones generated by the corresponding non-private algorithms.
As far as we know, the problem is quite new and only mentioned in the recent work [69] where
Mülle et al. use a sampling technique to perturb the input graph so that it satisfies differential
privacy before running the conventional CD algorithms. This technique (we call it EdgeFlip
afterwards) is classified as input perturbation in differential privacy literature (the other two
categories are algorithm perturbation and output perturbation). Similarly, TmF approach [77]
can apply to the true graph to get noisy output graphs as in the work of Mülle et al. Earlier,
1k-Series [100], Density Explore Reconstruct (DER) [21] and HRG-MCMC [105] are the best
known methods for graph structure release under differential privacy. These methods can be
followed by any exact CD algorithm to get a noisy clustering satisfying differential privacy. We
choose Louvain method [9] as such a CD algorithm. However, as we will see in the experiments,
the output clusterings by the aforementioned methods have very low modularity scores. This
fact necessitates new methods for CD problem under differential privacy.
Our main contributions are the new schemes LouvainDP (input perturbation) and ModDivi-
sive (algorithm perturbation) which perform much better than the state-of-the-art. LouvainDP
is a high-pass filtering method that randomly groups nodes into supernodes of equal size to
build a weighted supergraph. LouvainDP is guaranteed to run in linear time. ModDivisive is
a top-down approach which privately divides the node set into the k-ary tree guided by the
modularity score at each level. The main technique used in ModDivisive is the Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) to realize the exponential mechanism [62]. We show that ModDivisive’s
runtime is linear in the number of nodes, the height of the binary tree and the burn-in factor
of MCMC. The linear complexity enables us to examine million-scale graphs in minutes. The
experiments show the high modularity and low distortion of the output clusters by LouvainDP
and ModDivisive.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We analyze the major challenges of community detection under differential privacy. We
explain why techniques borrowed from k-Means fail and how the difficulty of ε-DP recom-
mender systems justifies a relaxation of ε.
• We design an input perturbation scheme LouvainDP that runs in linear time using the
high-pass filtering technique from [26] and Louvain method [9].
74
5.2. Preliminaries
• We propose an algorithm perturbation scheme ModDivisive as a divisive approach by
using the modularity-based score function in the exponential mechanism. We prove that
modularity has small global sensitivity and ModDivisive also runs in linear time.
• We conduct a thorough evaluation on real graphs of different sizes and show the outper-
formance of LouvainDP and ModDivisive over the state-of-the-art.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 briefly introduces the popular Louvain
method and the major challenges of ε-DP community detection. Section 5.3 focuses on the
category of input perturbation in which we propose LouvainDP and review several recent input
perturbation schemes. We describe ModDivisive in Section 5.4. We compare all the presented
schemes on real graphs in Section 5.5. Finally, we present our conclusions and suggest future
work in Section 5.6.
Table 5.1 summarizes the key notations used in this chapter.
Table 5.1: List of notations
Symbol Definition
G = (V,EG) true graph with n = |V | and m = |EG|
G′ = (V,EG′) neighboring graph of G
G̃ = (V,EG̃) sample noisy output graph
G1 = (V1, E1) supergraph generated by LouvainDP
k fan-out of the tree in ModDivisive
K burn-in factor in MCMC-based algorithms
λ common ratio to distribute the privacy budget
C a clustering of nodes in G
Q(C,G) modularity of the clustering C on graph G
5.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we review Louvain method and the major challenges of ε-DP community detec-
tion.
5.2.1 Louvain Method
Since its introduction in 2008, Louvain method [9] becomes one of the most cited methods for
the community detection task. It optimizes the modularity by a bottom-up folding process.
The algorithm is divided in passes each of which is composed of two phases that are repeated
iteratively. Initially, each node is assigned to a different community. So, there will be as many
communities as there are nodes in the first phase. Then, for each node i, the method considers
the gain of modularity if we move i from its community to the community of a neighbor j (a
local change). The node i is then placed in the community for which this gain is maximum and
positive (if any), otherwise it stays in its original community. This process is applied repeatedly
and sequentially for all nodes until no further improvement can be achieved and the first pass
is then complete.
We demonstrate Louvain method in Fig.5.1 by a graph of 13 nodes and 20 edges. If each node
forms its own singleton community, the modularity Q will be -0.0825. In the first pass of Louvain
method, each node moves to the best community selected from its neighbors’ communities.
We get the partition [{0, 1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5, 6, 11, 12}, {7, 8, 9, 10}] with modularity 0.46375. The
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Figure 5.1: Louvain method
second phase of first pass builds a weighted graph corresponding to the partition by aggregating
communities. The second pass repeats the folding process on this weighted graphs to reach the
final partition [{0, 1, 2}, {3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12}, {7, 8, 9, 10}] with modularity 0.47.
This simple algorithm has several advantages as stated in [9]. First, its steps are intuitive
and easy to implement, and the outcome is unsupervised. Second, the algorithm is extremely
fast, i.e. computer simulations on large modular networks suggest that its complexity is linear
on typical and sparse data. This is due to the fact that the possible gains in modularity are easy
to compute and the number of communities decreases drastically after just a few passes so that
most of the running time is concentrated on the first iterations. Third, the multi-level nature
of the method produces a hierarchical structure of communities which allows multi-resolution
analysis, i.e the user can zoom in the graph to observe its structure with the desired resolution.
In addition, Louvain method is runnable on weighted graphs. This fact supports naturally our
scheme LouvainDP as described in the next section.
5.2.2 Challenges of Community Detection under Differential Privacy
In this section, we explain why community detection under differential privacy is challenging.
We show how techniques borrowed from related problems fail. We also advocate the choice of ε
as a function of the graph size n.
The problem of differentially private community detection is closely related to ε-DP k-Means
clustering and recommender systems. The ε-DP k-Means is thoroughly discussed in [94]. How-
ever, techniques from ε-DP k-Means are not suitable to ε-DP community detection. First, items
in k-Means are in low-dimensional spaces and the number of clusters k is usually small. This
contrast to the case of community detection where nodes lie in a n-dimensional space and the
number of communities varies from tens to tens of thousands, not to say the communities may
overlap or be nested (multi-scale). Second, items in ε-DP k-Means are normalized to [−1, 1]d
while the same preprocessing seems invalid in ε-DP community detection. Moreover, the output
of k-Means usually consists of equal-sized balls while this is not true for communities in graphs.
Considering the graph as a high-dimensional dataset, we tried the private projection technique
in [50] which is followed by spectral clustering, but the modularity scores of the output are not
better than random clustering.
Recent papers on ε-DP recommender systems [6, 43] show that privately learning the clus-
tering of items from user ratings is hard unless we relax the value of ε up to logn. Banerjee
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et al. [6] model differentially private mechanisms as noisy channels and bound the mutual in-
formation between the generative sources and the privatized sketches. They show that in the
information-rich regime (each user rates O(n) items), their Pairwise-Preference succeeds if the
number of users is Ω(n logn/ε). Compared to ε-DP community detection where the number of
users is n, we should have ε = Ω(logn). Similarly, in D2P scheme, Guerraoui et al. [43] draw a
formula for ε as
ε
(p,0,λ)
D2P = ln(1 +
(1− p).NE
p.|Gλ|
) (5.1)
where λ is the distance used to conceal the user profiles (λ = 0 reduces to the classic notion
of differential privacy). NE is the number of items which is exactly n in community detection.
|Gλ| is the minimum size of user profiles at distance λ over all users (|Gλ| = o(NE) except at
unreasonably large λ). Clearly, at p = 0.5 (as used in [43]), we have ε(0.5,0,λ)D2P ≈ lnn. The sampling
technique in D2P is very similar to EdgeFlip [69] which is shown ineffective in ε-DP community
detection for ε ∈ (0, 0.5 lnn) (Section 5.5). Note that ε-DP community detection is unique in the
sense that the set of items and the set of users are the same. Graphs for community detection
are more general than bipartite graphs in recommender systems. In addition, modularity Q (c.f.
Formula 2.1) is non-monotone, i.e. for two disjoint sets of nodes A and B, Q(A ∪ B) may be
larger, smaller than or equal to Q(A) +Q(B).
To further emphasize the difficulty of ε-DP community detection, we found that IDC scheme
[44] using Sparse Vector Technique [35, Section 3.6] is hardly feasible. As shown in Algorithm
1 of [44], to publish a noisy graph that can approximately answer all cut queries with bounded
error m0.25n/ε0.5, IDC must have B(α) “yes” queries among all k queries. B(α) may be as low
as
√
m but k = 22n. In the average case, IDC incurs exponential time to complete.
The typical epsilon in the literature is 1.0 or less. However, this value is only applicable to
graph metrics of low sensitivity O(1) such as the number of edges, the degree sequence. The
global sensitivity of other metrics like the diameter, the number of triangles, 2K-series etc. is
O(n), calling for smooth sensitivity analysis (e.g. [79]). For counting queries, Laplace/Geometric
mechanisms are straightforward on real/integral (metric) spaces. However, direct noise adding
mechanisms on the space P of all ways to partition the nodeset V are non-trivial because
|P| ≈ nn and P is non-metric. Compared to ε-DP graph release (TmF and EdgeFlip schemes
in Chapter 4) and ε-DP recommender systems discussed above which use ε = lnn for the super-
exponential spaces of size O(2n(n−1)/2), ε-DP community detection clearly needs lower privacy
budget.
To conclude, ε-DP community detection is challenging and requires new techniques. In this
chapter, we evaluate the schemes for ε up to 0.5 lnn. At ε = 0.5 lnn, the multiplicative ratio
(c.f. Definition 4.1) is eε = e0.5 lnn =
√
n. We believe it is a reasonable threshold for privacy
protection compared to ε = lnn (i.e. eε = n) in ε-DP graph release and ε-DP recommender
systems.
5.3 Input Perturbation
In this section, we propose the linear scheme LouvainDP that uses a filtering technique to build
a noisy weighted supergraph and calls the exact Louvain method subsequently. Then we discuss
several recent ε-DP schemes that can be classified as input perturbation. Fig.5.2a sketches the
basic steps of the input perturbation paradigm.
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(a) Input perturbation (b) Algorithm perturbation
Figure 5.2: Two categories of ε-DP community detection
5.3.1 LouvainDP: Louvain Method on Noisy Supergraphs
The basic idea of LouvainDP is to create a noisy weighted supergraph G1 from G by grouping
nodes into supernodes of equal size k. Then we apply the filtering technique of Cormode et
al. [26] to ensure that there are only O(m) noisy weighted edges in G1. Finally, we run the exact
community detection on G1.
The high-pass filtering technique [26] was mentioned in 4.3.1. In our LouvainDP, the su-
pergraph G1 is an instance of sparse data with the domain size m0 = n1(n1+1)2 where n1 is
the number of supernodes and m1 is the number of non-zero entries corresponding to non-zero
superedges. We use the one-sided filtering [26] to efficiently compute G1 with O(m) edges in
linear time.
Algorithm
LouvainDP can run with either geometric or Laplace noise. We describe the version of geometric
noise in Algorithm 10.
Given the group size k, LouvainDP starts with a supergraph G1 having b |V |k c nodes by
randomly permuting the nodeset V and grouping every k consecutive nodes into a supernode
(lines 1-4). The permutation prevents the possible bias of node ordering in G. The set of
superedges E1 is easily computed from G. Note that m1 = |E1| ≤ m due to the fact that each
edge of G appears in one and only one superedge. The domain size is m0 = n1(n1+1)2 (i.e. we
consider all selfloops in G1). The noisy number of non-zero superedges is m1 = |E1|+Lap(1/ε2).
Then by one-sided filtering [26], we estimate the threshold θ (line 7) and the number of passing
zero superedges s (line 8). For each non-zero superedge, we add a geometric noise and add the
superedge to G1 if the noisy value is not smaller than θ. For s zero superedges e1(i, j) /∈ E1, we
draw an integral weight w from the distribution Pr[X ≤ x] = 1− αx−θ+1 and add e1(i, j) with
weight w to G1 if w > 0.
Complexity
LouvainDP runs in O(m) because the loops to compute superedges (Line 5) and to add geometric
noises (lines 9-12) cost O(m). We have s = (m0 − m1) α
θ
1+α ≤
m0−m1
1+α
(1+α)m1
m0−m1 = m1 (see Line
7). So the processing of s zero-superedges costs O(m). Moreover, Louvain method (line 17) is
empirically linear in m1 [9]. Informally, we can state that LouvainDP’s runtime is O(m) on any
graph where Louvain takes O(m) to run.
Privacy Analysis
In LouvainDP, we use a small privacy budget ε2 = 0.1 to compute the noisy number of non-zero
superedges m1. The remaining privacy budget ε1 is used for the geometric mechanism Geom(α).
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Algorithm 10 LouvainDP(G, s)
Input: undirected graph G, group size k, privacy budget ε
Output: noisy partition C̃
1: G1 ← ∅, n1 = b |V |k c − 1, V1 ← {0, 1, .., n1}
2: ε2 = 0.1, ε1 = ε− ε2, α = exp(−ε1)
3: get a random permutation Vp of V
4: compute the mapping M : Vp → V1
5: compute superedges of G1: E1 = {e1(i, j)} where i, j ∈ V1
6: m1 = |E1|+ Lap(1/ε2), m0 = n1(n1+1)2
7: θ = dlogα
(1+α)m1
m0−m1 e
8: s = (m0 −m1) α
θ
1+α
9: for e1(i, j) in E1 do
10: e1(i, j) = e1(i, j) +Geom(α)
11: if e1(i, j) ≥ θ then
12: add e1(i, j) to G1
13: for s edges e0(i, j) sampled uniformly at random such that e0(i, j) /∈ E1 do
14: draw w from the distribution Pr[X ≤ x] = 1− αx−θ+1
15: if w > 0 then
16: add edge e0(i, j) with weight w to G1
17: run Louvain method on G1 to get C̃1
18: compute C̃ from C̃1 using the mapping M
19: return C̃
Note that getting a random permutation Vp (line 3) costs no privacy budget. The number of
nodes n is public and given the group size k, the number of supernodes n1 is also public. The
high-pass filtering technique (Lines 6-16) inherits the privacy guarantee by [26]. By setting
ε1 = ε− ε2, LouvainDP satisfies ε-differential privacy (see the sequential composition (Theorem
4.3)).
5.3.2 Other Input Perturbation Schemes
1K-series [100], DER [21], TmF [77] and EdgeFlip [69] are the most recent differentially private
schemes for graph release that can be classified as input perturbation. While 1K-series and TmF
run in linear time, DER and EdgeFlip incur a quadratic complexity. DER and EdgeFlip are
therefore tested only on two medium-sized graphs in Section 5.5.
The expected number of edges by EdgeFlip is |EG̃| = (1 − s)m +
n(n−1)
4 s (see [69]) where
s = 2eε+1 is the flipping probability. Substitute s into |EG̃|, we get |EG̃| = m+(
n(n−1)
4 −m)
2
eε+1 .
The number of edges in the noisy graph G̃ generated by EdgeFlip increases exponentially as
ε decreases. To ensure the linear complexity for million-scale graphs, we propose a simple
extension of EdgeFlip, called EdgeFlipShrink (Algorithm 11).
Instead of outputting G̃, EdgeFlipShrink computes Ĝ that has the expected number of edges
m by shrinking EG̃. First, the algorithm computes the private number of edges m̃ using a small
budget ε2 (Lines 2-3 ). The new flipping probability s̃ is updated (Line 5). The noisy expected
number of edges in the original EdgeFlip is shown in Line 6. We obtain the shrinking factor
p = m̃m0 (Line 7). Using p, every 1-edge is sampled with probability
1−s̃
2 p instead of
1−s
2 as
in [69]. The remaining 0-edges are randomly picked from EG as long as they do not exist in Ĝ
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(Lines 14-19).
The expected edges of Ĝ is E[Ĝ] = E[m̃] = m and the running time of EdgeFlipShrink is
O(m).
Algorithm 11 EdgeFlipShrink(G, s)
Input: undirected graph G, flipping probability s
Output: anonymized graph Ĝ
1: Ĝ← ∅
2: ε2 = 0.1
3: m̃ = m+ Lap(1/ε2)
4: ε = ln(2s − 1)− ε2
5: s̃ = 2eε+1
6: m0 = (1− s̃)m̃+ n(n−1)4 s̃
7: p = m̃m0
8: // process 1-edges
9: n1 = 0
10: for edge (i, j) ∈ EG do
11: add edge (i, j) to Ĝ with prob. 1−s̃2 p
12: n1 + +
13: // process 0-edges
14: n0 = m̃− n1
15: while n0 > 0 do
16: random pick an edge (i, j) /∈ EG
17: if Ĝ does not contain (i, j) then
18: add edge (i, j) to Ĝ
19: n0- -
20: return Ĝ′
5.4 Algorithm Perturbation
The schemes in the algorithm perturbation category privately sample a node clustering from
the input graph without generating noisy sample graphs as in the input perturbation. This can
be done via the exponential mechanism. We introduce our main scheme ModDivisive in Section
5.4.1 and explain how HRG-MCMC and its variants are also instances of algorithm perturba-
tion schemes (Section 5.4.2). Fig.5.2b sketches the basic steps of the algorithm perturbation
paradigm.
5.4.1 ModDivisive: Top-down Exploration of Cohesive Groups
Overview
In contrast with the agglomerative approaches (e.g. Louvain method) in which small commu-
nities are iteratively merged if doing so increases the modularity, our ModDivisive scheme is a
divisive algorithm in which communities at each level are iteratively split into smaller ones. Our
goal is to heuristically detect cohesive groups of nodes in a private manner. There are several
technical challenges in this process. The first one is to efficiently find a good split of nodes that
induces a high modularity and satisfies ε-DP at the same time. The second one is how to merge
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Figure 5.3: example of ModDivisive with k = 3. A cut C is shown by the dot-dashed line
the small groups to larger ones. We cope with the first challenge by realizing an exponential
mechanism via MCMC (Markov Chain Monte-Carlo) sampling with the modularity as the score
function (see Theorem 4.2), i.e. u(G,C) = Q(C,G). The second challenge is solved by dynamic
programming. We design ModDivisive as a k-ary tree (Fig.5.3), i.e. each internal node has no
more than k child nodes. The root node (level 0) contains all nodes in V and assigns arbitrarily
each node to one of the k groups. Then we run the MCMC over the space of all partitions of V
into no more than k nonempty subsets. The resulting subsets are initialized as the child nodes
(level 1) of the root. The process is repeated for each child node at level 1 and stops at level
maxL. Fig.5.3 illustrates the idea with k = 3 for the graph in Fig.5.1.
Algorithm
Algorithm 12 sketches the main steps in our scheme ModDivisive. It comprises two phases:
differentially private sampling a k-ary tree of depth maxL which uses the privacy budget ε1 and
finding the best cut across the tree to get a good clustering of nodes which consumes a budget
maxL.εm.
The first phase (lines 1-14) begins with the creation of eA, the array of privacy budgets
allocated to levels of the tree. We use the parameter λ ≥ 1 as the common ratio to form a
geometric sequence. The rationale behind the common ratio is to give higher priority to the
levels near the root which have larger node sets. By sequential composition (Theorem 4.3), we
must have
∑
i eA[i] = ε1. All internal nodes at level i do the MCMC sampling on disjoint subsets
of nodes, so the parallel composition holds. Subsection 5.4.1 analyzes the privacy of ModDivisive
in more detail. We use a queue to do a level-by-level exploration. Each dequeued node r’s level
will be checked. If its level is not larger than maxL, we will run ModMCMC (Algorithm 13) on
it (line 9) to get a partition r.part of its nodeset r.S (Fig.5.3). Each subset in r.part forms a
child node and is pushed to the queue. The second phase (line 15) calls Algorithm 14 to find a
highly modular partition across the tree.
Differentially Private Nodeset Partitioning Let P be the space of all ways P to par-
tition a nodeset A to no more than k disjoint subsets, the direct application of exponential
mechanism needs the enumeration of P. The probability of a partition P being sampled is
exp( εp2∆QQ(P,G))∑
P ′∈P exp(
εp
2∆QQ(P ′, G))
(5.2)
However, |P| =
∑k
i=1 S(|A|, i) where S(|A|, i) is the Stirling number of the second kind [42],
S(n, k) ≈ knk! . This sum is exponential in |A|, so enumerating P is computationally infeasible.
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Algorithm 12 ModDivisive
Input: graph G, group size k, privacy budget ε, max level maxL, ratio λ, BestCut privacy at
each level εm
Output: noisy partition C̃
1: compute the array eA[0..maxL − 1] s.t.
∑
i eA[i] = ε1, eA[i] = eA[i + 1] ∗ λ where ε1 =
ε−maxL.εm
2: initialize the root node with nodeset V
3: root = NodeSet(G,V, k)
4: root.level = 0
5: queue Q← root
6: while Q is not empty do
7: r ← Q.dequeue()
8: if r.level < maxL then
9: r.part = ModMCMC(G, r.S, k, eA[r.level])
10: for subset Si in r.part do
11: Pi = NodeSet(G,Si, k)
12: Pi.level = r.level + 1
13: r.childi ← Pi
14: Q.enqueue(Pi)
15: C̃ ← BestCut(root, εm)
16: return C̃
Fortunately, MCMC can help us simulate the exponential mechanism by a sequence of local
transitions in P.
The space P is connected. It is straightforward to verify that the transitions performed in line
3 of ModMCMC are reversible and ergodic (i.e. any pair of nodeset partitions can be connected
by a sequence of such transitions). Hence, ModMCMC has a unique stationary distribution in
equilibrium. By empirical evaluation, we observe that ModMCMC converges after K|r.S| steps
for K = 50 (see Section 5.5.3).
Each node r in the tree is of type NodeSet. This structure consists of an array r.part where
r.part[u] ∈ {0..k−1} is the group id of u. To make sure that ModMCMC runs in linear time, we
must have a constant time computation of modularity Q(P ) (line 4 of Algorithm 13). This can
be done with two helper arrays: the number of intra-edges r.lc[0..k − 1] and the total degree of
nodes r.dc[0..k − 1] in each group. The modularity Q is computed in O(k) (Formula 2.1) using
r.lc, r.dc. When moving node u from group i to group j, r.lc and r.dc are updated accordingly
by checking the neighbors of u in G. The average degree is a constant, so the complexity of
ModMCMC is linear in the number of MCMC steps.
Finding the Best Cut Given the output k-ary tree R with the root node root, our next
step is to find the best cut across the tree. A cut C is a set of nodes in R that cover all
nodes in V . As an example, a cut C in Fig.5.3 returns the clustering [{0,1,2,3}, {4}, {5,6,11},
{8,9,10,7,12}]. Any cut has a modularity score. Our goal is to find the best cut, i.e. the cut
with highest modularity, in a private manner.
We solve this problem by a dynamic programming technique. Remember that modular-
ity is an additive quantity (c.f. Formula 2.1). By denoting opt(r) as the optimal modularity
for the subtree rooted at node r, the optimal value is opt(root). The recurrence relation is
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Algorithm 13 ModMCMC
Input: graph G, nodeset r.S, group size k, privacy budget εp
Output: sampled partition r.part
1: initialize r.part with a random partition P0 of k groups
2: for each step i in the Markov chain do
3: pick a neighboring partition P ′ of Pi−1 by randomly selecting node u ∈ r.S and moving
u to another group.
4: accept the transition and set Pi = P ′ with probability min(1,
exp( εp2∆QQ(P
′,G))
exp( εp2∆QQ(Pi−1,G))
)
5: // until equilibrium is reached
6: return a sampled partition r.part = Pi
straightforward
opt(r) = max{Q(r),
∑
t∈r.children
opt(t)}
Algorithm 14 realizes this idea in three steps. The first step (lines 1-6) uses a queue to fill a
stack S. The stack ensures any internal node to be considered after its child nodes. The second
step (lines 7-17) solves the recurrence relation. Because all modularity values are sensitive, we
add Laplace noise Laplace(∆Q/εm). The global sensitivity ∆Q = 3/m (see Theorem 5.2), so we
need only a small privacy budget for each level (εm = 0.01 is enough in our experiments). The
noisy modularity modn is used to decide whether the optimal modularity at node r is by itself
or by the sum over its children. The final step (lines 18-25) backtracks the best cut from the
root node.
Complexity
ModDivisive creates a k-ary tree of height maxL. At each node r of the tree other than the
leaf nodes, ModMCMC is run once. The run time of ModMCMC is O(K ∗ |r.S|) thanks to the
constant time for updating the modularity (line 4 of ModMCMC). Because the union of nodesets
at one level is V , the total runtime is O(K∗|V |∗maxL). BestCut only incurs a sublinear runtime
because the size of tree is always much smaller than |V |. The following theorem states this result
Theorem 5.1. The time complexity of ModDivisive is linear in the number of nodes n, the
maximum level maxL and the burn-in factor K. 
Privacy Analysis
We show that ModMCMC satisfies differential privacy. The goal of MCMC is to draw a random
sample from the desired distribution. Similarly, exponential mechanism is also a method to
sample an output x ∈ X from the target distribution with probability proportional to exp( εu(x)2∆u )
where u(x) is the score function (x with higher score has bigger chance to be sampled) and ∆u
is its sensitivity. The idea of using MCMC to realize exponential mechanism is first proposed
in [90] and applied to ε-DP graph release in [105].
In our ModMCMC, the modularity Q(P,G) is used directly as the score function. We need
to quantify the global sensitivity of Q. From Section 4.2.1, we have the following definition
Definition 5.1. (Global Sensitivity ∆Q)
∆Q = max
P,G,G′
|Q(P,G)−Q(P,G′)| (5.3)
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Algorithm 14 BestCut
Input: undirected graph G, root node root, privacy budget at each level εm
Output: best cut C
1: stack S ← ∅, queue Q← root
2: while Q is not empty do
3: r ← Q.dequeue()
4: S.push(r)
5: for child node ri in r.children do
6: Q.enqueue(ri)
7: dictionary sol← ∅
8: while S is not empty do
9: r ← S.pop(), r.modn = r.mod+ Laplace(∆Q/εm)
10: if r is a leaf node then
11: sol.put(r.id, (val = r.modn, self = True))
12: else
13: sm =
∑
ri∈r.children sol[ri.id].modn
14: if r.modn < sm then
15: sol.put(r.id, (val = sm, self = False))
16: else
17: sol.put(r.id, (val = r.modn, self = True))
18: list C ← ∅, queue Q← root
19: while Q is not empty do
20: r ← Q.dequeue()
21: if sol[r.id].self == True then
22: C = C ∪ {r}
23: else
24: for child node ri in r.children do
25: Q.enqueue(ri)
return C
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We prove that ∆Q = O(1/m) in the following theorem
Theorem 5.2. The global sensitivity of modularity, ∆Q, is smaller than 3m 
Proof. Given the graph G and a partition P of a nodeset Vp ⊆ V (for any node of the k-ary tree
other than the root node, its nodeset Vp is a strict subset of V ), the neighboring graph G′ has
EG′ = EG ∪ e. We have two cases
Case 1. The new edge e is an intra-edge within the community s. The modularity Q(P,G)
is
∑k
c ( lcm −
d2c
4m2 ). The modularity Q(P,G
′) is
∑k
c6=s( lcm+1 −
d2c
4(m+1)2 ) + (
ls+1
m+1 −
(ds+2)2
4(m+1)2 ).
The difference d1 = Q(P,G′)−Q(P,G) = 1m+1 −
1
m(m+1)
∑k
c lc + 2m+14m2(m+1)2
∑k
c d
2
c − ds+1(m+1)2
Because ∆Q is the absolute value of d1, we consider the most positive and the most negative
values of d1. Remember that
∑k
c dc ≤ 2m, so the positive bound d1 < 1m+1 +
(2m+1)4m2
4m2(m+1)2 <
3
m+1 .
For the negative bound, we use the constraints
∑k
c lc ≤ m and ds ≤ 2m, so d1 > 1m+1−
m
m(m+1)−
2m+1
(m+1)2 >
−2
m+1 . As a result, ∆Q = |d1| <
3
m+1 <
3
m .
Case 2. The new edge e is an inter-edge between the communities s and t. Similarly, we
have Q(P,G) =
∑k
c ( lcm −
d2c
4m2 ) while Q(P,G
′) =
∑k
c6=s,t( lcm+1 −
d2c
4(m+1)2 ) + (
ls
m+1 −
(ds+1)2
4(m+1)2 ) +
( ltm+1 −
(dt+1)2
4(m+1)2 ).
The difference d2 = Q(P,G′) − Q(P,G) = − 1m(m+1)
∑k
c lc + 2m+14m2(m+1)2
∑k
c d
2
c − 2ds+2dt+24(m+1)2 .
Again, we consider the most positive and the most negative values of d2, using the constraint∑k
c dc ≤ 2m, the positive bound d2 <
(2m+1)4m2
4m2(m+1)2 <
2
m+1 . For the negative bound, we use the
constraints
∑k
c lc ≤ m and ds + dt ≤ 2m, so d2 > − mm(m+1) −
4m+2
4(m+1)2 >
−2
m+1 . As a result,
∆Q = |d2| < 2m+1 <
2
m .
To recap, in both cases ∆Q < 3m .
5.4.2 HRG-MCMC and Variants
We note that HRG-based schemes in Section 4.5 are also instances of ε-DP community detection.
Omitting the step of outputting noisy sample graphs, noisy clusterings can be computed from
noisy HRG trees. Given a noisy HRG tree, we compute the modularity for all internal nodes
and apply the BestCut algorithm (Algorithm 14) to find the noisy clustering with the highest
modularity. HRG-MCMC [105] will be a competitor on small and medium-sized graphs while
HRG-FixedTree will apply to all graphs considered in the evaluation.
5.5 Experiments and Results
In this section, our evaluation aims to compare the performance of the competitors by clustering
quality and efficiency. The clustering quality is measured by the modularity Q, the average
F1-score and the Normalized Mutual Information (NMI) in which the modularity is the most
important metric as we aim at highly modular clusterings. The efficiency is measured by the
running time. All algorithms are implemented in Java and run on a desktop PC with Intelr
Core i7-4770@ 3.4Ghz, 16GB memory.
Two medium-sized and three large real graphs are used in our experiments 13. as20graph is
the graph of routers comprising the internet. ca-AstroPh and dblp are co-authorship networks
13http://snap.stanford.edu/data/index.html
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where two authors are connected if they publish at least one paper together. amazon is a product
co-purchasing network where the graph contains an undirected edge from i to j if a product i
is frequently co-purchased with product j. youtube is a video-sharing web site that includes a
social network. Table 5.2 shows the characteristics of the graphs. The columns Com(munities)
and Mod(ularity) are the output of Louvain method. The number of samples in each test case
is 20.
Table 5.2: Characteristics of the test graphs
Nodes Edges Com Mod
as20graph 6,474 12,572 30 0.623
ca-AstroPh 17,903 196,972 37 0.624
amazon 334,863 925,872 257 0.926
dblp 317,080 1,049,866 375 0.818
youtube 1,134,890 2,987,624 13,485 0.710
The schemes are abbreviated as 1K-series (1K), EdgeFlip (EF), Top-m-Filter (TmF), DER,
LouvainDP (LDP), ModDivisive (MD), HRG-MCMC and HRG-Fixed.
5.5.1 Quality Metrics
Apart from modularity Q, we use two more metrics for quality evaluation. The first metric is
F̄1, the average F1-score following the benchmarks in [106]. The F1 score of a set A with respect
to a set B is defined as the harmonic mean H of the precision and the recall of A against B.
We define prec(A,B) = |A∩B||A| , recall(A,B) =
|A∩B|
|B|
F1(A,B) =
2.prec(A,B).recall(A,B)
prec(A,B) + recall(A,B)
Then the average F1 score of two sets of communities C and C ′ is defined as
F1(A,C) = max
i
F1(A, ci), ci ∈ C = {c1, .., cn}
F̄1(C,C ′) =
1
2|C|
∑
ci∈C
F1(ci, C ′) +
1
2|C ′|
∑
ci∈C′
F1(ci, C)
The second metric is the Normalized Mutual Information (NMI) based on information theory
concepts [30]. Given the “real” communities C and the “found” communities C ′, we compute
the confusion matrix N where the element Nij is the number of nodes in the real community i
that appear in the found community j, i.e. Nij = |Ci ∩C ′j |. The NMI between C and C ′ is then
I(C,C ′) =
−2
∑|C|
i=1
∑|C′|
j=1Nij log(
NijN
Ni.N.j
)∑|C|
i=1Ni. log(
Ni.
N ) +
∑|C′|
j=1N.j log(
N.j
N )
where Ni. is the sum over row i and N.j is the sum over column j of N. Also, N =
∑|C|
i=1Ni. =∑|C′|
j=1N.j . Note that F̄1(C,C ′) and I(C,C ′) are symmetric functions.
We choose the output clustering of Louvain method as the ground truth for two reasons.
First, the evaluation on the real ground truth is already done in [83] and Louvain method is
proven to provide high quality communities. Second, the real ground truth is a set of overlap
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Figure 5.4: LouvainDP on youtube
communities whereas the schemes in this chapter output only non-overlap communities. The
chosen values of ε are {0.1lnn,0.2lnn,0.3lnn,0.4lnn,0.5lnn}. At ε = 0.5 lnn, the multiplicative
ratio (c.f. Definition 4.1) is eε = e0.5 lnn =
√
n, a reasonable threshold for privacy protection.
As an instance, on youtube the ratio is 1065.3 at ε = 0.5 lnn.
5.5.2 LouvainDP
We test LouvainDP for the group size k ∈ {4, 8, 16, 32, 64}. The results on youtube are displayed
in Fig. 5.4. We observe the clear separation of two groups k = 4, 8 and k = 16, 32, 64. As k
increases, the modularity increases faster but also saturates sooner. Similar separations appear
in avg.F1Score, NMI and the number of communities.
At ε = 0.5 lnn and k = 4, 8, the total edge weight in G1 is very low ( < 0.05m), so many
supernodes of G1 are disconnected and Louvain method outputs a large number of communities
(Fig. 5.4d). The reason is that the threshold θ in LouvainDP is an integral value, so causing
abnormal leaps in the total edge weight of G1. We pick k = 8, 16 for the comparative evaluation
(Section 5.5.4).
5.5.3 ModDivisive
The effectiveness of ModDivisive is illustrated in Fig. 5.5 for graph youtube and λ = 2.0,
K = 50. We select six pairs of (k,maxL) by the set {(2,10),(3,7),(4,5), (5,4),(6,4),(10,3)}.
Modularity and NMI increase steadily with ε while it is not always the case for avg.F1Score.
Interestingly, avg.F1Score and NMI show opposite trends for different pairs of (k,maxL). The
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Figure 5.5: ModDivisive on youtube with λ = 2.0, K = 50
pairs that have higher modularity also provide better avg.F1Score, but lower NMI. The number
of communities in the best cut is shown in Fig. 5.5d. Clearly, the small number of communities
indicates that ModDivisive’s best cut is not far from the root. The reason is the use of λ = 2.0,
i.e. half of privacy budget is reserved to the first level, the half of the rest for the second level
and so on. Lower levels receive geometrically smaller privacy budgets, so their partitions get
poorer results.
We choose λ = 2.0 to obtain a good allocation of ε among the levels. Fig. 5.6a shows the
modularity for different values of λ. Note that λ = 1.0 means ε is equally allocated to the maxL
levels. By building a k-ary tree, we reduce considerably the size of the state space P for MCMC.
As a result, we need only a small burn-in factor K. When we look at the Fig. 5.6b, we see that
larger K = 100 induces only tiny increase of modularity in comparison with that of K = 50.
5.5.4 Comparative Evaluation
In this section, we report a comparative evaluation of LouvainDP and ModDivisive against the
competitors in Figures 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11. The dashed lines in subfigures 5.7d, 5.8d,
5.9d, 5.10d and 5.11d represent the ground-truth number of communities by Louvain method.
ModDivisive performs best in most of the cases.
On as20graph and ca-AstroPh, HRG-MCMC outputs the whole nodeset V with the zero
modularity while 1K-series, TmF, DER also give useless clusterings. EdgeFlip produces good
quality metrics exclusively on ca-AstroPh while LouvainDP returns the highest modularity
scores on as20graph. However, the inherent quadratic complexity of EdgeFlip makes Louvain
method fail at ε = 0.1 lnn and 0.2 lnn for ca-AstroPh graph.
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Figure 5.6: ModDivisive: modularity vs. λ and K on amazon
On the three large graphs, ModDivisive dominates the other schemes by a large margin in
modularity and avg.F1Score. LouvainDP is the second best in modularity only at k = 16, ε =
0.5 lnn. It also provides the best NMI at k = 8, ε = 0.4, 0.5 lnn and k = 16, ε = 0.5 lnn. Our
proposed HRG-Fixed is consistent with ε and has good performance on dblp and youtube.
Note that HRG-MCMC is infeasible on the three large graphs due to its quadratic complexity.
Again, 1K-series, TmF and EdgeFlipShrink provide the worst quality scores with the exception
of 1K-series’s avg.F1Score and NMI on youtube.
The runtime of the linear schemes is reported in Fig. 5.12. EdgeFlipShrink, 1K-series,
TmF and LouvainDP benefit greatly by running Louvain method on the noisy output graph G̃.
ModDivisive and HRG-Fixed also finish their work quickly in O(K.n.maxL) and O(K.m. logn)
respectively.
5.6 Conclusion
We give a big picture of the problem ε-DP community detection within the two categories: input
and algorithm perturbation. We propose LouvainDP and ModDivisive as the representatives
of input and algorithm perturbation respectively. By conducting a comprehensive evaluation,
we reveal the advantages of our methods. ModDivisive steadily gives the best modularity and
avg.F1Score on large graphs while LouvainDP outperforms the remaining input perturbation
competitors in certain settings. HRG-MCMC/HRG-Fixed give low modularity clusterings, indi-
cating the limitation of the log-likelihood in divisive CD. The input perturbation schemes DER,
EF, 1K-series and TmF hardly deliver any good node clustering except EF on the two medium-
sized graphs. For future work, we plan to develop an ε-DP agglomerative scheme based on
Louvain method and extend our work for directed graphs and overlapping community detection
under differential privacy.
In the following chapter, we will propose and solve a novel problem: private link exchange
over social graphs.
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Figure 5.7: Quality metrics and the number of communities (as20graph)
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Figure 5.8: Quality metrics and the number of communities (ca-AstroPh)
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Figure 5.9: Quality metrics and the number of communities (amazon)
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Figure 5.10: Quality metrics and the number of communities (dblp)
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Figure 5.11: Quality metrics and the number of communities (youtube)
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6.1 Introduction
Online social networks (OSN) have grown significantly over the last ten years with billions of
active users using a variety of social network services. OSNs have revolutionized the way people
interact. People join social networking sites to connect and communicate with their friends in
real-time. They share interests and activities across political, economic, and geographic borders.
As social network sites continue to develop both in number and size, the service providers ac-
cumulate unprecedented amount of information about OSN users. As a result, social networks
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are a valuable data source for research on information societies. In particular, underlying social
graphs play a key role in understanding how people form communities, how the OSNs suggest
friendship to two users who do not know each other but have many common friends, etc. How-
ever, social graphs are not published in clear form due to serious privacy concerns. Instead, they
are anonymized in various forms and published to third party consumers such as sociologists,
epidemiologists, advertisers and criminologists. Alternatively, social networking sites provide
APIs 14 for data crawlers at limited rates and within privacy constraints (e.g. only public friend
lists are available). Using this method, the data crawlers can collect friendship information and
build a partial (local) view of the target social graph.
To overcome the constraints set by the service providers, we can start from user perspective,
i.e. the contributors of OSNs. More precisely, if users cautiously collaborate with one another,
they can exchange noisy friend lists (containing fake friendships) with their neighbors in several
rounds to get better views of the true social graph. Our ideas are based on the fact that user
IDs are public (e.g. Facebook profiles are searchable [1]) but the friendships are not so, except
when a user leaves his friend list in public mode. Using public user IDs, any user can claim fake
links from himself to the users not in his friend list.
The aggregation problem in this chapter is unique in the sense that the disseminated data
over the links are the links themselves. However, there exist fundamental questions about the
feasibility of this model. The first question is how to define simple and effective privacy concepts
for the link exchange processes. The second question comes from the high volume of link lists in
exchange which may increase exponentially round after round. While storage and computation
complexity may not be big problems, communication costs are non-trivial. We address both
questions by a simple (α, β)-exchange protocol with or without Bloom filters. To protect true
links from inference attacks, we add fake links which are beta-fraction of true links. Furthermore,
we realize the attenuated propagation of links via the parameter α ≤ 1.
Basically, we assume that users are honest-but-curious (HbC), i.e. they follow the protocol
but try to figure out true friendships among noisy friend lists. To preserve link privacy, each
node obfuscates its friend list by adding fake links originating from itself to a number of nodes
not in its friend list. Then in exchange stage, nodes share only with their friends a fraction of
noisy links they possess.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We introduce a novel private link exchange problem as an alternative to social graph
crawling and centralized anonymization of data. The problem is distributed and provides
a privacy/utility tradeoff for all nodes.
• We present two schemes for (α, β)-exchange protocol: Baseline and Bloom filter based.
We protect the true links by adding fake links and requiring the propagation probability
of links to be attenuated by distance. We analyze the advantages and disadvantages of
each scheme.
• We evaluate our proposed schemes on various synthetic graph models and draw a number
of critical findings.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 briefly introduces key concepts of Bloom
filter and our link exchange model. In Section 6.3, we present Baseline (α, β)-exchange that
realizes the exchange model by sending noisy link lists in clear form. Section 6.4 describes Bloom
filter version of (α, β)-exchange with constant complexities and better privacy. We validate the
14https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api
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proposed schemes in Section 6.5. Finally, we present our remarks and suggest future work in
Section 6.6.
Table 6.1 summarizes notations used in this chapter.
Table 6.1: List of notations
Symbol Definition
G = (V,E) social graph with N = |V | and M = |EG|
A(G) adjacency matrix of G
D degree sequence of G (column vector)
Diam(G) diameter of G
N(u) neighbors of node u in G, du = |N(u)|
T number of exchange rounds
(v, w) true link between v and w
(v → w) fake link generated by v
Lu(t) set of links possessed by u at round t
Luv(t) set of links u sends to v at time t
∝ uniformly at random sampling without replacement
α fraction of links shared between a pair of nodes
β fraction of fake links generated at t = 0
m number of bits in Bloom filter
k number of hash functions used in Bloom filter
n number of elements in Bloom filter
Bfu(t) Bloom filter possessed by u at round t
Bfuv(t) Bloom filter u sends to v at time t
6.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we present the exchange model and attack model. Then we review key concepts
about Bloom filter.
6.2.1 Exchange Model
We consider a distributed exchange model in which each node possesses his friend list and all
nodes participate in the exchange protocol. We work on the following assumptions
• Assumption 1 The space of node IDs is public. A node can generate fake links to any
node. All friend lists (true links) are private, i.e. the existence of true link (u, v) is surely
known to u and v only.
• Assumption 2 A node exchanges messages with its neighbors only. Interacting with
neighbors is based on an intuition of trusted relationships: we trust our friends more than
any strangers.
• Assumption 3 A synchronous model is guaranteed by round-tagged messages. It means
a node prepares the message for round t + 1 if and only if it has received all t-th round
messages from his friends.
• Assumption 4 All nodes are honest-but-curious. They follow the protocol but try to
infer true links among noisy links.
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Figure 6.1: Link exchange with α = 1, β = 1/3
Fig. 6.1 illustrates the exchange model. At round t = 0 (initial round), each node u prepare
a noisy friend list by adding some fake links (u, v) (i.e. links from u to some people not in his
friend list). This is feasible because all user IDs are public (e.g. [1]). For example, node 0 adds a
fake link (0,3) and his noisy friend list {(0,1), (0,2), (0,3)} is ready to be exchanged. Similarly,
the other nodes prepare their noisy friend lists as in Fig 6.1. At round t = 1, all nodes send and
receive noisy friend lists from their neighbors. The local views of nodes 0 and 1 at t = 1 are
shown in Fig. 6.1 where the solid lines (resp. the dashed arrows) are the true links (resp. fake
links) known by the node and the dashed lines represent noisy links received at the node.
6.2.2 Attack Model
We consider honest-but-curious users (nodes) who follow the protocol but try to infer true links
among noisy links. We propose a simple inference attack based on frequencies of links arriving
to a node. Given a link (v, w) (a true link or a fake link) arriving to node u, if (v, w) does not
exist in u’s local view, it will be added. Otherwise, its frequency is increased by 1. At the end
of the protocol, each node sorts all links in its local view by frequency and selects top K links
as true links. How to select the value of K will be discussed later.
By splitting noisy links into two sets of links as above, the inference capability of each
node is evaluated by common measures [37]: True Positives (TP), True Negatives (TN), False
Positives (FP), False Negatives (FN). As we will see in Section 6.3, the parameter α introduces
an attenuation effect for link propagation when α < 1. Given a link e, nodes farther from e have
lower chance of getting this link. This effect adds another dimension to our privacy model.
6.2.3 Bloom Filter
The Bloom filter is a space-efficient probabilistic data structure that supports set membership
queries. It was first conceived by Burton Howard Bloom in 1970 [10]. It is used to test whether
an element is a member of a set and can result in false positives (claiming an element to belong
to the set when it was not inserted), but never in false negatives (reporting an inserted element
not in the set).
An empty Bloom filter is an array of m bits, all set to zero. There must also be k different
hash functions defined, each of which maps or hashes some set element x to one of the m array
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Figure 6.2: Bloom filter
positions with a uniform random distribution. We denote n as the number of elements inserted
into the Bloom filter. Fig. 6.2 gives an example of Bloom filter with m = 18, k = 2 and n = 3.
The MD5 hash algorithm is a popular choice for the hash functions. When an element not in
the set w is looked up, it will be hashed by the k hash functions into bit positions. If one of the
positions is zero, we conclude that w is not in the set. It may happen that all the bit positions
of an element have been set. When this occurs, the Bloom filter will erroneously report that
the element is a member of the set, also known as false positives. Fig. 6.2 shows w as a false
positive.
Given the three parameters m, k and n, the false positive probability is (see [16]).
p =
(
1− (1− 1
m
)kn
)k
≈ (1− e−kn/m)k (6.1)
The false positive probability decreases as m increases or n decreases. Given m and n, the
probability of false positives (1− e−kn/m)k is minimized at k = kopt = mn ln 2 (see [16]). In this
case, the false positive rate p = (1/2)k or equivalently
k = − log2 p (6.2)
6.3 Baseline (α, β)-exchange
In this section, we present the main ideas of our proposed (α, β)-exchange and the improvements
using Bloom filters.
6.3.1 Overview
As shown in Section 6.2.1, the link exchange protocol is straightforward. At the beginning of the
protocol, all the nodes agree on the number of rounds T and the two parameters α ∈ [0, 1], β ≥ 0.
Then, each node u prepares his own noisy friend list Lu(0) by setting Lu(0) = {(u, v)|v ∈ N(u)}
and adding βN(u) fake links in the form (u → w) where w /∈ N(u). At t = 1, each node u
makes a noisy list Luv(1) for every neighbor v so that Luv(1) contains α|Lu(0)| links sampled
from Lu(0). Similarly, node v prepares a noisy list Lvu(1) for u. All the nodes sends and receives
noisy link lists. Next, each node aggregates noisy link lists by removing duplicate links (if any)
and obtains his local view of graph by Lu(1). The round t = 1 finishes.
At t = 2, the process repeats: all nodes u makes a noisy list Luv(2) for every neighbor v that
contains α|Lu(1)| links sampled from Lu(1). They exchange noisy link lists and after receiving
all Lvu(2) from his friends, node u updates his local view and gets Lu(2). When t = T , the
protocol terminates.
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6.3.2 Baseline Scheme
The idea in the previous section is called Baseline (α, β)-exchange as all noisy link lists are in
clear form. Algorithm 15 shows steps for Baseline (α, β)-exchange.
Algorithm 15 Baseline (α, β)-exchange
Input: undirected graph G = (V,E), parameters α ∈ [0, 1], β ≥ 0, number of rounds T
Output: noisy local views of graph Lu(T ), u ∈ V
1: // initialization stage
2: for u ∈ V do
3: Fa(u) = {(u→ w)|w /∈ N(u)} s.t. |Fa(u)| = β|N(u)|
4: Lu(0) = {(u, v)|v ∈ N(u)} ∪ Fa(u)
5: // exchange stage
6: for t = 1..T do
7: for (u, v) ∈ E do
8: u : Luv(t) ∝ Lu(t− 1) s.t. |Luv(t)| = α|Lu(t− 1)|
9: v : Lvu(t) ∝ Lv(t− 1) s.t. |Lvu(t)| = α|Lv(t− 1)|
10: u sends Luv(t) to v
11: v sends Lvu(t) to u
12: for u ∈ V do
13: Lu(t) = Lu(t− 1) ∪
⋃
v∈N(u)
Lvu(t)
return Lu(T ), u ∈ V
Given the graph structure G = (V,E), two parameters α ∈ [0, 1], β ≥ 0 and the number of
rounds T . The protocol takes place in two stages. In initialization stage, each node u prepares
his own noisy friend list Lu(0) by adding βN(u) fake links in the form (u,w) where w /∈ N(u)
(Lines 3 and 4). In exchange stage (Lines 6-13), at round t, each node u makes a noisy list Luv(t)
for every neighbor v that contains α|Lu(t)| links sampled from Lu(t). The exchange happens
on every relationship (true link). Each node takes the union of all noisy links he receives before
starting the next round.
Faster Simulation in A Single PC
For simulation in a single PC, storing all link lists for all nodes in clear form is a costly solution.
Moreover, the union operation on lists is time-consuming. We present here a technique to reduce
the memory footprint and processing time using bit sets.
Fig. 6.3 outlines the idea. We have M ′ = (1 + 2β)|EG| distinct links consisting of |EG| true
links and 2β|EG| fake links. By indexing M ′ links from 0 to M ′ − 1, the noisy link list at each
node is stored in a bit set of sizeM ′. The union of link lists (Line 13 Algorithm 15) is equivalent
to an OR operation between bit sets. To prepare Luv(t) for link exchange in round t, node u
must recover link IDs in its bit set.
We emphasize that indexing links and storing link IDs in bit sets are only for simulation. In
reality, the number of links are unknown to all nodes, so they must run Baseline or Bloom filter
(Section 6.4) protocol.
For the case α = 1, the exchange volume is reduced further if each node u sends only “new”
links, i.e. the links that do not exist in u’s list in the previous round. Fig. 6.4 visualizes this
idea in which “new” links are in shaded region and old links are in white region. Note that
98
6.3. Baseline (α, β)-exchange
Figure 6.3: Fast simulation using bit sets (column vectors)
Figure 6.4: Incremental volume for α = 1
the incremental volume is valid only for α = 1. When α < 1, the phenomenon of multipath
propagation (Fig. 6.5) requires both new and old links to be sampled with probability α.
Utility-Oriented Initialization
Baseline scheme in the previous section lets a node u generate fake links by connecting u to a
certain number of nodes not in u’s friend list. This initialization may make local sub graphs
at the final round have distorted path distributions due to many fake links connecting faraway
nodes. Distorted path distributions reduce the “utility” perceived at each node. Based on the
observation of using fake links connecting nearby nodes [76], we suggest a utility-oriented im-
provement by two-round initialization. We call a fake link (u→ v) distance-2 link if d(u, v) = 2.
For example, in Fig.6.1 (0→ 3) is a distance-2 fake link while (2→ 10) is not. Correspondingly,
v is called a distance-2 node w.r.t u.
We introduce a new parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] which stipulates that each node u create γβdu fake
links at t = 0 and exchange α(1 + γβ)du randomly chosen links to each of its neighbors. Node
u collects node IDs and save them in the set IDu. At t = 1, node u uses node IDs in IDu to
create α(1− γ)βdu fake links. Algorithm 16 implements this idea.
The number of distance-2 nodes that u collects in Line 7 of Algorithm 16 is α(
∑
v∈N(u) dv −
du − 2Tri(u)) where Tri(u) is the number of triangles with u as a vertex. Assuming that the
set Fa0(u) contains no distance-2 links (Line 3 Algorithm 16). The number of non-distance-2
nodes that u collects is
∑
v∈N(u) αγβdv. The expected number of distance-2 links that u can
create is
L2(u) =
(1− γ)(
∑
v∈N(u) dv − du − 2Tri(u))
[
∑
v∈N(u) dv − du − 2Tri(u)] +
∑
v∈N(u) γβdv
L2(u) is a decreasing function of γ. All nodes have the highest (resp. lowest) number of
distance-2 fake links at γ = 0 (resp. γ = 1). The case of γ = 1 reduces to standard initialization
(Lines 2-4 Algorithm 15).
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Algorithm 16 Two-round Initialization
Input: undirected graph G = (V,E), parameters α, γ ∈ [0, 1], β ≥ 0
Output: each node u issues βdu fake links
1: // t = 0
2: for u ∈ V do
3: Fa0(u) = {(u→ w)|w /∈ N(u)} s.t. |Fa0(u)| = γβ|N(u)|
4: Lu(0) = {(u, v)|v ∈ N(u)} ∪ Fa0(u)
5: // t = 1
6: for (u, v) ∈ E do
7: u and v exchange α-fraction of their links
8: for u ∈ V do
9: u aggregates all links it knows into Lu(1)
10: IDu = {w|w = v1 ∧ w = v2, (v1, v2) ∈ Lu(1)} \ {u,N(u)}
11: Fa1(u) = {(u→ w)|w ∈ IDu}
12: s.t. |Fa1(u)| = α(1− γ)β|N(u)|
13: Lu(1) = Lu(1) ∪ Fa1(u)
Figure 6.5: Multipath link propagation
6.3.3 Complexity Analysis
Let A be the adjacency matrix of G and D be the column vector of degree sequence of nodes, the
number of links at all nodes is upper bounded by the following vector, where IN is the identity
matrix of size N .
LU(t) = (IN + αA)t(1 + β)D (6.3)
We say LU(t) an “upper-bound” because LU(t) accepts duplicate links. More precisely,
let LUu(t) and LUuv(t) be the noisy link lists at node u and for exchange without removing
duplicate links as in Line 13 Algorithm 15. We have LUu(t) = LUu(t − 1) +
∑
v∈N(u)
LUvu(t),
where “+” denotes multiset semantics. Clearly, Lu(t) < LUu(t).
Note that the number of rounds T can be small because of the following analysis. We have
four simple facts (see Fig. 6.5)
1. for α = 1, a true link (v, w) is propagated to node u at round t iff min{d(u, v), d(u,w)} = t.
2. for α = 1, a fake link (v → w) is propagated to node u at round t iff d(u, v) = t.
3. for α < 1, a true link (v, w) is propagated to node u at round t with probability min(
∑
pl∈P (u,v)∪P (u,w) α
l, 1).
Here pl is a path of length l from u to v or w (l is in the range [1..t]).
4. for α < 1, a fake link (v → w) is propagated to node u at round t with probability
min(
∑
pl∈P (u,v) α
l, 1) where pl is defined in the previous case.
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We consider three cases.
Case 1: α = 1, β = 0 In this case, there is no fake links. Using Fact 1, we have
|Lu(Diam(G) − 1)| = m, i.e. every node u receives all true links in G after (Diam(G) − 1
rounds.
Case 2: α = 1, β > 0 In this case, there are 2βm fake links. Using Facts 1 and 2, we have
|Lu(Diam(G))| = (1 + 2β)m, i.e. every node u receives all true links and fake links in G after
Diam(G) rounds.
Case 3: α < 1, β ≥ 0 In this case, there are 2βm fake links. Using Facts 3 and 4, every
node u receives all true links (v, w) in G after T rounds if
T∑
t=1
[(αA)t]vu + [(αA)t]wu ≥ 1 (6.4)
and all fake links (v → w) if
T∑
t=1
[(αA)t]vu ≥ 1 (6.5)
The protocol’s complexity is measured in storage, computation and communication. Because
all links are stored in clear form, all complexities increase round by round (except the trivial
case α = 0). They are also upper bounded by the total links in graph, which is (1 + 2β)|EG|.
Intuitively, low-degree nodes will incur lower complexities than high-degree nodes. However, as
t increases, the gap gets narrower. In Section 6.4, we will achieve constant complexities by using
Bloom filters.
6.3.4 Privacy Analysis
In this section, we discuss the link inference attacks that can be mounted by nodes. Each node
has knowledge about the true links connecting itself to its neighbors and the fake links it creates
before the first round as well as the fake links pointing to it. The remaining links (denoted as
Bu) stored at node u are subject to an inference attack by u. As discussed in Section 6.2.2, u
may mount an inference attack by sorting links in Bu by weight and picks top-K links as true
links.
In Baseline (α, β)-exchange, the ratio of true links over fake links is 1β . Each user, therefore,
can set K = |Bu|1+β and divide Bu into two sets Tu (predicted true links) and Fu (predicted fake
links). The numbers of true positives, true negatives, false positives and false negatives are
TPu = |EG ∩ Tu| , FPu = |Tu \ EG| (6.6)
FNu = |EG ∩ Fu| , TNu = |Fu \ EG| (6.7)
The precision, recall and F1 score are defined as
Prec = TPu
TPu + FPu
(6.8)
Recall = TPu
TPu + FNu
(6.9)
F1 = 2.P rec.Recall
Prec+Recall (6.10)
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Figure 6.6: Inference attack measures
6.4 Bloom Filter Based Scheme
6.4.1 Motivation
Baseline (α, β)-exchange has several drawbacks that motivate a better approach. First, all link
lists are in clear form, allowing nodes to store link frequencies for inference attack (Section
6.3.4). If we obfuscate link lists, this kind of attack may be mitigated. Hashing could be a
solution. Second, sending link lists in clear form may incur high communication cost, especially
at high degree nodes. Assuming that all node IDs are in range {0...232 − 1}, i.e. each ID needs
4 bytes, each link is encoded in 8 bytes. Given a link list, a better way to encode it is to store
all links (u, vi) incident to u by {u|{vi}}. In this way, the message length for a link list can be
reduced up to 50%. In average, each link costs between 32-bit to 64-bit. Using Bloom filters,
the number of bits per link may be reduced. For example, with k = 4, the number of bits per
link is k/ ln 2 ≈ 5.8.
This section introduces a Bloom filter based approach. Compared to Baseline approach,
it has several advantages and limitations. Bloom filters, by encoding links in compact forms,
reduce the storage and communication costs. The computation at each node is also much simpler
thanks to logical OR operation compared to set unions in Baseline.
6.4.2 Bloom Filter Based Scheme
Algorithm 17 describes steps of Bloom filter version of (α, β)-exchange. As for inputs, we add a
global false positive probability p and the number of links |EG|. As analyzed in [16], the number
of hash functions k is set to d− log2 pe (Line 2). The number of bits per link is c = k/ ln 2 (Line
3). The length of every Bloom filter is m = c.|EG| (Line 4). Then, each node u initializes its
Bloom filter Bfu(0) by hashing all links in Lu(0) using k hash functions. At the same time, all
nodes send their noisy links Lu(0) to the coordinator who will gather all links into the list L.
This list will be used in the recovery stage.
In the exchange stage, each pair of nodes (u, v) prepare and exchange noisy link lists in
encoded form Bfuv(t) and Bfvu(t) (Lines 14-18). Before the next round, each node aggregates
all Bloom filters sent to it by taking the OR operation. (Lines 19 and 20). Finally, the recovery
stage helps each node to obtain its noisy local view Lu(T ). In this stage, the coordinator sends
to L to all nodes. If we omit the role of the coordinator (Lines 5,11 and 23), each node u has to
try hash N(N−1)2 possible links against its final Bloom filter Bfu(T ).
Bit Erasure
Because Bloom filters store links information in encoded form, we have to simulate the α-
sampling steps (Lines 8 and 9, Algorithm 15).
α-sampling is equivalent to “deletion” of (1−α)|Bfu(t−1)| elements from Bfu(t−1). We can
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Algorithm 17 Bloom filter (α, β)-exchange
Input: undirected graph G = (V,E), parameters α ∈ [0, 1], β ≥ 0, number of rounds T , false
positive probability p
Output: noisy local views of graph Lu(T ), u ∈ V
1: // initialization stage
2: k = d− log2 pe (see equation (6.2))
3: c = k/ ln 2
4: m = c.|EG|
5: L = ∅
6: for u ∈ V do
7: Bfu(0) = BloomFilter(k,m,c)
8: Fa(u) = {(u→ w)|w /∈ N(u)} s.t. |Fa(u)| = β|N(u)|
9: Lu(0) = {(u, v)|v ∈ N(u)} ∪ Fa(u)
10: Hash all e ∈ Lu(0) into Bfu(0)
11: L = L ∪ Lu(0)
12: // exchange stage
13: for t = 1..T do
14: for (u, v) ∈ E do
15: u prepares Bfuv(t) = BitErasure(Bfu(t− 1), α)
16: v prepares Bfvu(t) = BitErasure(Bfv(t− 1), α)
17: u sends Bfuv(t) to v
18: v sends Bfvu(t) to u
19: for u ∈ V do
20: Bfu(t) = Bfu(t− 1) ∨
∨
v∈N(u)
Bfvu(t)
21: // link recovery stage
22: for u ∈ V do
23: Lu(T ) = Hash(L,Bfu(T ))
return Lu(T ), u ∈ V
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Figure 6.7: Fraction of erased bits as a function of α and k
perform this operation by recovering elements in Bfu(t − 1) then explicitly keeping α-fraction
of elements and hashing these elements to an empty Bloom filter. This approach, however, is
costly because the node must try N(N−1)2 possible links. As a result, an implicit removal of
(1− α)-fraction of elements is needed.
Resetting one bit causes one or several misses (false negatives) and possibly reduces false
positives. For example, resetting the second bit in Bloom filter (Fig. 6.2) makes x a false
negative whereas resetting the 12th-bit makes both y and z disappear. Moreover, if the 8-th bit
is reset, x becomes a false negative and w is no longer a false positive.
Let m1 be the number of 1-bits in Bloom filter Bfu(t− 1) and s be the number of randomly
reset bits (s < m1), the probability of a true positive remaining in Bloom filter is
(1− s
m1
)k (6.11)
If omitting the effect of false positives (which is reduced as illustrated above), the formula (6.11)
is exactly the sampling fraction α. In other words,
α = (1− s
m1
)k ⇒ s = m1(1− α1/k) (6.12)
We can see that s is a decreasing function of α and k. An illustration of this fact is shown
in Fig. 6.7.
Algorithm 18 realizes α-sampling implicitly via bit erasure.
Algorithm 18 Bit Erasure
Input: Bloom filter B, parameter α ∈ [0, 1], number of hashes k
Output: Bloom filter B′ that contains approximately α fraction of elements in B
1: B′ = B
2: M1 = {i|B(i) = 1}
3: m1 = |M1|
4: s = bm1(1− α1/kc
5: randomly reset s bits in m1 positions of B′
6: return B′
Bloom Filter Compression
In Algorithm 17, all Bloom filters stored at nodes and transmitted between nodes are of length
m bits where m = |EG|k/ ln 2. For p = 0.1, we have k = 4 and m ≈ 5.8|EG|. For p = 0.01,
we have k = 7 and m ≈ 10.1|EG|. For million-scale graphs with hundreds of millions of links,
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the length of Bloom filters would be hundreds of megabytes. This is undesirable for message
transmission although storage and computation are not big problems. However, we observe that
as in Baseline (α, β)-exchange, not all messages have the length of Θ(EG). Thus, lossless data
compression is a useful tool for Bloom filter exchange.
Arithmetic coding [67] is such a lossless compression scheme. Arithmetic coding differs from
other forms of entropy encoding, such as Huffman coding [48]. Huffman coding separates the
input into component symbols with symbol probabilities approximated by negative powers of
two and replaces each with a code. Arithmetic coding encodes the entire message into a single
number, a fraction f where 0.0 ≤ f < 1.0. Arithmetic coding runs in linear time [67].
6.4.3 Complexity and Privacy Analysis
Thanks to constant sizes of bit arrays and constant time for OR operations, the total communi-
cation cost of Bloom Filter scheme is constant and the aggregation of noisy link lists is constant
too. However, Bloom Filter scheme incurs an extra recovery step at all nodes. Each node needs
to download the full noisy link set L from the coordinator. As we confirm in Section 6.5.2, the
exchange time of Bloom Filter scheme is much lower than that of Baseline, but the recovery
step costs higher time complexity.
As mentioned in Section 6.4.1, all link lists are obfuscated in Bloom filters, frequency-based
inference attacks may be mitigated if the set of all links L is revealed to all nodes only after the
final round. The ratio of true links over fake links in Bloom Filter scheme is almost identical
to that of Baseline. The reason lies in the independence of all links in exchange protocols. All
links have the same probability to be sampled and sent to neighbors of nodes. Interestingly,
Bloom Filter helps reduce the true/fake link ratio faster than Baseline for small α (Section 6.5.1)
thanks to its inherent false positives as well as false negatives caused by bit erasure.
6.5 Evaluation
In this section, we empirically evaluate the performance of our proposed schemes on synthetic
graphs. All algorithms are implemented in Java and run on a desktop PC with Intelr Core
i7-4770@ 3.4Ghz, 16GB memory.
Two kinds of synthetic graphs are generated: Barabási-Albert power-law (PL) graphs and
Erdös-Rényi (ER) random graphs [73]. Table 6.2 lists six synthetic graphs used in our exper-
iments. Each test case is run 10 times. We abbreviate the two schemes Baseline (BS) and
BloomFilter-based (BF) in the legends of the figures below.
We choose α ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0} and β ∈ {0.5, 1.0}. The default number of hash functions
k is 4.
Table 6.2: Synthetic graphs
Graph #Nodes #links Diameter
PL1 10,000 29,990 7
PL2 10,000 49,970 6
PL3 10,000 99,872 5
ER1 10,000 30,076 10
ER2 10,000 50,424 7
ER3 10,000 99,615 5
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Figure 6.8: Normalized number of true/fake links (e.g. BS-true is the number of true links in
Baseline scheme) and link ratios on ER2.
6.5.1 Message Volume and Inference Attacks
We investigate the message volume by the total number of true/fake links at all nodes after
each round t = 1..Diam(G). These values are normalized by dividing them by N.M.(1 + 2β).
We also estimate the inference attacks by the ratio between the number of true links and the
number of fake links. Fig. 6.8 and Fig. 6.9 show two-y-axis charts. The left y-axis is for the
normalized number of links. The right y-axis is for the ratios.
Several observations can be made clearly from Figures 6.8 and 6.9. First, the number
of true/fake links increases exponentially and converges fast as all nodes reach the round at
Diam(G). For α = 0.25, Baseline does not converge because not all links are propagated to all
nodes. Bloom filter scheme produces higher number of true/fake links, especially at α = 0.25, 0.5.
For larger values of α, the two schemes almost coincide. Second, the ratio of true links over fake
links decreases round by round and converges to 12β . In early rounds, the ratios are lower than
1
β . Higher the ratio, higher inference risk of true links. Clearly, Bloom Filter scheme reduces
the risk better than Baseline for α = 0.25, 0.5 in later rounds.
Fig. 6.10 displays the distribution of link volume collected at sample nodes. We sort V by
degree and take 100 sample nodes. ER graphs which are commonly called homogeneous graphs
show nearly uniform distributions for various values of (α, β). On the contrary, PL graphs are
heterogeneous ones and sample nodes exhibit much more random distributions.
The inference attack on Baseline scheme (Section 6.3.4) is shown in Fig. 6.11. The average
F1 scores for two values of β are plotted at different rounds of Baseline protocol. We observe
that the scores are quite close to the theoretical values 1/(1+β) (see the dashed lines). On ER2
graph, the inference attack is more effective at latter rounds and for larger α while this is not
clear on PL2.
6.5.2 Bloom Filter Scheme
In this section, we examine the performance of Bloom Filter scheme. We set the false positive
rate of Bloom Filter to 0.1, 0.01 and 0.001 (the number of hash functions k is 4,7 and 10
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Figure 6.9: Normalized number of true/fake links (e.g. BS-true is the number of true links in
Baseline scheme) and link ratios on PL2.
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Figure 6.10: Number of edges at sampled nodes (t = 1(.), t = 2(+), t = 3(◦), t = 4(), t =
5(), t = 6(4), t = 7(∗)). First row for ER2, second row for PL2.
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Figure 6.11: Inference attacks
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Figure 6.12: Normalized number of true/fake links by different false positive rates. First row
for ER2, second row for PL2.
respectively). Fig. 6.12 displays the normalized number of true/fake links by Baseline and
Bloom Filter with different false positive rates. We find that lower false positive rates make no
improvement for α = 0.25, 0.5. Bit Erasure (Algorithm 18) causes this effect. Lower α means
more bits to be erased in Bloom filters. Consequently, the number of false positive links and
false negative links is amplified round by round for small α.
We compare the communication complexity of Baseline and Bloom Filter schemes in the
number of bytes transmitted among nodes in each round. Fig. 6.13 reports the total message
size of Baseline and Bloom Filter (with or without compression). Baseline scheme stores links
in clear form, so it incurs exponential communication complexity. As discussed in Section 6.4.1,
we assume that each node ID cost 4 bytes and a link list of length l may be stored compactly
in 4l bytes. Bloom Filter uses constant-sized bit arrays, so its communication cost is constant
too. Using bit array compression (Section 6.4.2), Bloom Filter scheme reduces the message size
even further, especially at early rounds.
In Fig. 6.14, we compare the runtime of Baseline and Bloom Filter simulations in a single
PC. In each round, each node updates its link set (count operation) by aggregating noisy link
lists from its neighbors. Then, each node prepares (exchange operation), for the next round,
new noisy link lists sampled from its link set. At α < 1, the exchange operations cost an
increasing time as more rounds are considered. Higher α makes the link sampling slower. Only
at α = 1, we have fast exchange operations. In particular, the exchange runtime of Bloom Filter
scheme is constant for α = 1 and is an increasing function of round for α < 1 due to bit erasure
operations. The count operation of Bloom Filter dominates that of Baseline because each node
has to hash the full link set to recover its noisy link set at each round.
6.5.3 Utility-Oriented Initialization
In this section, we illustrate the benefit of two-round initialization (Algorithm 16). We set
γ = 0.0, 0.5 and denote the enhanced scheme as D2. Several utility metrics are chosen as
follows.
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Figure 6.13: Communication complexity. Y-axis is the number of bytes transmitted among
nodes (log-scale). First row for ER2, second row for PL2.
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Figure 6.14: Total simulation runtime of all nodes (in millisecond). First row for ER2, second
row for PL2.
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- Power-law exponent of degree sequence: PL is the estimate of η assuming the degree
sequence follows a power-law nd ∼ d−η where nd is the number of d-degree nodes.
- Clustering coefficient: CC = 3N∆N3 where N∆ is the number of triangles and N3 is the
number of connected triples.
- Average distance: APD is the average distance among all pairs of vertices that are path-
connected.
- Distance distribution: Distance is the normalized node-pair shortest-path histogram.
We take 100 sample nodes by degree and compare local aggregated graphs to the ground
truth. The ground truth is computed by setting β = 0 in Baseline scheme. Fig. 6.15 shows the
benefit of two-round initialization (D2-0.0 and D2-0.5) on PL2 graph in early rounds. D2-0.0
and D2-0.5 schemes result in lower relative errors than Baseline and Bloom Filter in the first and
second rounds, especially by CC and PL metrics. All schemes are comparable at t = 3, except
on CC metric. Finally, Baseline and Bloom Filter are almost equivalent in terms of utility and
they perform better D2 schemes at t = Diam(G) on PL, APD and Distance metrics.
6.6 Conclusion
We motivate the private link exchange problem as an alternative to social graph crawling and
centralized anonymization of data. The problem is distributed and provides a privacy/utility
tradeoff for all nodes. Our proposed problem is unique in the sense that the disseminated data
over the links are the links themselves. We present two schemes for (α, β)-exchange protocol:
Baseline and Bloom filter based. Experiments on synthetic graphs clarify advantages and draw-
backs of both schemes. Baseline scheme keeps link lists in clear form, so its communication
cost increases fast. Bloom Filter scheme incurs lower communication complexity but needs an
extra recovery step in the final round. Both schemes guarantee link privacy in the range [ 12β ,
1
β ].
In Baseline, the inference attack based on link counting is not much better than the random
attack. For future work, we plan to investigate asynchronous models and node/links failures.
We also consider community-based link exchange models in which nodes are gathered in super
nodes and the link exchange takes place among super nodes only.
In the next chapter, we summarize our main contributions and discuss possible directions
for future work.
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Figure 6.15: Utility relative errors on PL2 (α = 1.0, β = 0.5)
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We conclude this thesis by summarizing the main contributions and describing possible
directions for future research.
7.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, we have made significant contributions to the following problems for privacy
protection in social networks.
Social Graph Anonymization Social graphs are the key underlying structure of social
networking services. They are relational data in which a lot of correlation information about
users is encoded. Careless publication of social graphs opens the doors to large-scale privacy
violations. Graph anonymization, therefore, is an important technique to mitigate the risks.
This thesis contributes to the graph anonymization toolbox with several novel schemes based on
uncertainty semantics and differential privacy, two out of five main anonymization categories.
in Chapter 3, we identify the shortcomings of two existing works [11, 66] and devise a unified
model, Uncertain Adjacency Matrix (UAM). Based on UAM, we propose an effective scheme,
Maximum Variance that formalizes the edge probability assignments in the form of a quadratic
program. UAM also helps us to quantify and compare the total edge variance between the three
schemes and to show how well our approach fills the existing gap between [11] and [66].
Differential privacy is a formal privacy notion that has attracted a lot of interdisciplinary
research recently. Differentially private mechanisms for graph anonymization are broadly studied
in Chapter 4. We identify two main classes of techniques: direct publication and model-based
publication. We also analyze two radical challenges of graph release under differential privacy:
huge output space and consistency. These challenges allow a relaxation of ε to lnn where n is
the number of nodes. Our proposed scheme Top-m-Filter and an existing one EdgeFlip belong
to the category of direct publication. Both of them satisfy the consistency property while the
model-based schemes like 1K-series [100], HRG [105] and DER [21] cannot. Through evaluation
over a wide range of real graphs, we reveal the advantages and drawbacks of each technique.
Direct publication schemes require large ε (i.e. ≈ lnn) to achieve low relative errors for all
metrics. Meanwhile, the results of model-based schemes depend strongly on graphs and utility
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metrics. 1K-series works well for degree-based metrics while HRG is suitable for path-based
metrics on graphs exposing community structure. DER performs worst and is runnable only on
medium-sized graphs.
Private Community Detection Community structure is the mesoscopic structure between
microscopic (node level) and macroscopic (graph level) structures. A graph is said to have
community structure if it appears as a combination of components fairly independent of each
other. The problem of how to identify communities plays a significant role in understanding the
organization and function of complex networks. A large body of work on community detection in
a variety of settings has been proposed over the last decade. However, these approaches work, by
default, in non-private manner. In this thesis, we add the privacy dimension to the community
detection problem because non-private output clusterings may reveal sensitive information about
users’ relationships and memberships. We analyze the major challenges of community detection
under differential privacy. We explain why techniques borrowed from k-Means [94] fail and how
the difficulty of ε-DP recommender systems [43] justifies a relaxation of ε to 0.5 lnn. We propose
two novel schemes LouvainDP and ModDivisive. As a bottom-up approach, LouvainDP employs
the high-pass filtering technique from [26] and Louvain method. ModDivisive is a top-down
approach and uses the modularity-based score function in the exponential mechanism. Both
schemes run in linear time and output much better clusterings than the existing techniques.
Private Link Exchange Despite their high value for research on information societies,
social graphs are not published in clear-form due to serious privacy concerns. Instead, they
are anonymized in various forms and published to third party consumers. Alternatively, social
networking sites provide APIs for data crawlers at limited rates and within privacy constraints.
To overcome the constraints set by the service providers, we propose an aggregation model start
from user perspective, i.e. from the contributors of OSNs. We introduce a novel private link
exchange problem as an alternative to social graph crawling and centralized anonymization of
data. The problem is distributed and provides a privacy/utility tradeoff for all nodes. Our
proposed problem is unique in the sense that the disseminated data over the links are the links
themselves. We design two schemes for (α, β)-exchange protocol: Baseline and Bloom filter
based. We protect the true links by adding fake links and requiring the propagation probability
of links to be attenuated by distance. We analyze the advantages and drawbacks of each scheme.
The evaluation on various synthetic graph models helps us to draw a number of critical findings.
We believe that (α, β)-link exchange provides a good prototype for important extensions and
real-world deployments in future.
7.2 Perspectives
As discussed in Chapter 3, our work on UAM and MarVar has several limitations that may
incite several directions for future research. First, the model of UAM is currently constructed
by solving a quadratic program. The exact optimization over millions of variables is non-trivial
and we have to divide the graph into subgraphs of tens of thousands of nodes. Approximations
based on linear programming and local search may be good solutions. In addition, we believe
that each edge has only limited influence to the probabilities of nearby edges. This locality
property may further simplify the approximate methods by dividing the graph to nearly disjoint
communities. Second, the linear tradeoff for both H1 and
√
H2open against the relative errors
is worth a theoretical explanation. Third, the extensions of UAM and MaxVar for directed and
bipartite graphs are straightforward and we intend to find competitors for them and carry out
extensive evaluations on real graphs.
114
7.2. Perspectives
Chapters 4 and 5 apply differential privacy to graph release and community detection. Both
of them require a relaxation of ε to lnn and 0.5 lnn respectively. As we have seen in Chapter
4, the consistency property stipulates that relative errors have to be as low as zero for large
enough privacy budget. Only direct publication schemes like TmF and EdgeFlip satisfy this
desideratum. All well-known model-based schemes like 1K-series [100], HRG [105] and DER [21]
fail to meet this requirement. Specifically, model-based schemes cannot keep low relative errors
for both degree-based metrics and path-based metrics. We think that the main reason lies in
the reconstruction step used in the model-based schemes. For future work, we aim at formally
quantifying these types of reconstruction error. On the other hand, finding alternative summary
structures (e.g. structures of space complexity O(n logn)) for graphs may lead to publication
models better than O(n) models like HRG, 1K-series.
Regarding ε-DP community detection, LouvainDP’s performance depends on the initializa-
tion of supernodes. Remember that Louvain method [9], by using only local moves for searching
the best community for each node, implies that supernodes are formed by connected nodes.
This characteristic does not hold for LouvainDP due to its random division of the node set into
groups of size k (to cost no privacy budget). An improvement for LouvainDP may stem from
the good private initialization of supernodes. We may reserve a part of ε for this step. As a
top-down approach, ModDivisive has to split the privacy budget ε for MCMC runs at levels of
the k-ary tree. It has a limitation: the best cuts are near the root. In addition, the MCMC
only simulates the exponential mechanism and its convergence is hard to prove. This is also the
problem of HRG-based schemes in Chapter 4. As we discussed in Section 5.2.2, the output space
of ε-DP community detection is immense (O(nn)) and non-metric, so explicit implementations
of the exponential mechanism are infeasible. The same argument holds for HRG-based schemes
which have to explore the space of size O(2n(n−1)/2). To avoid this approximation, we may
think about other query-and-reconstruction schemes. For example, we may sample m random
clusterings and query for their modularity scores. This operation costs ε = m. 3m = 3. In the
end, we keep top clusterings and fuse them to get better clusterings.
Despite its simplicity, the link exchange model in Chapter 6 provides a good starting point
for several important extensions and real-world deployments. The current model assumes syn-
chronous message passing, no node/edge failures and honest-but-curious users. First, if we
switch to asynchronous models, i.e. we remove the requirement that each node waits for all
t-round messages from its neighbors, the problem becomes more challenging. However, the se-
mantics of multipath propagation for α < 1 (Section 6.3) is still the same. Each edge (v, w)
once reaches node u is forwarded to the neighbors of u with probability α. Second, node/edge
failures may change significantly the distribution of final link sets at nodes, especially if these
failures happen at bridges or articulation nodes. Also, when high-degree nodes (or hubs) refuse
to join the protocol, a large number of propagation paths are removed, so the chance to get
distant links decreases too. Third, if dishonest nodes exist in the network and form coalitions
to reveal true links out of link sets, the protocol is even harder to design. We may need costly
verification mechanisms in this case. Lastly, to reduce the communication cost, we may think
about community-based link exchange models in which nodes are gathered in super nodes and
the link exchange takes place among super nodes only.
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A.1 Chapter 4: Analysis of Expected Edit Distance
In this section, we give a deeper analysis of the expected edit distance D(G, G̃) and the effect
of ε2 on it. From Section 4.3.3,
D(G, G̃) = 12(|EG \ EG̃|+ |EG̃ \ EG|) =
1
2(m− n1 + m̃− n1) (A.1)
Taking the expectation, we get E[D(G, G̃)] = m − E[n1] where n1 = m̃2 (2 − e
−ε1(1−θ)) and
θ = 12ε1 ln(
n(n−1)
2m̃ − 1) +
1
2 . Compared to Formula 4.3, the term m is replaced by m̃ to take into
account the effect of ε2.
After a few calculations, we get E[n1] = m− E[X] where
X = 12e
−ε1/2
√
m̃n(n− 1)
2 − m̃
2 (A.2)
Because m̃ may take non-positive values (with vanishing probabilities) which make X un-
defined, we bound the value of E[X] in the interval [m − ∆,m + ∆] where ∆ indicates the
approximation of Laplace distribution as in Fig. A.1. For ε2 = 0.1, the probability mass of
Laplace distribution in the interval [m−∆,m+ ∆] is 0.9999 at ∆ = 100( m).
By Formula 4.3, the expected of n1 is m−X0 where
X0 =
1
2e
−ε1/2
√
mn(n− 1)
2 −m
2 (A.3)
Our objective is to show that with high probability (w.h.p)X ∈ [X0
√
(1−∆/m), X0
√
(1 + ∆/m)].
It is straightforward to see that X is an increasing function in the interval [m − ∆,m +
∆], so E[X] is lower bounded by 12e
−ε1/2
√
(m−∆)n(n−1)
2 − (m−∆)2 and upper bounded by
1
2e
−ε1/2
√
(m+∆)n(n−1)
2 − (m+ ∆)2. Using the facts that ∆  m and m  n(n − 1)/2, we
get the result: X ∈ [X0
√
(1−∆/m), X0
√
(1 + ∆/m)] (w.h.p) after a few calculations.
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Figure A.1: Approximate distribution of m̃ by the interval [m−∆,m+ ∆]
As mentioned in Section 4.3.2, the High-Filtering technique by Cormode et al. [26] uses the
number of non-zero entries in non-private manner. Their threshold θ is computed as
θ =
log
(
(1+α)s
2(m0−m1)
)
logα (A.4)
where m0 is the domain size (public), m1 is the number of non-zero entries (private), α = e−ε
is the parameter of Geometric noise and s = Θ(m1) is the expected number of passing entries.
We can hide the true value of m1 in this formula by m̃1 = m1 +Lap(1/ε2) where ε2 is subtracted
from ε as we have done in TmF.
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B.1 Motivation
B.1.1 Vie Privée dans les Réseaux Sociaux
Un réseau social est une structure sociale composée d’un ensemble d’acteurs sociaux, de relations
et autres modes d’interactions sociales entre les acteurs. Avec l’émergence des réseaux sociaux en
ligne (OSN) 15, les usagers disposent de médias sociaux d’une puissance inédite. Facebook 16, le
plus grand OSN, a plus de 1,65 milliard d’utilisateurs mensuels actifs avec une augmentation de
15 pour cent par an. La plupart des OSNs offrent des services gratuits en échange d’informations
collectées sur l’utilisateur et qui sont exploitées par les fournisseurs de services pour de la pub-
licité ciblée. Parce que la protection des données de l’utilisateur n’est pas toujours garantie, la
vie privée des utilisateurs du réseau social est souvent mise en danger. La fuite d’informations
peut avoir de nombreuses causes: la négligence des utilisateurs, le partage de données à des tiers
par les fournisseurs de services et les attaques brutales par les cybercriminels 17.
15https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_networking_service
16https://zephoria.com/top-15-valuable-facebook-statistics/
17https://heimdalsecurity.com/blog/10-surprising-cyber-security-facts-that-may-affect-your-online-safety/
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Les OSNs sont également une source importante de données pour le Big Data, une technologie
qui est en train de changer le monde. Les réseaux sociaux, ainsi que d’autres réseaux complexes,
fournissent des données utiles pour les études en sciences sociales, statistiques et théorie des
graphes. Aujourd’hui, le public s’intéresse à la façon dont les acteurs économiques peuvent
maximiser les avantages de l’exploitation des masses de données tout en minimisant les risques
sur la vie privée. Les utilisateurs d’OSNs, de leur côté, souhaitent toujours plus d’avantages que
de risques. Ceci explique le développement rapide des politiques de confidentialité de plus en plus
complexes par les fournisseurs de services (comme Facebook). Dans la section suivante, nous
motivons quelques approches de minimisation des risques sur les réseaux sociaux en fonction de
leurs graphes sociaux.
B.1.2 Menaces sur la Vie Privée liées aux Publications des Graphes Sociaux
Li et al. [54] présentent les deux types principaux de divulgation d’information étudiés dans la
littérature: la divulgation de l’identité et la révélation d’un attribut. Notons que la découverte
de l’identité conduit souvent à la révélation d’un attribut. Chaque fois qu’un attaquant révèle
le lien de certaines données à une entité spécifique du monde réel, nous disons qu’une révélation
d’identité a lieu. La révélation d’un attribut implique une inférence réussie d’attributs sensibles
appartenant à un utilisateur ciblé. En outre, la littérature sur la vie privée identifie deux classes
principales de mécanismes de requêtes à la disposition d’un attaquant: le mode interactif et le
mode non-interactif. Dans le cadre interactif, un attaquant est autorisé à poser des questions à
une base de données et le propriétaire de la base de données répond avec des réponses bruitées.
Sur la base des informations recueillies à partir des réponses précédentes, l’attaquant peut poser
des requêtes adaptatives pour éviter des réponses inutiles. Dans un cadre non-interactif, le
propriétaire de la base de données publie une version anonymisée de la base de données pour
répondre à certaines exigences de la vie privée (par exemple les noms d’utilisateur dans la base
de données publiée peuvent être remplacés par des numéros fictifs). Les recherches antérieures
sur la confidentialité des données sont principalement axées sur des données structurées en tables
dont les lignes représentent des enregistrements indépendants et identiquement distribuées (i.i.d)
et dont les colonnes représentent les attributs [54,59,95]. Cependant, les données du monde réel
sont souvent relationnelles et les enregistrements d’une table sont liés les uns aux autres ou à
ceux provenant d’autres tables. Cela soulève des défis considérables pour la préservation de la
vie privée des utilisateurs.
Chaque utilisateur des réseaux sociaux en ligne est représenté par un profil riche d’un en-
semble d’attributs (par exemple le sexe, la date de naissance, les loisirs, l’état marital et le lieu)
et par ses relations (les liens d’amitié et les adhésions à des groupes d’intérêt). En particulier,
les graphes sociaux qui représentent la structure des réseaux sociaux sont des données relation-
nelles qui contiennent beaucoup d’informations et peuvent être exploitées par des analystes de
données, ainsi que par des attaquants. En général, les utilisateurs d’OSNs ont le sentiment que
les fournisseurs de services gardent leurs informations privées de manière sécurisée [4] et que
leurs identités sont dissimulées parmi celles des autres utilisateurs dans des bases de données
anonymisées. Cependant, une forte corrélation entre les utilisateurs dans une même base de
données et avec des utilisateurs d’autres bases de données rend les attaques par ré-identification
à grande échelle possibles [70–72,111].
Nous illustrons une attaque simple par ré-identification dans Figure B.1. Un graphe social
de treize utilisateurs est naïvement anonymisé en remplaçant les noms d’utilisateurs par des
numéros fictifs. Un attaquant peut réidentifier les utilisateurs en comptant le nombre d’amis
dont chaque utilisateur dispose. Ceci est tout à fait possible parce que les OSNs comme Facebook
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Figure B.1: An example of re-identification attack
permettent aux utilisateurs de laisser leur nombre d’amis en mode public. En supposant que
l’attaquant tente de lier le nœud 5 dans le graphe anonymisé à un utilisateur dans le vrai graphe
social, il itère sur l’OSN des recherches d’ utilisateurs ayant cinq amis. Ainsi, l’utilisateur
Walter sera révélé. Puis des informations sur Walter peuvent être obtenues par d’autres attaques
utilisant des inférences, par exemple en examinant les groupes que Walter rejoint [111].
B.1.3 Nouveaux Mécanismes pour Préserver la Vie Privée dans les Graphes
Sociaux
Avec l’émergence de réseaux de plus en plus complexes [73], la communauté scientifique a be-
soin de graphes de grandes tailles précis pour mener des études approfondies. Toutefois, cette
exigence est souvent en conflit avec la confidentialité des données des entités contribuantes. Les
approches naïves comme la suppression des IDs de l’utilisateur à partir d’un graphe social ne
sont pas efficaces, laissant les utilisateurs sujets à des risques sur leur vie privée, en particulier
à des attaques par ré-identification [4,46]. Par conséquent, de nombreuses techniques élaborées
d’anonymisation ont été proposées [23, 55,96,103,112,113].
Étant donné un graphe non-orienté non-étiqueté, les méthodes d’anonymisation existantes
se répartissent en cinq catégories principales.
• La première utilise l’ajout aléatoire, la suppression et la commutation de liens [13,46,107,
109] pour empêcher la ré-identification des nœuds ou des liens.
• La seconde vise à obtenir la k-anonymité [95] par additions ou suppressions déterministes
de liens [23,55,96,103,112,113], en supposant que l’attaquant connait certaines propriétés
de ses nœuds ciblés.
• La troisième repose sur la généralisation [18,46,97] et regroupe les nœuds dans des super-
nœuds de taille au moins k, où k est un paramètre de confidentialité.
• Les méthodes de la quatrième catégorie attribuent des probabilités aux liens pour ajouter
de l’incertitude au graphe original. Les probabilités peuvent être calculées explicitement
comme dans [11] ou implicitement par Random-Walk [66]. Notez que cette classe de
systèmes et ceux de la troisième catégorie induisent des modèles de mondes possibles, c’est-
à-dire, les graphes produits par la méthode sont obtenus par échantillonnage du graphe
incertain.
• Enfin, il existe des techniques pour l’anonymisation de graphes basées sur la notion de vie
privée différentielle [33].
121
Appendix B. Résumé étendu
Nous observons quelques problèmes des quatrième et cinquième catégories dans l’état-de-
l’art. La quatrième catégorie exploite la sémantique de liens probabilistes pour injecter de
l’incertitude dans un graphe déterministe en le transformant en un graphe probabiliste avant de
publier des graphes échantillonnés. L’approche par (k,ε)-obscurcissement [11] n’offre pas un bon
compromis entre la protection de la vie privée et l’utilité, tandis que l’approcheRandWalk [66]
souffre de limites inférieures pour l’utilité, malgré son excellent compromis entre vie privée et
utilité.
La cinquième catégorie aborde la publication du graphe par la technique de vie privée dif-
férentielle (ε-DP). Pour une introduction brève, voir la section B.4. Par la vie privée différen-
tielle, nous voulons assurer que les liens entre les utilisateurs restent cachés dans le graphe
publié tout en conservant une information structurelle importante pour permettre l’analyse du
graphe [21,89,100,101,105]. Cependant, le problème est difficile en raison de l’énorme espace de
graphes bruités possibles en sortie. La plupart des systèmes existants ne permet pas de relâcher
le paramètre, appelé budget, qui contrôle la vie privée, ni de déterminer sa borne supérieure.
En outre, certains d’entre eux ont un problème de flexibilité, et généralement une complexité
quadratique.
En dehors de la publication du graphe social, d’autres opérations sur les graphes ont égale-
ment un grand intérêt, comme par exemple la détection de communautés. De nombreux réseaux
complexes exposent une structure mésoscopique, c’est-à-dire qu’ils apparaissent comme une com-
binaison de composants relativement indépendants les uns des autres. Ces composants sont
appelés communautés, modules ou clusters et c’est un problème important de les découvrir pour
la compréhension de l’organisation et le fonctionnement des réseaux complexes. Au cours de
la dernière décennie, un grand nombre d’algorithmes de détection de communautés (CD) ont
été proposés pour résoudre ce problème dans une variété de contextes, tels que les réseaux non-
orientés ou orientés, avec chevauchement ou non, pour des graphes pondérés ou non [38]. Ces
approches sont traitées d’une manière non privée, c’est-à-dire un collecteur de données (comme
Facebook) connaît tous les utilisateurs contribuants et leurs relations avant d’exécuter des al-
gorithmes de CD. La sortie d’un tel CD, sous la forme la plus simple, est un regroupement de
nœuds. Même dans ce cas, lorsque un seul des clusters de nœuds (et non tout le graphe) est
révélé, la vie privée des utilisateurs peut encore être mise en danger.
Nous formulons comme dernière contribution un problème original et intéressant: l’échange
de liens privés. Le problème est motivé par le fait que la plupart des OSNs gardent leurs
données secrètes et de manière centralisée. Traditionnellement, les données bruitées sont publiées
pour la recherche publique et des données plus précises sont réservées à la recherche interne.
Alternativement, les chercheurs sont autorisés à collecter les graphes sociaux (et les données),
mais avec de fortes limitations, ce qui aboutit à des vues partielles des vrais graphes sociaux.
Pour surmonter cet obstacle, nous pouvons nous placer du point de vue des utilisateurs, les
contributeurs des OSNs. Plus précisément, si les utilisateurs collaborent avec précaution ils
peuvent échanger des listes d’amis bruitées avec leurs voisins en plusieurs tours pour obtenir
une meilleure vue du vrai graphe social. Nous partons de l’hypothèse qu’un utilisateur fait plus
confiance à ses amis qu’à des étrangers. Les utilisateurs veulent donc que les informations sur leur
liste d’amis soient réduites lorsque la distance de propagation dans le graphe social augmente.
Cependant, des questions fondamentales demeurent sur la faisabilité de ce modèle. La première
question est de savoir comment définir des concepts de confidentialité simples et efficaces pour
les processus d’échange de lien. La deuxième question est de savoir traiter le volume élevé des
listes de liens échangés qui peut augmenter de façon exponentielle tour après tour. Bien que le
coût du stockage et la complexité de calcul peuvent être gérés, les coûts de communication ne
sont pas négligeables. Ainsi, des protocoles d’échange efficaces sont nécessaires.
122
B.2. Bilan des problèmes
Figure B.2: La sémantique de l’incertitude des liens. De gauche à droite: graphe d’origine,
graphe incertain et deux graphes échantillonnés de sortie
B.2 Bilan des problèmes
Dans cette section, nous décrivons les solutions pour résoudre les trois problèmes abordés dans
la thèse: l’anonymisation de graphes sociaux, la détection de communautés privées et l’échange
de liens privés.
B.2.1 Anonymisation de Graphes Sociaux
Nous étudions l’anonymisation de graphes sociaux sous deux angles: la sémantique de l’incertitude
et la vie privée différentielle.
L’intuition derrière l’utilisation de la sémantique d’incertitude pour anonymiser les graphes
sociaux est illustrée sur la Figure B.2. Le vrai graphe est transformé en un graphe incertain
en ajoutant de nouveaux liens (appelés liens potentiels) et en attribuant des probabilités de
liens. Les graphes de sortie sont produits à partir du graphe incertain en échantillonnant in-
dépendamment les liens. Les liens probabilistes peuvent être calculées explicitement comme
dans [11] ou implicitement par marches aléatoires [66]. Les performances des différents schémas
sont quantifiées par le niveau de vie privée et les métriques d’utilité. Les métriques de confi-
dentialité peuvent être des mesures de quantité d’information comme dans l’approche par (k, ε)-
obscurcissement [11] ou d’incorrection en fonction du degré (Chapitre 3). Les métriques d’utilité
couramment utilisées sont basées sur le degré de nœuds et les statistiques de chemin [12,100,107].
De toute évidence, plus il y a de liens potentiels et plus il y a de liens incertains (c’est-à-dire
la probabilité des liens se rapproche de 0.5), plus la vie privée est protégée (par exemple par
la baisse des risques de ré-identification) mais l’utilité décroit (la structure du graphe est défor-
mée). Tous les systèmes d’anonymisation visent à optimiser le compromis entre ces deux aspects
concurrents.
La vie privée différentielle [33] propose une définition formelle de la vie privée avec beaucoup
de propriétés intéressantes: pas d’hypothèses sur la capacité de calcul et les informations pos-
sédées par les attaquants, agnosticité par rapport aux types de données, composabilité [63]. Les
algorithmes de vie privée différentielle associent une quantité de bruit à la sensibilité du calcul
i.e., la variation du résultat du calcul suivant une (petite) variation de l’entrée (en ajoutant par
exemple un lien au graphe d’entrée), d’où le terme “différentiel”. Une faible sensibilité implique
moins de bruit à ajouter et vice-versa. Parce que les liens dans les graphes non-orientés et
simples sont généralement supposés indépendants, le mécanisme standard de Laplace est appli-
cable (en ajoutant par exemple un bruit de Laplace à chaque cellule de la matrice d’adjacence).
Cependant, cette approche peut sérieusement détériorer la structure du graphe. Des méthodes
récentes pour publier des graphes dans l’approche de la vie privée différentielle tentent de réduire
la sensibilité du graphe de différentes façons. Les schémas de [89, 100] utilisent dK-série [60]
pour résumer le graphe par une distribution des corrélations de degré. La sensibilité globale de
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Figure B.3: Détection de communautés: un bon regroupement (gauche), un regroupement bruité
(droit)
1K-série (resp. 2K-série) est 4 (resp. O(n)). Une sensibilité inférieure à O(
√
n) est proposée
dans [101] par une analyse spectrale des graphes. Les travaux les plus récents Density Explorer
Reconstruct (DER) [21] et HRG-MCMC [105] réduisent même la sensibilité du graphe à O(logn).
Toutefois, les deux admettent une complexité quadratique O(n2), limitant leur intérêt aux seuls
graphes de tailles moyennes.
B.2.2 Détection de Communautés Privées
Les structures communautaires sont très fréquentes dans les réseaux réels. Les réseaux soci-
aux proposent des groupes communautaires en fonction de la localisation géographique, des
intérêts, de la profession, etc... Des communautés apparaissent dans les réseaux d’information
(comme World Wide Web) sous la forme de groupes de pages se citant mutuellement. Les
réseaux métaboliques font émerger des communautés sur la base de groupements fonctionnels
de protéines. Réseaux de citations possèdent des communautés par sujet de recherche.
Pour la détection de communautés non-privées, nous disposons du vrai graphe et nous pou-
vons exécuter des algorithmes de détection de haute qualité afin d’ obtenir des groupes de nœuds
de bonne qualité. Les bons regroupements peuvent indiquer une modularité élevée, une faible
conductance, des nœuds semblables, etc. [38]. La Figure B.3 montre un exemple de détection
de communautés avec un bon regroupement et un regroupement bruité.
Dans le cadre de la détection de communautés privée, les données sont fournies sous forme
d’un graphe bruité sur lequel est appliqué un algorithme de détection. Le résultat est un ensemble
de communautés bruitées (et donc avec une modularité différente ou d’autres métriques sur la
qualité des regroupements considérés). Une alternative consiste à envoyer au gestionnaire de
données un certain nombre de requêtes sur le vrai graphe et à obtenir des réponses bruitées. Le
nombre de requêtes dépend du budget de vie privée qui nous est alloué (par exemple la valeur de
ε dans l’approche par la vie privée différentielle). Sur la base des réponses bruitées nous calculons
un regroupement bruité. Dans cette thèse, nous considérons la détection de communautés (sans
chevauchement) privée par la technique de vie privée différentielle.
B.2.3 Echange de Liens Privés
Les graphes sociaux sont une source précieuse pour l’étude des sociétés de l’information, mais ces
graphes ne sont pas publiés en clair pour des raisons de confidentialité. Au contraire, les graphes
sociaux sont publiés sous diverses formes anonymisées avant d’être donnés aux tiers consomma-
teurs. Dans l’architecture client-serveur classique des OSNs, le serveur conserve l’ensemble du
graphe social. Pour fournir des graphes échantillonnés bruités, le serveur peut exécuter des
programmes d’anonymisation sur le graphe social qu’il conserve. Si le graphe social est partagé
entre plusieurs serveurs, nous pouvons recourir à l’anonymisation distribuée, comme par ex-
emple dans [97]. Alternativement, les sites de réseaux sociaux fournissent des APIs (Facebook,
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Figure B.4: Echange de liens privés. Liens vrais sont en gras. Liens faux sont italiques
Twitter) pour les robots d’exploration de données avec des limitations sur leur vitesse et des con-
traintes sur la vie privée (par exemple uniquement les listes d’amis publics sont disponibles). En
utilisant cette méthode, les robots d’exploration de données peuvent recueillir des informations
privées et reconstruire une vue partielle (locale) du graphe social.
Pour surmonter les contraintes imposées par les fournisseurs de services, nous partons du
point de vue de l’utilisateur, c’est-à-dire d’un contributeur de l’OSN. Plus précisément, si les
utilisateurs collaborent avec précaution, ils peuvent échanger des listes d’amis bruitées avec leurs
voisins en plusieurs itérations pour obtenir une meilleure vue du graphe social réel. Nos idées
sont basées sur le fait que les identités des utilisateurs sont publiques (par exemple les profils
Facebook sont consultables [1]), mais les liens d’amitié ne le sont pas, sauf si un utilisateur met
sa liste d’amis en mode public. Dans cette thèse, nous introduisons un modèle différent dans
lequel les nœuds créent des listes de liens bruitées et les échangent avec leurs voisins en plusieurs
passes. Le problème est original dans le fait que les données diffusées sur les liens sont les liens
eux-mêmes. A la fin de la procédure, nous obtenons n graphes locaux où n est le nombre de
nœuds. Nous supposons que tous les nœuds sont honnêtes-mais-curieux, c’est-à-dire ils suivent
les protocoles bien définis et essaient d’en déduire les liens véritables à partir des listes de liens
bruitées qui leur sont envoyées. La Figure B.4 représente l’idée de base de l’échange de lien.
Chaque nœud ajoute du bruit à ses listes d’amis (en gras) en créant de faux liens (en italique).
Ensuite, les paires de nœuds connectés effectuent l’échange de liens et chaque nœud supprime
automatiquement les liens en double.
B.3 Contributions
Les trois problèmes ci-dessus sont présentés en détail successivement dans les Chapitres 3, 4, 5
et 6. Nous avons obtenu les contributions clés suivantes.
• Chapitre 3: Nous proposons un modèle général appelé matrice d’adjacence incertaine
(UAM) pour l’anonymisation de graphe via la sémantique de liens incertains. La propriété
clé de ce modèle est que les degrés attendus de tous les nœuds doivent être préservés dans
le graphe anonymisé. Nous montrons que (k, ε)-obf [11] et RandWalk [66] s’adaptent bien
à notre modèle, puis nous analysons leurs désavantages. Nous introduisons la technique de
Variance Maximizing (MaxVar) qui satisfait toutes les propriétés de l’UAM. Elle réalise
un bon compromis vie privée-utilité grace à deux observations clés: les liens potentiels sont
créés entre deux noeuds proches dans le graphe réel (et sont donc plausibles et utiles) et la
variance totale du degré d’un nœud est maximisée par un programme quadratique simple
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(améliorant l’incertitude sur le nombre de liens et donc l’anonymat). Afin d’établir une
méthodologie de comparaison équitable entre les schémas d’anonymisation de graphes,
cette thèse introduit un cadre de quantification générique mettant en avant la mesure
de distorsion (également appelé incorrection dans [92]) pour mesurer les risques de ré-
identification des nœuds. Concernant le score d’utilité, des mesures typiques de graphes
[11, 107] sont choisies. Nous menons une étude comparative des approches mentionnées
sur trois grands graphes du monde réel et montrons l’efficacité de nos solutions.
• Chapitre 4: Nous analysons les deux défis clés pour la publication de graphes avec
la technique de vie privée différentielle: l’immense espace des résultats possibles et la
notion de cohérence. Nous justifions aussi la relaxation de ε à lnn en utilisant le concept
de ρ-identifiabilité [52]. Nous prouvons une borne supérieure du budget de vie privée ε
que tout système différentiellement privé (pour des graphes) ne doit pas dépasser. La
limite supérieure est validée par notre schéma linéaire Top-m-Filter (TmF) et le schéma
EdgeFlip [69] obtenu par d’autres auteurs. Par une analyse théorique plus profonde, nous
prouvons la convergence rapide d’ EdgeFlip et révélons ses limites. TmF et EdgeFlip
présentent un comportement cohérent pour des régimes ayant un budget de vie privée
élevé. Nous introduisons HRG-FixedTree pour réduire le temps d’exécution du schéma
HRG inférence [105] par plusieurs ordres de magnitude, ce qui rend possible d’effectuer
l’inférence sur de grands graphes. Nous présentons également le schéma en temps linéaire
1K-série qui est basé sur le modèle de configuration [73]. Nous procédons à une évaluation
approfondie sur des graphes de tailles petites, moyennes et grandes pour étudier quelle
méthode fonctionne le mieux selon les différents régimes de vie privée.
• Chapitre 5: Nous analysons les défis majeurs de la détection de communautés dans la
vie privée différentielle [78]. Nous expliquons pourquoi des techniques empruntées à k-
Means échouent et comment la difficulté rencontrée avec les systèmes de recommandation
différentiellement privés justifie une relaxation de ε. Nous concevons un algorithme de per-
turbation d’entrée LouvainDP qui fonctionne en temps linéaire en utilisant la technique de
filtrage passe-haut de [26] et la méthode Louvain [9]. Nous proposons aussi un schéma de
perturbation d’algorithme ModDivisive, qui procède par division en utilisant la fonction
de score basée sur la modularité et le mécanisme exponentiel. Nous prouvons que la mod-
ularité a une faible sensibilité globale et ModDivisive fonctionne aussi en temps linéaire.
Nous procédons à une évaluation approfondie sur de vrais graphes de différentes tailles et
montrons le gain de performance de LouvainDP et ModDivisive sur l’état de l’art.
• Chapitre 6: Nous introduisons un problème d’échange de liens privés comme une al-
ternative à l’exploration de graphe social et l’anonymisation de données centralisée. Le
problème est distribué et offre un compromis de vie privée-utilité pour tous les nœuds.
Notre problème est unique en ce sens que les données diffusées sur les liens sont les liens
eux-mêmes. Nous présentons deux schémas pour (α, β)-échange: l’un avec des techniques
de base et l’autre basé sur les filtres de Bloom. Nous protégeons les liens privés en ajoutant
de faux liens et exigeons que la probabilité de propagation d’un lien soit atténuée avec la
distance entre l’origine et la destination du message. Nous analysons les avantages et les
désavantages de chaque schéma. Nous évaluons nos propositions de systèmes sur différents
modèles de graphes synthétiques et tirons un certain nombre de conclusions critiques.
Publications Certaines parties de cette thèse ont été publiées et soumises aux conférences
et revues suivantes:
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- H. H. Nguyen, A. Imine, and M. Rusinowitch. A Maximum Variance Approach for Graph
Anonymization (FPS 2014)
- H. H. Nguyen, A. Imine, and M. Rusinowitch. Anonymizing Social Graphs via Uncertainty
Semantics (ASIACCS 2015)
- H. H. Nguyen, A. Imine, and M. Rusinowitch. Differentially Private Publication of Social
Graphs at Linear Cost (ASONAM 2015)
- H. H. Nguyen, A. Imine, and M. Rusinowitch. Network Structure Release under Differential
Privacy (Transactions on Data Privacy, under 1st revision)
- H. H. Nguyen, A. Imine, and M. Rusinowitch. Detecting Communities under Differential
Privacy (WPES 2016)
- H. H. Nguyen, A. Imine, and M. Rusinowitch. Private Link Exchange over Social Graphs
(in preparation)
B.4 Vie Privée Différentielle: Une Introduction Brève
B.4.1 Motivation
Aujourd’hui, les données sont produites et collectées à un rythme phénoménal. L’analyse des
énormes masses de données apporte des avantages sans précédents, mais menace également la
vie privée des personnes. Nous devons faire face au défi paradoxal d’apprendre des informations
utiles sur une population [35] sans rien apprendre sur un individu. Beaucoup de solutions ont
été proposées pour résoudre ce paradoxe, mais pour chaque solution proposée de nouvelles vul-
nérabilités ont été trouvées. A la différence des paradigmes précédents, la vie privée différentielle
nous fournit une avancée prometteuse: peu importe ce que l’adversaire sait sur vous à partir de
sources d’information auxiliaires, votre participation à un ensemble de données ne pourra etre
déduite (d’où le nom vie privée “différentielle”).
La vie privée différentielle est un modèle formel de confidentialité initialement développé
pour des données tabulaires et offre des garanties de confidentialité solides sans dépendre de
la connaissance de l’adversaire, de sa puissance de calcul ou de son comportement ultérieur
[33, 35]. Parce que la protection absolue de vie privée est impossible (voir [32] et [35, Section
1.1]), la vie privée différentielle offre une protection relative (vie privée relative) qui se révèle
utile pour de nombreuses applications dans un large éventail de tâches d’analyse de données.
De plus la vie privée différentielle a des relations étroites avec d’autres domaines tels que la
cryptographie, les statistiques, la complexité, la combinatoire, la conception de mécanismes
(théorie des jeux) et l’optimisation. Des résultats importants sur la vie privée différentielle
sont présentés systématiquement dans [35] où les auteurs expliquent les aspects essentiels de ce
concept de protection de la vie privée.
Le principe de la vie privée différentielle est vérifié si deux bases de données D et D′ tel que
D′ = D∪{X}, c’est-à-direD etD′ ne diffèrent que par un seul élément, les distributions de prob-
abilités sur les résultats de D et D′ fournies par la vie privée différentielle sont “essentiellement
les mêmes”. Plus formellement,
Definition B.1. Un algorithme randomisé A est (ε, δ)-differentially private ((ε, δ)-DP en rac-
courci) si, pour deux ensembles quelconques de données voisins D and D′, et pour tout résultat
O ∈ Range(A),
Pr[A(D) ∈ O] ≤ eεPr[A(D′) ∈ O] + δ
Si δ = 0, nous avons la notion de ε-DP qui est prouvée plus stricte que (ε, δ)-DP [31],
c’est-à-dire (ε, δ)-DP nécessite moins de distorsion (bruit aléatoire) que ε-DP.
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Figure B.5: Interactif vs. Non-interactif
La vie privée différentielle assure simplement que la participation à un ensemble de données
ne sera pas révélée. Il est très possible que les conclusions tirées de l’ensemble de données
reflètent des informations statistiques sur un individu. Par exemple, étant donné un ensemble
de données de 100 personnes, 80 d’entre eux ont une certaine propriété P . Les réponses bruitées
aux requêtes sur la taille de l’ensemble de données et sur le nombre d’utilisateurs ayant la
propriété P sont, par exemple, 101.3 et 78.6 respectivement. De ces résultats, un analyste (ainsi
qu’un attaquant) peut estimer que tout utilisateur a la propriété P avec une probabilité de 77.6
%, très proche des statistiques réelles de 80 %. Cependant, ceci est une information statistique,
qui n’est pas liée à la participation d’un individu particulier à l’ensemble des données, comme
le garantit la vie privée différentielle.
Il existe deux approches connues pour publier des données dans le cadre de la vie privée
différentielle: le mode interactif et le mode non-interactif comme illustré sur la Figure B.5.
Dans un cadre non-interactif, le gestionnaire des données publie un ensemble de données bruitées
D̃ et s’arrête. Les utilisateurs peuvent effectuer toutes les opérations qu’ils souhaitent sur D̃.
Dans les dispositifs interactifs, les utilisateurs sont autorisés à présenter un certain nombre de
requêtes (qi, εi) où qi est la requête sur D et εi est le budget de qi tel que
∑
i εi ≤ ε. Cela signifie
qu’ après une requête, le budget de vie privée est réduit et quand il atteint zéro, il n’existe plus
de requêtes autorisées.
4.2 Compositions Rendant la Vie Privée Différentielle Programmable
Non seulement la vie privée différentielle est formellement définie mais elle est également équipé
de propriétés de composition intéressantes: la composition séquentielle et la composition paral-
lèle (voir la Section 4.2 pour plus de détails). La composition séquentielle signifie que lorsque
nous exécutons une série d’algorithmes randomisés Ai(εi) sur le même ensemble de données D,
le budget total de vie privée ε de l’opération sera la somme des εi. La composition parallèle stip-
ule que lorsque nous exécutons une série d’algorithmes randomisés Ai(εi) sur les sous-ensembles
disjoints Di de D, le budget effectif de vie privée de l’opération sera le maximum des εi.
Ces compositions permettent de décomposer de nombreux algorithmes complexes en étapes
dans lesquelles les mécanisme de Laplace et le mécanisme exponentielle jouent le rôle de blocs
de construction. Dans la plupart des cas, la preuve de ε-DP pour un algorithme donné est
obtenu automatiquement. La tâche qui reste pour les concepteurs d’algorithmes est de réduire
la variance des résultats aléatoires afin d’obtenir une meilleure utilité. À notre connaissance,
aucun des concepts de confidentialité antérieurs comme la k-anonymité [95], l-diversité [59],
t-proximité [54] et leurs variantes possède ces propriétés de composition.
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Résumé
La vie privée est une préoccupation des utilisateurs des réseaux sociaux. Les réseaux sociaux
offrent des services gratuits en échange d’informations personnelles. Les réseaux sociaux sont
aussi une source de données précieuses pour des analyses scientifiques ou commerciales. Le
problème de la protection des données privées au sein des réseaux sociaux demande des solu-
tions efficaces aussi bien dans des contextes centralisés que décentralisés. Cette thèse aborde
trois problèmes de confidentialité des réseaux sociaux: l’anonymisation de graphes sociaux, la
détection de communautés privées et l’échange de liens privés.
Nous abordons le problème d’anonymisation de graphes via deux sémantiques différentes: la
sémantique de l’incertitude et l’intimité différentielle. Pour la sémantique de l’incertitude, nous
proposons un modèle général appelé Uncertain Adjacency Matrix (UAM) qui préserve dans
le graphe anonymisé les degrés des noeuds du graphe non-anonymisé. Nous analysons deux
schémas proposés récemment et montrons leur adaptation dans notre modèle. Nous rappelons
également les inconvénients de chaque schéma et présentons notre approche dite MaxVar. Les
expériences sur de grands graphes sociaux démontrent l’efficacité de MaxVar. Pour la technique
d’intimité différentielle, le problème devient difficile en raison de l’énorme espace des graphes
anonymisés possibles. Un grand nombre de systèmes existants ne permettent pas de relâcher
le paramètre (appelé budget) contrôlant la vie privée, ni de déterminer sa borne supérieure.
Dans notre approche nous pouvons calculer cette borne. Nous introduisons le nouveau schéma
Top-m-Filter de complexité linéaire et améliorons la technique récente EdgeFlip. L’évaluation
de ces algorithmes sur une large gamme de graphes donne un panorama de l’état de l’art.
Nous présentons le problème original de la détection de la communauté dans le cadre de
l’intimité différentielle. Un grand nombre d’algorithmes pour la détection de communautés
ont été proposées. Cependant, ils ne protègent pas la vie privée. Nous analysons les défis
majeurs du problème et nous proposons quelques approches pour les aborder sous deux angles:
par perturbation d’entrée et par perturbation d’algorithme. Pour la perturbation d’entrée, nous
proposons la méthode LouvainDP qui applique l’ algorithme Louvain sur un super-graphe bruité.
Dans la seconde approche nous proposons ModDivisive qui utilise le mécanisme exponentiel avec
la modularité comme score. Nous avons évalué nos techniques sur des graphes réels de différentes
tailles et montré leur performance par rapport à l’état-de-l’art.
Certains réseaux sociaux en ligne connus conservent des données privées de manière cen-
tralisée, ce qui empêche les utilisateurs d’avoir une vue globale même approximative du graphe
social. Nous montrons comment traiter ce problème dans le cas des listes d’amis avec des utilisa-
teurs qui collaborent avec précaution, en échangeant des listes d’amis bruitées avec leurs voisins
en plusieurs étapes. La solution est donc un protocole d’échange simple que nous avons pu
évaluer sur différents modèles de graphes synthétiques. Le problème est unique en ce sens que
les données diffusées sur les liens sont les liens eux-mêmes.
Mots-clés: Réseaux sociaux, Incertaine matrice d’adjacence, Maximum Variance, Vie privée
différentielle, Top-m-Filte, détection de communautés, LouvainDP, ModDivisive, Echange intime
des liens, (α, β)-échange
Abstract
Privacy is a serious concern of users in daily usage of social networks, especially when online
social networks offer free services in exchange for large collection of user information. At the same
time, social networks are a valuable data source for large-scale studies on social organization and
evolution and are usually published in anonymized forms. On the other side, by participating
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to social networks, users keep their own data and they may use the infrastructure of service
providers to gather local views of the network to some extent not only restricted to 1-hop
friends, for example by exchanging noisy links. To this end, the problems of privacy protection
for social network data are still calling for effective and efficient approaches both in centralized
and decentralized settings.
This thesis addresses three privacy problems of social networks: graph anonymization, pri-
vate community detection and private link exchange. The main goal is to provide new paradigms
for anonymization of social graphs, private community detection as well as distributed aggrega-
tion of graphs via noisy link exchange processes. We start the thesis by giving the big picture
of data privacy in social networks and clarify the categories to which our work belongs. Then
we go to the three contributions as follows.
First, we tackle the problem of graph anonymization via two different semantics: uncertainty
semantics and differential privacy. As for uncertainty semantics, we propose a general obfusca-
tion model called Uncertain Adjacency Matrix (UAM) that keep expected node degrees equal
to those in the unanonymized graph. We analyze two recently proposed schemes and show their
fitting into the model. We also point out disadvantages in each method and present our scheme
Maximum Variance (MaxVar) to fill the gap between them. Experiments on large social graphs
demonstrate the effectiveness of MaxVar.
Using differential privacy, the problem is very challenging because of the huge output space of
noisy graphs. A large body of existing schemes on differentially private release of graphs are not
consistent with increasing privacy budgets as well as do not clarify the upper bounds of privacy
budgets. In this thesis, such a bound is provided. We introduce the new linear scheme Top-m-
Filter (TmF) and improve the existing technique EdgeFlip. Thorough comparative evaluation
on a wide range of graphs provides a panorama of the state-of-the-art’s performance as well as
validates our proposed schemes.
Second, we present the problem of community detection under differential privacy. A great
number of algorithms for community detection have been proposed to deal with the increasingly
complex networks. However, the problem of doing this in a private manner is rarely considered.
We analyze the major challenges behind the problem and propose several schemes to tackle them
from two perspectives: input perturbation and algorithm perturbation. For input perturbation,
we propose the method LouvainDP which runs Louvain algorithm on a noisy super-graph. For
algorithm perturbation, we design ModDivisive using exponential mechanism with the modular-
ity as the score. We have thoroughly evaluated our techniques on real graphs of different sizes
and verified their outperformance over the state-of-the-art.
Finally, we propose protocols for private link exchange over social graphs. It is motivated
by the fact that current online social networks (OSN) keep their data secret and in centralized
manner. To overcome this constraint, we may start from user perspective. More precisely, if
users cautiously collaborate with one another, they can exchange noisy friend lists with their
neighbors in several rounds to get better views of the true social graph. The problem is unique
in the sense that the disseminated data over the links are the links themselves. We propose
simple (α, β)-exchange protocols and evaluate them on various synthetic graph models.
Keywords: Social networks, Uncertain Adjacency Matrix, Maximum Variance, Differential
privacy, Top-m-Filter, Community detection, LouvainDP, ModDivisive, Private link exchange,
(α, β)-exchange
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